

084097
JPRS-NEA-85-010

23 January 1985

Near East/South Asia Report

DISC QUALITY

19980306 148

FBIS

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

REPRODUCED BY
NATIONAL TECHNICAL
INFORMATION SERVICE
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

Approved for public release;
Distribution Unlimited

6
123
A06

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

23 January 1985

NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA REPORT

CONTENTS

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

- Terrorist Action Leaves Six Wounded in Paris
(LE MONDE, 27 Nov 84) 1

ARAB AFRICA

ALGERIA

- Algeria's Oil Minister Interviewed
(Belkacem Nabi Interview; AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO,
No 32, 17 Dec 84) 3

EGYPT

- Shortage of Imams Discussed
(AL-AHRAR, 1 Nov 84) 5
- Negative Attitudes Toward Press Examined
(AL-AHRAR, 1 Nov 84) 10
- New Alexandria Port Facilities Discussed
(AKHIR SA'AH, No 2611, 7 Nov 84) 14
- People's Assembly Deputy Speaker Discusses Legislative Issues
(AKHIR SA'AH, No 2612, 14 Nov 84) 16

SUDAN

- Various Supreme Court Judges Praise Shift to Islamic Law
(Adil Silahi; AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, various dates) 21

ARAB EAST/ISRAEL

IRAQ

Foreign Ministry Changes Reported (AL-TADAMUN, No 79, 13 Oct 84)	35
Names of National Assembly Members Published (AL-THAWRAH, No 345, 22 Oct 84)	37

ISRAEL

Langer Criticizes Israeli Domestic, Foreign Policies (Felicia Langer Interview; LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, No 47, 21 Nov 84)	47
Foreign Trade Balance Improving (ISRAEL BUSINESS, No 401, Dec 84)	52
Exports to Arab Nations (ISRAEL BUSINESS, No 401, Dec 84)	54
El Al Operating on Profit Again (ISRAEL BUSINESS, No 400, Nov 84)	56
Liquid Coal Production Begun (INNOVATION, No 108, Nov 84)	58
New Industry in Jerusalem (ISRAEL BUSINESS, No 400, Nov 84)	59
Briefs Phosphate Production Expanding	60

LEBANON

Birri Discusses Contacts in U.S., Situation in South Lebanon (Nabih Birri Interview; AL-TADAMUN, No 82, 3 Nov 84)	61
Phalangists Lose Confidence in Israeli Role (AL-TADAMUN, No 79, 13 Oct 84)	66
Rifts in Shi'ite Movement Analyzed (AL-TADAMUN, No 82, 3 Nov 84)	69
Pros, Cons of Selling Gold Reserves Debated (Ibrahim 'Awadah; AL-TADAMUN, No 84, 17 Dec 84)	72
Militias Prepare for Struggle in Iqlim al-Kharrub (AL-TADAMUN, No 84, 17 Dec 84)	75

Al-Jumayyil Moves to Weaken Opposition (Husayn Karim; AL-TADAMUN, No 85, 24 Dec 84)	81
Briefs	
Private Sector Debt	84
MEA 20 Million Dollar Loan	84
Reconstruction Bank Proposal	84
SAUDI ARABIA	
Private Sector Difficulties Examined (AL-TADAMUN, No 80, 20-26 Oct 84)	86
Diversification of Industrial Base Sought (AL-TADAMUN, No 80, 20-26 Oct 84)	90
SYRIA	
Government Briefs Klibi on Arab Unification (Marwan al-Mahayini; AL-MUSTAQBAL, No 402, 3 Nov 84)	93
Briefs	
Al-Asad Moscow Visit	94
SOUTH ASIA	
AFGHANISTAN	
Government Forces Kill Over 200 in Retaliation (KEYHAN, 12 Dec 84)	95
Mujahidin Reportedly Fighting Effectively on All Fronts (KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL, 16 Dec 84)	96
Pakistan Urges International Solution to Afghan Problem (KEYHAN, 17 Dec 84)	100
Briefs	
Guerrillas Reportedly Surrender	101
IRAN	
German-Swedish Company To Purchase Food Products (BURS, 21 Nov 84)	102
Talks for Trade Expansion With Albania Underway (BURS, 27 Nov 84)	103
Close Trade Relations Between Iran, South Korea Cited (TEHRAN TIMES, 22 Dec 84)	104

Article Examines 5-Year Development Plan (KEYHAN, 6 Dec 84)	106
Fars Power Plant Reportedly Under Construction (KEYHAN, 12 Dec 84)	109
Montazeri: Positions Must Be Filled by Qualified Military (KEYHAN, 15 Dec 84)	110
PAKISTAN	
Baluchistan Governor: Arms Trickling Into Our Country (DAWN, 20 Dec 84)	111
Economic Policies, Planning Criticized (Shahid Kardar; DAWN, 22 Dec 84)	112
Referendum Mandate for Zia Hailed (DAWN, 22 Dec 84)	115
Briefs	
Prisoners Pardoned in Punjab	116
Zia Remits Prisoners' Sentences	116
Arrested for Distributing Pamphlets	116
Ghafoor on Referendum Voting	116
Election Arrangements Reviewed	117

TERRORIST ACTION LEAVES SIX WOUNDED IN PARIS

Paris LE MONDE in French 27 Nov 84 p 37

/Text/ On 25 November at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, an attack was committed in front of the entrance to Pleyel Hall in Paris (8th) shortly before the opening of a gala dedicated to the 64th anniversary of the creation of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Armenia, one of the 15 republics of the USSR. Six persons were injured, one of them seriously. This Monday morning, 26 November, no one had yet claimed credit for the attack, which is the fourth since the beginning of the year.

The celebration of Armenian national rebirth, which nearly 2,000 people were to have attended, has been taking place annually in France for 30 years. This gala, organized by 16 movements and associations of Armenians, commemorates the creation, on 29 November 1920, of Soviet Armenia, where many Armenians persecuted by the Turks were able to find refuge. One of the members of the organizing committee explains: "Since our physical existence was threatened, the creation of this province made it possible to stop the massacres."

Shortly before the beginning of the spectacle, a medium-sized bomb was placed in front of the hall, although the doors of Pleyel Hall had not yet been opened. The device blew a hole nearly a meter in diameter and numerous window panes were blown out. No police officers were present in front of the hall at the time of the attack. Due to a shortage of personnel, the management of Pleyel Hall refused to postpone the gala to late Sunday afternoon after the attack as the organizers wished.

Numerous Armenians, shocked by the event, remained around Pleyel Hall into the early evening. There were some disagreements among the crowd present concerning the interpretation given to the event. If the organizers of the gala remained circumspect concerning the origin of the attack, the militants of the National Armenian Movement /NMA/ were not so prudent. "Murderous Turks," shouted the youngest among them. And Mr Jean-Marc Toranian, spokesman for the National Armenian Movement, declared: "This is a new intimidation maneuver by the Turks to frighten the Armenian community and demobilize it. It is not by chance that this act occurs several days after the attack which cost a Turkish diplomat his life in Vienna."

Reactions

Last 19 November, in fact, a Turkish diplomat stationed at the UN center in Vienna, Mr Evner Ergun, was killed in his car, right in the center of the Austrian capital. The Armenian Revolutionary Army /ARA/ took credit for that attack.

The MNA calls "all Armenian and democratic communities" to a protest march on Tuesday, 27 November at 6:30 in the evening from Pleyel Hall to the Turkish embassy.

Reactions have been numerous. Mr Pierre Joxe, minister of the interior, after harshly condemning the attack, added on Sunday evening to Europe 1: "One cannot hope, however, that a few hours after a criminal explosion, the police will lay their hands on the murderer as if he showed up spontaneously. It is very rare for criminals to show up spontaneously at the police station."

The organizing committee for the gala considers that this act: "fits into the pattern of violent acts that we have always condemned, which aim to institute a climate of insecurity and hatred, harming Franco-Armenian friendship and, beyond that, between peoples and peace. /sic/"

Finally, the France-USSR Association condemns the attack. Mr Gerard Jacquet, a former minister, a member of the national presidency of the France-USSR Association, was to have presided at the gala and address the gathering. The association declares: "We assure the organizing committee of the anniversaries of Soviet Armenia of our strong support in this circumstance. This odious attack will not end our desire to develop, in the national interest and in the interest of peace, mutual knowledge, friendship, cooperation between France, Soviet Armenia and other peoples of the USSR."

9895

CSO: 4619/13

ALGERIA

ALGERIA'S OIL MINISTER INTERVIEWED

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 32, 17 Dec 84 pp 8-9

[Interview with Belkacem Nabi, Minister of Energy, Chemical and Petrochemical Industries]

[Text]

How does Algeria see the current oil market and what measures does it expect to be agreed at the Geneva meeting?

The position of Algeria was made very clear at the last Geneva meeting. We said then that the proposed reduction of Opec output was not enough and might not have the expected effect upon the world oil market. I am sorry to see that we were quite right. The last production cut did not produce the desired effect. Some people said then that de-stocking would amount to between 500,000 and one million b/d. We said it would be three million. Again, I am sorry to say, we have been proved right. This does not mean that we had an exclusive key to what was going to happen. It was always quite clear that within the context of the current economic crisis — the high dollar and high interest rates — there are plenty of reasons why industrial countries should press down on oil prices, particularly Opec prices. The current situation is not good and we should not try to hide that fact. We should not pretend that things are good under the pretext that this provides the right psychological context. If Opec is still committed to defending the \$29 marker price, we shall have to look at the situation clearly and take the right decisions.

What are they?

Let us start by being serious. This, first of all, means treating all Opec members equally. Secondly, Opec decisions should be clear. They must be precise, without leaving any vagueness that could be harmful to the proper execution of its decisions. Thirdly, we should not undertake to defend at all cost and at one and the same time the interests of Opec states, of the

multinationals and the industrialised countries. We run the risk of defending none of them. If the oil price should drop, it would be counter to the interests of all of us, consumers and producers.

Sheikh Yamani of Saudi Arabia said at the meeting that the marker price would certainly be maintained at the next Opec conference and that the current situation was only temporary. But we've been hearing that "this situation is temporary" for months now. What is going to happen to prices at the next meeting?

What Sheikh Zaki said is very important. If Saudi Arabia wants to defend the \$29-a-barrel marker, as I believe it does, and it produces its oil at the appropriate level, there is no reason to believe that the current marker price cannot be defended.

However there must be greater compatibility between words and deeds. This is not a matter of personal conviction or commitment: it is simple arithmetic. As long as the industrialised countries are able to play on the production of both Opec and non-Opec producers, on their stocks and on the consumption estimates that the Opec producers take for granted, they will be able to apply pressure and get a reduction in the price of oil. I think that the statements from some politicians and officials in the industrialised countries are indicative of this.

The next conference is expected to re-align price differentials. Do you think that adjustments within, say, 30 to 50 cents a barrel will be sufficient?

I said we have to be serious. The differentials problem is serious and important. It is not serious to try to limit the adjustments within this limit.

For the next Opec conference, should seriousness begin at 16mn b/d, or at some lower ceiling?

Seriousness begins with every Opec country announcing every week its official production target. I would have no objection to Sonatrach's doing this every week. It is very unfortunate: everybody publishes estimates of Opec production, except Opec, itself. This is very worrying, because an international organisation that does not make its presence felt internationally and leaves it to others to describe its activities in any way they wish is an organisation that has problems.

But do you think that even with a serious commitment to hold production to 16mn b/d, you can defend the \$29-a-barrel price?

I don't like to deal with predicted figures. There are known parameters that will allow us to fix the required output so as to have an orderly market. We in Algeria do not believe that we should build a policy based on how much is to be consumed in the Western industrialised countries, or how much they should draw on their reserves. In this issue, they are not neutral. We have an alternative. There are other

indicators that would allow us to devise a policy that best protects our interests as members of Opec.

What is your estimate of current demand?

I don't have one and I don't want to make one.

What about on demand forecasts?

There are no two views the same on demand — whether we're talking about the short- or the long-term. First, we have to know what the world economic forecast is, in the long- or short-term. I don't know anybody who could correctly answer that. The main cause of the reduction in oil demand is the recession. But conservation and the development of alternative energy sources also play a role.

So, to sum up: are you worried?

There are as many reasons to be worried as not to be. If Opec countries realise, at long last, that the current passivity is costing us a lot, and if they realise that what we have to do is not directed against anybody but should only allow us to protect a price that has been frozen for a number of years, and if our discussions are frank and conducted in a spirit of equality, I think we can save the situation and improve the current one.

There was talk at the OAPEC meeting of Algeria's having a dry-dock. Some experts are arguing that it would be uneconomic. What is the position?

OAPEC made a study to determine where and under what conditions a dry-dock should be built to take advantage of the growing demand for such facilities both inside and outside the Arab world. The report put Algeria at the top of the list of possible sites because it satisfied all the appropriate conditions, geographical, economic and so on. The decision to implement the project was taken on June 7th 1980. Since that date, we've gone from one postponement to another. I admit, there were problems on the Algerian side because we twice had to change the site. We had to find a spot that was suitable for the project but which avoided ecological damage. We opted for the site where Algeria is also building a new port. In fact, the dry-dock is going to be a supplementary basin in a port that is already going to be built. The project is viable. The study undertaken by the consultant appointed by the OAPEC secretary-general indicates clearly the viability of the project. It is an infrastructural project. But it seems that some countries consider that times are difficult. This has not been said officially, but we have received the impression from some of the statements made at the meeting. But Algeria is not asking for the project. Algeria has simply agreed to be the country where the project is to be implemented, and it will be the first intra-Arab project in Algeria. Now, the meeting decided that member-governments should write directly, setting out their positions and indicating their willingness to participate.

SHORTAGE OF IMAMS DISCUSSED

Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 1 Nov 84 p 6

[Text] The mosque has been at the center of the spread of education and Islamic teachings and the focal point for the memorization of the Koran and the study of the Prophet's Hadith.

The imam and the preacher play the pivotal role in these centers. Today most mosques are without imams or preachers as graduates have gone into teaching or the teacher abroad loan program due to living conditions. The number of preachers in Egypt has declined to 3,500, whereas the number of mosques in the country totals 50,000. This means that 46,000 mosques do not have preachers. This phenomenon poses the threat that the mosques in Cairo and all of the governorates will cease to perform their mission.

What is behind this serious phenomenon? Some believe that the reason for it is that preachers leave this profession due to the lack of material incentives. Others say that the reason is a question of devotion and professionalism, not arming the preacher with the weapon of faith, and the weak convictions of some youth.

For answers to these questions, we met with many men of religion. Following are their views.

Minister of Religious Trusts Confesses

At the first conference of members of the teaching staff held in Iman Muhammad 'Abdul Hall at al-Azhar University, Minister of State for Religious Trusts Dr Muhammad al-Ahmadi Abu-al-Nur acknowledged that the Ministry of Religious Trusts oversees 3,500 mosques, although there are more than 50,000 mosques in Egypt. Therefore, there are 46,000 mosques without preachers.

The minister added that there is a rift between the imam and the people who pray in the mosque, and this rift cannot be eliminated unless the imam earns a level of confidence in his education, practice, teaching and grasp of subject matter. Therefore, we are looking for pious, practicing, educated preachers. The minister said that al-Azhar University must provide the ministry with qualified preachers for this purpose.

Minister of Religious Trusts' Request

The minister of religious trusts asked the professors at al-Azhar University to fulfill their role at the pulpits with distinction. He said that the number of mosques whose people complain that there is no imam or preacher is great. He added that the ministry is prepared to provide aid to students of the College of Religious Principles and the Religious Call College through incentives for superior students and aid from the al-Azhar institutes so that this rift can be eliminated.

Complete Renunciation of Material Dimension

Dr Ibrahim al-Khuli, professor of rhetoric and debate in the Arabic Language College at al-Azhar University, differs with the minister of religious trusts on the question of preachers who have left the mosque. He says that the problem is not one of material incentives, and that the problem will absolutely not be solved from this material premise because the first requirement for sincere teachings from a sincere preacher is the absolute renunciation--which should not be influenced negatively or positively--of anything that is viewed in the material context.

The Religious Call: Devotion and Professionalism

Dr al-Khuli stresses that if we want the correct encouragement of the call to religion, then the aspects of this call must be studied in terms of devotion and professionalism. Through this study, one must conclude that the positive inducements are those which reflect positively on the call and on society. One must also conclude where the negative factors are hidden which strip the call of its essence even though they are financially rewarding.

He added, "Another thing is the characteristics of the preacher, whether or not that preacher is a specialist. I don't just mean the official preacher who devotes himself to the religious call after he graduates from the specialized institutes, from the al-Azhar institutes to college level institutes. It is obvious that the preacher must have memorized the Koran, the Prophet's Sunna, religious decisions, and the Shari'ah, and he must be familiar with the problems of society."

"Many of those who join the Religious Call College or the Religious Principles College at al-Azhar do not have the educational preparation or level necessary to acquire the characteristics with which the Muslim preacher and mosque imam must be armed. Enrollment in the Religious Call College or the Religious Principles College should not be punishment for those whose grades do not qualify them to enroll in the practical colleges at al-Azhar such as the colleges of medicine and engineering."

Correcting Scripture, Hadith

Dr al-Khuli asks, "It is not backwards that those who are praying in the mosque are the ones who correct the scripture quoted by the "preacher" to

make a point or the Hadith that he recites? Is it not contradictory that we should listen to a speaker who interprets what God has said? It has been decided by Muslim scholars that the Koran is not to be recited with interpretations. What confidence can be built between the Muslim public and such a preacher who is imposed upon the people because of his certificate, not his competence?"

University Professor's Letter to Minister of Religious Trusts Dr Ibrahim al-Khuli, professor of debate and rhetoric, recommends to the Minister of Religious Trusts, who is said to have allocated a huge sum of money for the renovation of al-Azhar buildings, that, rather than begin preoccupied with renovating the buildings, it would be better to direct this money to filling the gap in the memorization of the Koran. It would be a more righteous gesture to the call to religion and to Muslims who donate their money to this call to reward students who memorize the entire Koran with a prize of 1,000 pounds and to award large sums and assistance to students at the various stages of their education. If the Ministry of Religious Trusts allocated 10 million pounds over 5 years for this noble purpose, amazing results would be achieved. There would be 10,000 students who will have perfectly memorized the Book of God and who could then take jobs as clerics and utilize their craft fighting the enemies of Islamic thought. The problem of the call to religion will continue until the problem of a lack of devotion and professionalism is solved.

Arming Preacher with Weapon of Faith--Koran and Sunna Dr 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Qadir, a religious call instructor in the College of Religious Principles at al-Azhar University, believes that the reason there are so few preachers at the mosques is that there is a shortage of true preachers who are faithful and who practice what they preach and confirm God's scripture "Oh, ye believers who do not speak as you act, great is God's loathing for those who preach what they do not practice." A rift has appeared between the preacher and his subjects. The true preacher is one who applies to himself and his family what he says to the public. Then he can order the public to apply what he preaches. If he does this, his call will achieve great success in society.

Lack of Conviction

Shaykh Ahmad Farhat, the imam at the al-Husayn mosque states that the aversion of youth and preachers to work in the mosques is attributable to the materialistic views of graduates these days. This is a matter that can be treated by providing a respectable life to this group and instituting salaries and benefits that will maintain their dignity in society.

Shaykh Ahmad Farhat adds that the Ministry of Religious Trusts is considering giving the preacher, in addition to a salary, housing, clothing and other incentives so that graduates will accept this work.

Excessive Cost of Living

Shaykh Zayn Muhammad, an imam and preacher at the Jamal Abd-al-Nasir mosque located at the al-Qibbah overpass, agrees with his colleague Ahmad Farhat and says that preachers are leaving the mosques, not because of a lack of devotion, but because they are concerned about the following matters:

- 1) The preacher is a recent graduate from one of the colleges at al-Azhar University and wants to get an apartment or has a family and has to face an exorbitant cost of living. In either case he resorts to looking for another job that will provide a livelihood.
- 2) Or the preacher is weak in the Prophet's Hadith and the memorization of the Holy Koran, so he leaves this job which requires effort and toil from him. He would rather be a teacher so he will have his chance in the future to go on a teacher loan program.

Preparatory Side/Social Side

Shaykh Hanafi 'Abd-al-'Aziz, formerly the Ministry of Religious Trusts' envoy to Tanzania and the head imam at al-Minufiyah religious trusts, comments that the problem of the departure from the mosques of preachers has two aspects:

There is a preparatory aspect and an interpersonal or social aspect. Al-Azhar, as a respected Islamic university, is responsible for the preparatory side. It must graduate men who above all else have a thorough legal knowledge of their religion and who can publish and defend the religion. This is the work of al-Azhar and its primary mission.

Al-Azhar is not solely responsible. The primary responsibility is to improve al-Azhar, which has not provided society with men who can confront the tremendous accumulation of corrupt trends.

Preachers Without Koran

Shaykh Hanafi adds, "By God, how can there be preachers without the Koran? The first steps on the road to reform at al-Azhar must be the return of respect for the Book of God and the requirement that students in the university's courtyards memorize the mighty Book of God. Al-Azhar should not grant degrees from any of its colleges except to those who have memorized the entire Koran."

"The public is subjected to preachers' stammering and stuttering of the Koran at prayer time, during mosque sermons and daily studies. This greatly diminishes the value of the preacher. In fact, it causes them to lose the confidence of the public. The Koran is the focal point of the religious call to God."

What About Preachers' Rights?

Al-Shaykh Hanafi adds, "As for the second aspect, the interpersonal or social aspect, I do not believe that there is a preacher who is not concerned about

his position and the state's appreciation of him. How can he work under the pressure of economic conditions while there are other sectors to which the state pays more attention? The preacher is not less important than those in other sectors."

12608

CSO: 4504/97

NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARD PRESS EXAMINED

Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 1 Nov 84 p 3

[Text] Nahlah Abu-al-'Ala wrote: "Press talk! This is a phrase circulating on the tongues of the people. It reflects a lack of confidence between the newspaper and the reader and between the reader and the government official as a result of what the newspapers publish."

AL-AHRAR presents this subject in a sincere effort to erase this phrase from people's minds--both the reader and the official. But before this, we ask along with others the reasons behind this notion that the people have.

We interviewed a number of senior media professors and experts in addition to some newspaper readers.

Old Phrase

Dr Khalil Sabat, journalism professor at the college of journalism, says that the phrase "press talk" is as old as the press in Egypt. It signifies to the reader that a piece of news is suspect or that the news was printed in a hurry and is incorrect and imprecise. To me it means, beyond this, a disdain for the reader and a weak conscience on the part of the journalist who accepts that he--and the honorable occupation he has chosen--become a rumor monger and a publisher of false news. Freedom of the press or freedom of communication or what we refer to today as the right to communicate means the right of every individual to know the truth and the whole truth. If we truly consider ourselves to be a democracy, then knowledge of the truth is a right. In other words, the citizen who truly wants to participate in the governing of his country either knows the reality around him or is treated like a child, that is, the truth--the whole truth--is hidden from him. Freedom is that which respects the mind of the reader and only presents him with the truth.

Media obfuscation or media emptiness are attempts doomed to failure. They are aimed at hiding certain news or events from the masses in fear of the possible reaction. Experience has shown that media obfuscation only disgraces and destroys the confidence of the people in those who hide the truth from them. After this, it becomes difficult to restore this confidence. In our recent history, there have been numerous events that the ruling regime has

tried to hide from the people, but the opposition media have exposed these efforts to hide the news.

Dr. Khalil Sabat adds that this hiding of the news is a phenomenon that must be eliminated because in most cases this leads to the publication of rumors concerning the news or the topic which was intended to be hidden from the public. It is better for the ruling authorities to tell the public the truth no matter how painful, than to hide it from them. Those with evil intentions will spread distorted news to the public, which will be quick to believe it. Afterwards, it is difficult to correct the story.

Dr Sabat adds, "Finally, let me say that concealing the news is incompatible with freedom of expression, without which the individual is not an individual."

Media Education

Dr Ibrahim 'Abduh, professor of journalism, says, "The phrase 'press talk' that is commonly used by the people means a lie or a distortion or the censorship of a column by the press management. From the days of Muhammad 'Ali, the only accurate thing that was published was in the paper AL-WAQA'I' AL-MASRIYAH [official gazette]. The other papers were not objects of esteem or respect. All of the newspapers, whether government or opposition, represent 'press talk.' This also means that the news published in them is subject to doubt. This media obfuscation is a national catastrophe and unfortunately the issue is in the hands of people who do not have the incentive to tell the truth because the truth is painful. However, the duty of the state and every journalist that respects the profession is to tell the truth. The newspapers must not hide truths from the public. They may be important facts that might lead to disasters. For example, we heard in foreign broadcasts about the problem of mines in the Red Sea. This forced the newspapers to write about it after the story had been broadcast by foreign broadcasts, we would not have known about this matter at all. This is a disaster. We are pursuing the trend that we began toward democracy. Democracy is still moving forward slowly and it must not be impeded by hiding the truth from the public because this leads to disasters. For example, we heard about the spread of cholera in a certain region, yet the newspapers and other media said nothing about this matter. In addition, there was defeat [1967 war]--the reprehensible defeat--yet they called it a setback. If that was a setback, then what is a defeat?"

After the experts, AL-AHRAR met with citizens to determine their feelings and opinions concerning the meaning of this phrase and the extent to which they are affected by it.

Muhammad Samir Wahbah, headmaster at Dar al-Mu'allimin in Bab al-Luq, says about the use of the phrase press talk, "In some cases I find the words of the press convincing and at other times I find it impossible to believe, such as when officials promise to do something but the problems remain unsolved. I have not had confidence in the visual, voice and print media since the June 1967 war when the supposed victory was proclaimed. The news and

trends that most of the papers publish turn out to be merely for consumption. Despite this, confidence could be restored between the people and the national newspapers and radio if they were to publish and broadcast all of the facts clearly and quickly without distortion. The opposition papers try to present the truth to the people, and this is what attracts the public to them to compare the news in them with the news in the papers called national papers."

Engineer Mukhtar Sayf-al-Din, who lives in al-Qalyubiyah, says that some of the things that the newspapers publish and that we hear on the radio and television might not be true, such as the fantastic numbers of completed housing units. He says, "Although I am thoroughly convinced that apartments are not distributed fairly, this does not mean that the news is untrue or that housing units are not being completed, but certainly they are not being completed at this high rate."

Muhammad Hasani says, "Regardless of what is published in the national papers, there are shortcomings in the coverage of some news stories. As for radio and television, they suffer from a lack of timeliness in reporting the news. They do not report the news at the appropriate time and this leads people to listen to the news on foreign stations."

Private citizen and taxi driver Hasani Ahmad Hasani says, "I am not convinced by what is published in the papers or broadcast by the other media until after it has been demonstrated to be true. I don't believe anything about the promises that have not been fulfilled."

He added, "I prefer to read the opposition papers because they publish the truth about conferences, meetings and subjects about which the public likes to be constantly reassured."

'Adil al-Maraghi, party secretary in Shubra al-Khaymah, says that the public repeats the phrase "press talk" in a way that nearly confirms their belief that freedom of the press and democracy are only superficial phenomena and that the newspapers do not tell the truth, or do not tell most of it.

As for television and radio, these may conceal news stories or topics that concern the citizen while the international stations broadcast this news. The citizen then feels that the media in his country is deceiving him or concealing the truth from him.

The great writer Najib Mahfuz commented on what the newspapers publish concerning projects. He said, "The newspapers report about projects, but if we tried to record all of these projects in a notebook, we would find that these projects could provide for an entirely new country if they were completed. What is published is one thing, but what is accomplished is something else altogether. Monitoring, determination and oversight are required to complete these projects."

Muhsim Jamal-al-Din, a private citizen and laborer, adds that this phrase has become a fixed slogan for the press and journalists in our country. In fact, journalists have long been considered among the weaker groups. Journalists have not been prestigious or highly regarded people. Therefore, the view of newspapers and magazines has emerged that even if they changed and improved significantly, there would still be these remnants. We hope that these can be completely eliminated in the presence of true democracy and complete freedom of the press and freedom for journalists.

12608

CSO: 4504/97

EGYPT

NEW ALEXANDRIA PORT FACILITIES DISCUSSED

Cairo AKHIR SA'AH in Arabic No 2611, 7 Nov 84 p 45

[Text] For the first time, a new company has been established in the port of Alexandria to load and unload cargo ships. This will allow the port of Alexandria to follow world development in the speedy transport of goods to and from container ships and avoid backlogs.

For the first time, new cargo stations have been constructed on piers 49 - 54 with funds from the International Bank for Construction and Development. The project will cost 30 million Egyptian pounds.

The new company will be funded with a capital of 20.5 million pounds. It will be equipped with the most modern equipment available for loading and unloading in order to control the administration of the new station. So indicated Captain Badr-al-Din Muhammad Ibrahim, president of the new company's administrative committee. He said that the new equipment included two pier cranes to transport cargo to and from the piers, and two yard cranes to move the goods from the dock to the trucks and vice versa. They have very high capacity and are able to move 20 to 25 containers in an hour, which is an average of about 250-300 tons an hour. This represents the loading and unloading capabilities for 24 hours for a normal ship. The loading and unloading capabilities of the Port of Alexandria will increase from the several days required before the new company was established, to several hours, an increase of 2.5 million tons yearly, or the equivalent of 120,000 containers per year. During phase two of the project, the number of cranes will be increased to three pier cranes and six yard cranes, thereby increasing the station capabilities to 165,000 cartons per year.

This was decided by the prime minister when he appointed Commodore Badr-al-Din Ibrahim president of the administrative council of the Alexandria Company for the Transfer of Cargo on 30 October 1984. The company is currently receiving the container station project from the port authority after establishing its administration.

Who is the President of the Alexandria Company for the Transfer of Cargo?

The president of the company is Captain Badr-al-Din Muhammad Ibrahim. He was born in 1933, is married, and has children. He is fluent in English, French, and Russian.

He received his baccalaureate in naval science in 1955 and then general staff with a naval speciality from the Soviet Union in 1959. He received the diploma for high seas captain in 1965 and his masters degree in naval science, general staff while session, in 1968. In 1981, he had a tour of duty in the administration of cargo at the Port of Marseilles in France as well as at the port of Antwerp, Belgium, with the United Nations in the same year. He then obtained a diploma in the administration of cargo stations and planning from the Institute of Naval Studies at the Port of Marseilles in 1983. In 1955, Captain Badr-al-Din Ibrahim was appointed to the Egyptian navy, where he served for 25 years. During this time, he held the posts of commander of a destroyer, leader of a naval formation, then head of the department of naval sciences, and head of the teaching branch for naval forces's schools.

He was on active duty during the October war of 1973 as commander of a destroyer during the blockade of Bab al-Mandeb Gulf. He was awarded the Order of the Republic First Class. Then he was head of operations for Alexandria naval base and then commander of a destroyer brigade.

In 1980, he joined the Alexandria Port Authority to supervise the planning and implementation of the new cargo station project. In 1982, he was appointed head of the cargo division of Alexandria Port Authority with the rank of undersecretary. He worked for the Alexandria Port Authority as head of the study committee for the cargo station project, as head of evaluation and contracting for the post radar network project, and as head of the study, evaluation and contracting committee of the project to develop the port's harbor.

This was a short tract on the first company in Egypt for the movement of containers and on its new president, Naval Commodore Badr-al-Din Ibrahim. The company has begun to hire workers to speed its progress towards matching world developments in the quick transport of goods and in the prevention of backlogs in the Port of Alexandria.

12551

CSO: 4504/109

PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY DEPUTY SPEAKER DISCUSSES LEGISLATIVE ISSUES

Cairo AKHIR SA'AH in Arabic No 2612, 14 Nov 84 p 56

[Text] Justice Ahmad Musa, deputy speaker of the People's Assembly, said during his discussions with AKHIR SA'AH about the abundance of legislation that the Assembly had established a technical office to collect all legislation currently being applied, to review it, and to resolve all conflicts in it.

With respect to popular diplomacy, he said that it leaves a greater impression than formal contacts because it originates with the masses. Regarding political democracy, he said that we are moving down the correct path toward deepening democracy, which is the cornerstone of any sound system working for the welfare of its people.

He said that the Assembly will discuss the special report responding to the president's speech in its upcoming sessions.

At the beginning of his discussion, he said: President Husni Mubarak, in his last speech to the joint session of the People's Assembly and the Consultative Council, pointed out the danger of legislative inflation when he said that the problem is not with legislative inflation or with accelerating the introduction of new legislation, but with the inability of this legislation to respond to social and economic development and to clear the way for change and development.

Legislative inflation has reached a high level in Egypt. The People's Assembly has been concerned with this and has established a technical office to deal with the matter. Ahmad Musa, deputy speaker of the People's Assembly, is in charge of this office.

In a meeting, he discussed all these matters and answered all the questions put to him by AKHIR SA'AH.

[Question] In your position as a man of law, what is your opinion of the legislative inflation from which we are suffering and what news is there from the committee which was formed under your supervision to study this matter?

[Answer] We have indeed begun to collect all of the current legislation in order to review it and to resolve all conflicts in it, or to amend it as is required for the public good by changes which have occurred since the law was enacted. A technical office actually has been established by the Assembly for this task and legal specialists as well as others have been appointed to undertake the necessary studies. All the ministries have been asked for a list of the laws they are applying so that a full legislative survey can be made. This means not only the legislation but also some amendments to existing legislation, which has led to the inflation in legislation.

[Question] In your capacity as a former minister of justice, what are the reasons which lead to long years of delay in court cases?

[Answer] One of the reasons was the number of laws, but that is not the main reason. It is necessary that the law be understood during the time it is published in the Official Gazette. However, the Gazette does not reach all citizens whose knowledge is gained from newspapers or magazines which generally are not concerned with publishing the law in its entirety. This requires going to the official Gazette's which publish the law to find the official text.

[Question] I asked the deputy speaker of the assembly about the contacts he made as head of the parliamentary delegation in Geneva?

[Answer] Contacts were made with several Arab and African delegations, particularly with the Jordanian delegation, to discuss the positions that would be taken regarding the resolutions to be voted upon. A call was made by the Jordanian parliamentary delegation, from both the Senate and the House of Representatives to strengthen the ties between the Egyptian and Jordanian parliaments.

[Question] How do you view the role of popular diplomacy?

[Answer] There is no doubt that a person's direct contacts with organizations, groups and unions have a strong influence. I am not exaggerating if I say that they have more influence than official contacts because they spring from the bases of the masses and their influence reflects back on it. There is nothing more indicative of this than the recent conference of the Sudanese people's organizations in which the public expressed its desire for integration between Egypt and the Sudan. This also occurred recently at the Arab lawyers Union in Tunis with the resolutions requesting that serious steps be taken to normalize relations between Egypt and the rest of the Arab countries.

[Question] I asked the deputy for Moghaghah what had been accomplished in this session and what his hopes were for it?

[Answer] To a degree, God helped me to achieve some of what was requested of me in some areas such as housing facilities, schools in some villages, or telephones. All this pertains to the general areas. I made every

effort to implement specific requests which conform to the laws. Many of these still have not been realized. This is because Upper Egypt has been forgotten for a long time and the simplest of urgent requests such as establishing new roads besides the orphan, or road, which is called the "road of death" because of the many accidents occurring on it. This road is 900 km long and runs through seven governorates. It is not constructed for transport or public transit, which is the cause of many accidents. We have requested that the East Nile Road and a road through the western desert be built to lighten the pressure on the lone road, to build up these areas and encourage immigration to them, and to encourage industrial and agricultural investment and the [development] of new cities. This would lessen [the pressure] on the narrow valley in Upper Egypt. The first stage of the eastern road has been finished up to Bani Suwayf and we are hoping for the speedy completion of the rest of these stages.

[Question] There is no doubt that political democracy has been achieved in Egypt. In your opinion, what confirms this?

[Answer] From the beginning, the People's Assembly took serious steps to deepen the democratic system in Egypt whether in the existence of a large percentage of the opposition from all parties, the procedure for debate allowing differing opinions - such as the majority party - so that anything might be said about the topics under discussion in the Assembly. That uses the principle which says that the opposition is one wing of democracy and without another viewpoint we would not be able to uncover the truth which comes out through quiet, pointed, and free discussion. We are all pleased that the majority accepts the minority viewpoint when that viewpoint proves to be correct, and that the minority goes along with the majority on draft laws presented by the government in order to realize the public good. A new method has been used to involve the opposition and its newspapers in the representative delegations of the People's Assembly at international conferences and meetings so that they might follow and participate in all that goes on outside the country as well as inside. All this assures us that we are progressing down the right path toward deepening democracy, which is the cornerstone of any healthy system which works for the welfare of its people.

[Question] What new methods will you use in your committees?

[Answer] To give every member of the committee the opportunity to present whatever he feels will benefit the public good, to present their ideas on all the current problems, and to be able to utilize specific resolutions of the committees. The situation calls for many meetings, whether on the president's speech or the prime minister's statement, to discuss all the issues which were brought up in the president's speech so that the requirements of the coming phase might be faced. There are representatives from all the parties on the committee and their representatives participate in drafting the reports. Everything is decided by consensus.

Studying the President's Speech

[Question] What are the most important features of the report pertaining to the study of the president's speech that the Assembly will discuss during its next session?

[Answer] We have finished the special report on the study of the president's statement and the report is composed of two main parts. The first part deals with the practice of democracy, the rule of law, foreign policy, and national security. The second section treats the tasks of the coming phase which are increasing production, preparing for the second 5-year plan, social justice, bureaucratic negativism and unconcern, education and housing.

With respect to foreign policy, the report points out that Egypt is firm regarding the need to establish good relations with all the nations of the world which support international legality and the principles of international law. It believes in the importance of a balance in international relations between the East and the West and rejects polarization or alienation from any of the great powers.

The committee has confirmed that joint Arab efforts and responsible solidarity in a limited positive strategic framework is the way to realize Arab goals, defend the higher national welfare, and provide national security and social and economic growth for the Peoples of the Arab nation. Likewise, Egypt has asked the General Assembly to make more effective efforts to end the Iran-Iraq war, especially following the U.N. Secretary General's success in stopping the bombing of civilian targets in both countries. This was a positive step which could be the central pillar in achieving a total ceasefire between the two countries.

Sufficiency and Justice

Regarding domestic policy, the committee affirms its support of our armed forces in its role as the protective shield for Egypt and the Arab nation in facing all dangers. It praised the great efforts which the security forces make for stability in society.

The committee also notes that Egypt's economic system is predicated upon democratic socialism based upon sufficiency and justice without exploitation. This leads to closing the gap between classes and protects legitimate gain while protecting justice by spreading out the general burdens and expenses, raising the standard of living, decreasing unemployment, increasing job opportunities, and tying wages to productivity although guaranteeing a minimum wage. This all leads to the realization of social justice.

On the rule of law, the committee affirmed that the law embodies the will of the people and therefore expresses the rule of the people. When it comes down to adjudicating the law and determining its legality and the value of the rule of law, it is everyone subjecting themselves to

it equally with the presence of the necessary protections to allow this. Human value resides in people and nothing supports it except an individual's freedom and sanctity. This is the natural reflection of the honor of a nation. The rule of law requires personal freedom just as respect for the law and duties is an integral part of the necessary assets of society. With the attainment of freedom and its protection, freedom is protected from some irresponsible action.

12551

CSO: 4504/109

SUDAN

VARIOUS SUPREME COURT JUDGES PRAISE SHIFT TO ISLAMIC LAW

London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 31 Oct, 2, 5 Nov 84

[Article by 'Adil Silahi: "The Supreme Court Judges Talk about the Effect of the Judiciary Change: Before the Application of Islamic Law, Weapons Were a Means for Regaining Rights"]

[31 Oct 84 p 12]

[Text] The judiciary was the first touchstone to which people's attention turned in the Sudan in ascertaining the effect of the declaration of the application of Islamic law and the start of the process of bringing the Sudan back to its pure Islamic character. That was natural, for unless people's conflicts are resolved in accordance with Islamic law, the claims that Islamic law is being applied will remain mere ink on paper.

Months passed in which people saw no tangible effect on the judiciary, until the emergency law was issued and the courts which were called "courts of full justice" ^{See footnote below} were formed to rid the Sudanese judiciary of the pernicious effect of Western secular laws on society. It is well known that the Sudan had applied British law before it returned to the application of Islamic law.

The formation of these courts stirred up various feelings. In them the Sudanese saw a modern form of the courts which were known in our country in its Islamic eras, while the Western press, the enemies of Islam and the opponents of the application of Islamic law spread about lies, saying that these were summary courts which did not reflect or proceed with caution but issued verdicts haphazardly and exploited their character as "decisive" assert their arguments.

Then they went about spreading lies once again when the emergency law was abrogated in the Sudan and these courts were abrogated along with it. Some Western papers even alleged that the Islamic laws had been abrogated in the Sudan.

However, I visited this good country when this recent change occurred, and it was clear there that the experiment of "full justice" had achieved a

*Read the term "full justice" as "decisive justice" whenever it appears.

great success, through which the officials in the Sudan considered it fit to spread this experiment about over the whole judiciary. As a result of that, Prof Fu'ad al-Amin 'Abd-al-Rahman was appointed chief of the judiciary, after he had occupied the post of chief of the court of appeals of full justice, and the two judges Ahmad Mahjub Hajj Nur and al-Makashifi Taha al-Kabashi were appointed supreme court judges after they had been judges in the court of appeals of full justice.*

I went to that court, where I had this conversation with the two judges Ahmad Mahjub Hajj Nur and al-Makashifi Taha al-Kabashi and with Prof Muhammad Adam 'Isa, who had been head of the office of the prosecutor of full justice and became minister of state for criminal affairs in the office of the public prosecutor. I started the conversation with the question one could not avoid in these circumstances: what does full justice mean?

Prof Ahmad Mahjub Hajj Nur said, "The basic meaning of full justice is the refusal to be satisfied with the judiciary of the past. It is a name that asserts a single basic notion, which is that the judiciary that functioned in the Sudan was afflicted with the malady of extreme slowness, which kept it from satisfying the grievances of people who had suffered from them and restoring to people their rights and from getting criminals to receive and be punished by the deterrent penalty they deserved, which would discipline them, reward them and prevent the spread of the crime. It is in reality full in the sense that it is an effective judiciary whose effects appear in the society. This of necessity means that we were under the umbrella of a judiciary which the people could not feel, and that was an ineffective judiciary.

"It is a judiciary which is swift, but swift only when compared with the slowness of the judiciary which prevailed in the country. The fact is that it is an ordinary judiciary which follows the ordinary law on evidence and the criminal procedures which are observed. Indeed, from this standpoint, it is very close, indeed, is much more Islamic than the judiciary which prevailed in the country, because there is no case in the history of Islam which went on 5 or 6 or 10 years and there are no cases in the history of Islam which go on before the court and which judges deal with in succession for many years. That in itself is something that influences the course of justice. How can a judge be expected to hear part of a case, then hear another part after a few months or a few years, and then another judge comes to continue the hearing, and a third judge and a fourth one? Is it possible that a good grasp of the case could be realized after that, and a carefully studied verdict be given on it by law? All we are now trying to do is to hear the case without much interruption, which will affect it.

The Slow Traditions

[Question] Where did the slowness come from in the past?

[Answer] The slowness came about as a result of numerous causes, but most of them can in my opinion be attributed to the judiciary's method of functioning. The system of the courts is connected to very slow English traditions. These in reality do not now represent the English or non-English judiciary,

but traditions arose among us in the context of the English system in which there was much slowness, since cases were postponed for the most trivial reasons, under requests from lawyers, and indeed procedures were exploited to suspend cases, and suspending cases became an art which lawyers and others engaged in, resulting in suspensions for many long years. This has become a kind of trick which is resorted to to avoid a verdict. This is one of the causes; it is what we could characterize as judiciary mood and a method of ruling on cases which dominated the judges and lawyers and made them spend many hours on the most trivial problems, in a manner which caused the basic issues to be lost. The whole struggle was then over procedures and formal laws, and there would be no pressing into the heart of the case.

[Question] Does that mean that there are no formal measures in the judiciary system of full justice?

[Answer] The judiciary system of full justice includes formal measures, but they are limited. We are concerned more with the essence of cases than with their formal appearances. However, what has happened is that in cases involving full justice the activity of lawyers has been determined in a clear manner. They attend the case as friends of the litigants, not as their delegates. Consequently, they are not given the right to address themselves to the courts directly or to talk by proxy for the accused; instead, they are given the right to sit alongside them, advise them and guide them on what will preserve their rights for them. As for talking in their name, no, although some full justice courts permit them to do so.

However, the lawyers write the writs the litigants present, without addressing the courts directly.

[Question] That is totally at variance with British law, which does not permit the plaintiff or the person filing the case to talk before the court unless he does not have a lawyer!

[Answer] We are totally the opposite of this. We have the plaintiff in the case, who is the basic person filing the case, and the lawyer is someone who has come to help. We consider him a helper or a friend who provides advice to him, but, in spite of that, in large cases the court, if it sees a need or finds that the plaintiff in a given case is incapable of expressing himself, will permit the lawyer to address the court. However, that depends on the finding of the court.

In another area, proceeding with the tradition of the judiciary in Islam, the judge in reality in all cases investigates the matters that are related to the defense and the charge. We, in order to fulfil our obligation before God, do not sit down in the court as spectators but rather examine matters so that we can seek explanations for the points in the accusation and the points for the defense.

The Full Performance of Justice

[Question] Since it appears that the new decrees organizing the judiciary are oriented toward the general promotion of the experiment of "full

justice" within the entire judiciary, permit me to emphasize once again the meaning of the word "full" and ask whether we can describe these courts as courts of "the full performance of justice."

Prof al-Makashifi Taha al-Kabashi answered by saying, "We cannot understand the meaning of the word 'full justice' unless we compare it with what existed before. The courts in days past would proceed with their system, which was observed in the context of secular laws. Then, in the earliest days of the application of Islamic law in the Sudan, we observed that the courts had not kept up with the Islamic revolution and the legislative revolution which the country had witnessed. Their failure to do so may be ascribed to many reasons, most important of which was the absence of judges who believed in Islamic law itself. There is a kind of secular judge, and there is a kind of greedy judge who is not much interested in the subject of Islamic law. As long as these types exist, they cannot keep abreast of the Islamic movement and the legislative revolution in the Sudan. Therefore there was an obstruction of Islamic law by the courts in the earliest days.

"To that I can add that these courts proceeded for a very long period of time with the English system. I mean that the measures which they proceeded by in the past were not Islamic. Therefore, we found that people in the context of the secular laws lost hope that the courts would satisfy their grievances, to the point where the loss of hope caused people to take their rights by force, without resorting to the judiciary. There is much evidence to show that some people started to resort to an attempt to regain their rights by the use of arms and by murder. The reason was that individuals had lost hope in the courts. Therefore, from this premise, it was necessary that there be Islamic courts to restrict and change this picture.

"Therefore these Islamic courts came into being and proceeded in accordance with an Islamic system which led to the attainment of rapid justice and performance. There is no speed in the sense that they hasten to review cases without careful thought. No. Rather, there is speed which can be attributed to the judge himself. We have observed some courts sitting for long hours over a single case; indeed, they might continue to review the case for 10 full hours, lest the features of the case set out in the courtroom be lost. The judge sits down and considers that doing this is a form of worship of almighty glorious God, the attainment of justice.

"Therefore there is full performance, in the sense that the judge performs the work that is in his hands without delay and without slowness. This is the meaning of the full performance we observe in the courts. I can assert for certain that there has been no haste over verdicts which would prompt anyone to characterize these verdicts as capricious or disruptive. The proof of that is that the judges in the courts of full justice themselves follow and vigilantly observe the realization of justice. Then these verdicts of theirs are presented to the court of appeals for investigation and confirmation that justice has been realized. All the serious verdicts are presented for appeal, or I believe that this is a sort of deliberation and careful reflection regarding the verdict."

The Appeals Court

[Question] Are all verdicts bearing on the imposition of Islamic penalties presented to the court of appeals, whether the condemned person requests that or not?

[Answer] Yes, they are presented to the court of appeals whether the person involved in them makes an appeal for review or not. In addition, the court of appeals itself is carrying out its work to the point where we have been sitting for long hours, starting from 0800 hours in the morning, and on many occasions might keep on until 2200 hours at night.

[Question] With these two stages of litigation and trial, in the court of first instance then the court of appeals, isn't a long period of time involved?

Professor al-Makashifi answered by saying, "Let us assume that the court of first instance issues a verdict on Islamic penalty, whether that be severance of the hand, severance of something else or execution, today. This verdict is presented on the same day to the court of appeals. The court of appeals has two sessions a week, Tuesday and Saturday. It discusses all the verdicts presented to it on the same day, even if it is compelled to sit for long hours. We cannot issue verdicts haphazardly, in an unbalanced manner or in violation of Islamic law. Rather, we give the accused person an adequate opportunity and adequate scope. We also give him a chance in the preliminary trial. Since the purpose in this preliminary trial is to realize justice, it gives an adequate opportunity for the accused person's defense. The witnesses discuss their testimony to the degree where many people have started to dispense with their lawyer friends. Why? Because the courts undertake this on their own, and when a witness comes to the court the judge directs very many questions at him, including some that are in the interests of the accused and some that are not in his interests. This is all for the sake of achieving justice.

[Question] Does the court of appeals give a specific time for review of the cases presented to it?

[Answer] As I pointed out, we present all the cases of verdicts of Islamic penalties to the court of appeals automatically. The other verdicts provide an opportunity of 3 days following the declaration of the verdict in which the condemned person can make an appeal, seek mercy, request that the examination be reviewed, and so forth.

[Question] How much time does the case take in the court of appeals?

[Answer] That of course depends on the volume of the work presented to the court. However, I can mention, for example, that we had 10 cases before us in a single week and we reviewed and completed them, all in the same week. We would not have accomplished that except that we sat for more than 12 hours straight and carried out all the work required. Thus, the meaning of full justice comes from the word "full performance."

[Question] Does the court of appeals summon the two parties to the case to appear before them?

[Answer] Yes, it summons them on some occasions, or contents itself with the legal arguments the parties have submitted.

[2 Nov 84 p 10]

[Text] No discussion can take place on the application of Islamic law without the adversaries of this religion starting to talk about the "harshness" of Islamic penalties and punishment, to the point where Islamic law no longer means anything except the penal code. However, God's law deals with all matters of life, and its application must have important effects on the social life of people.

The experience with "full justice" in the Sudan is one that has been crowned with great success. Even I have personally sensed people's joy when they have seen that the suspension of the "full justice" courts was aimed at putting this experiment into general use throughout the entire judiciary, after it had been restricted solely to criminal matters. This general application is the reason why the post of the chief of the Sudanese judiciary was given to Prof Fu'ad al-Amin 'Abd-al-Rahman, who before that was chairman of the court of appeals of full justice.

Today we are continuing our conversation with Profs Hamad Mahjub Hajj Nur and al-Makashifi Taha al-Kabashi, judges in the Sudanese Supreme Court, who had been judges in the Sudanese Supreme Court and judges in the court of appeals of full justice. In my conversation with them, I referred to the great costs which sometimes prevent people from turning to the judiciary, and asked about the costs which people who turn to the judiciary of full justice defray. Prof Ahmad Mahjub Hajj Nur began the response by stating:

"We are concerned with criminal cases. These involve no costs which individuals have to pay; the individuals do not pay for more than the submission of a petition to the office of the public prosecutor or the police, which approves it, and that costs them just 10 piasters. The costs generally come in the civil cases, on which there are civil fees, if civil cases lie within criminal cases. It has been the custom for the person who is sentenced to defray them, or for the person involved in the case to do so; in this respect, the procedures for ordinary civil fees are carried out."

[Question] Could you provide us with details for this answer?

[Answer] The area of competence of these courts is criminal cases. The plaintiffs in these cases do not pay any fees; rather, all they have to do is present a petition which bears a stamp costing a few piasters. The security and judiciary agencies then take charge of reviewing these complaints and filing the cases with the court if necessary. The issue of big costs might arise in civil cases.

[Question] What is meant by civil cases?

[Answer] Cases involving rights, such as a case of failure to repay a debt, for instance. However, if this aspect arises in a criminal case, for instance, if a check is submitted without cover or if someone usurps property deceitfully or through fraud, for example, the case becomes a criminal one, but it includes the restoration of rights to the person to whom they are due. There are no fees involved. Rather, the person who has been found guilty defrays the restoration of the property to its owner, the restoration of the right to the person to whom it is due, or the evacuation of the place against which he has trespassed, for example. An additional fine is imposed on him in a manner that is in keeping with his crime, but the plaintiff has no obligations in this matter, and consequently the person does not defray any expenses with the objective of regaining his rights. However, these civil cases have different procedures and different courts. There when a person comes he pays a specific fee. The fee in the Sudan is not so great that a person would be unable to pay it.

Prof al-Makashifi al-Kabashi talked about the subject of the costs the person who is given summons or the defendant in any case pays, stating,

"First, in criminal cases, by which I mean those in which there is a criminal element, whether that be forgery, fraud, deceit or the like, that is the area of competence of the criminal courts of full justice. If there is a civil element to this case, that is ruled on there. Then, thanks to almighty glorious God, courts of full civil justice have been formed which review all civil litigation regarding sales, purchases, rents, trade, companies of all kinds, different forms of speculation, mortgages of different types and other types of litigation which have a purely civil nature and which involve no criminal aspects. This is an Islamic categorization. If we break the courts down into civil and criminal and other courts which review personal matters in the form of marriage, divorce and so forth, we will make the litigation process easier for people, and at the same time justice will be realized at a very good pace, and it will entail no kind of unfairness against anyone. Proceeding from this premise, all of these courts are now proceeding with this policy."

Social Effects

[Question] What social effect results from the establishment of these courts of various forms and types in the Sudan?

Prof al-Makashifi answered by saying:

"A case regarding someone who had beat his wife violently, causing her grievous harm, was presented to me. This was a criminal case but the court reviewed the two things together. It reviewed the first matter, which was a criminal element, the crime which befell the woman and inflicted harm on her, and it also reviewed the effect which resulted from this crime. If a person reaches a point in a relationship with his wife where he beats her severely, that means that life between the two of them has become an unendurable hell, and therefore the court makes two rulings: first, it punishes him for the harm, then it divorces him from his wife, on the basis of her request in the suit.

"Another example: Someone defrauded someone else. A Swiss businessman had reached agreement with a Sudanese businessman to build the latter a hotel in the Sudan on the basis of a partnership between the two of them; according to the desired specifications, a bid was offered for this amount, and the sum of half a million dollars was fraudulently taken from that person. The case was presented to the court of full justice, which ruled on all matters. This confirms to people that when there is any civil conflict, or conflict over personal status, related to a crime, the court renders judgment on the two things together.

"This beautiful picture has led to very great social effects in the society. The most important of these effects has been people's trust in the courts. Perhaps the courts, as I said, have raised a great Islamic slogan, which is restoring the object of grievances to the people who hold them and restoring rights to the people to whom they are due. Believe me when I say that as soon as these courts were established and they started to engage in their activities, many of the people who owed people rights restored those rights to the people to whom they were due as soon as they knew that the case would be presented to the court that day or the next day. The people to whom the rights are due come, certain that the court of full justice will make a finding on the case when that is presented to it, and present an application to the court in which they admit that they are wrong and undertake to have the rights restored to the people to whom they are due.

"We have witnessed a number of cases of deceit, fraud, and theft or usurpation of people's property through fraud and swindling, and we have seen that when people feel that the judiciary is standing on its own feet and has become just, they have all become concerned that rights be restored to the people to whom they are due before they turn to the court. The accused person reaches agreement with the plaintiff, and they write up a petition in which the plaintiff mentions that his rights have been restored to him and the object of his grievance has been restored.

"Proceeding from this premise, I can say that these courts have restored trust in the judiciary to people for many reasons, most important of which is that the judiciary in the Sudan today has freedom and has independence, two things which had been lacking. I am not exaggerating when I say that the judiciary in the past had reached a stage where all verdicts had become open to bargaining and auctioneering. Today, however, the judiciary now has freedom. No one interferes in its activities, not even the president himself. I can give you a vivid example: a minister tried to interfere in a case, and his fate was that the president issued a decree removing him from his position, because he had exploited his position so that he could influence the course of justice. His fate was to be removed. Therefore, people became confident that the judiciary was not subject to influence from anyone and that the judge was just and a man of integrity and the president did not intervene with him, nor did people in higher leadership in the country intervene with the judiciary. Proceeding from this premise, the judiciary has regained the awe in which it was held."

[Question] Could we say that it is possible to file a case against a minister or official?

[Answer] Yes, that is entirely possible. Trust in the judiciary and its realization of justice returned to people's minds only after actions which were clear and obvious to everyone. As soon as the courts of full justice of various kinds were formed, everyone became as equal as the teeth of a comb before these courts. There is no difference between a major or minor, between a minister or a security guard. Proceeding from this premise, some ministers have been accused of specific crimes and their positions have not prevented them from being brought to trial. Indeed, they have actually been tried. The same is the case with people holding other positions, whether in the State Security Agency, the system of the military forces, or millionaires. Money or higher positions have not prevented anyone from being brought to trial if there is circumstantial evidence to prove that he has committed some crime. At that point he is brought to the court and tried. This factor is what has given people confidence that they are really equal before these courts.

[Question] Could one call in witnesses who have high positions?

[Answer] Yes, and that has happened. For example, I summoned a minister as a witness to my court. In Court of Full Justice Two they called in the minister of commerce, who came as a witness. In Court of Justice Three, they called in another minister and took his statements as a witness. It has not happened that any minister has written giving any preoccupations as an excuse for not appearing before the court and giving his testimony. Indeed, everyone has responded, some people have been proud to do so and one of them gave a speech in the court and said, "These courts are just and remind one of the courts of the early people of Islam, before which princes and commanders stood. In the first era of Islam and in the era of the upright caliphs, senior companions of the prophet stood guilty before the court. 'Ali, may God be satisfied with him, stood accused, and other good early men of Islam stood up. Their status did not prevent them from appearing before the judiciary. This minister I referred to came happy and proud, and gave his testimony, which was essential for the condemnation of one person and exoneration of another one.

The Proper Place

Prof Ahmad Mahjub Hajj Nur made an additional comment, stressing the role of the experiment with "full justice" in restoring the feeling of awe for the government and the status of the judiciary to their proper state. He said that the new Islamic laws, especially the law on the application of Islamic penalties, remained without any effect worth mentioning for a period of 8 months; then came the courts of full justice, which turned them into actual reality. He said,

"Perhaps people do not appreciate the seriousness of this, because our brother the president declared the application of Islamic penalties, and a week after that, 13,000 prisoners were released, including some who were habitual criminals and members of criminal gangs. However, he took his good step and released them all, in order to give them an opportunity to reform. People continued to watch for a while and when they saw the agency of the judiciary not carrying out the provisions of Islamic law, some of them once again

committed corruption on earth, until people raised a furore, some of them thinking that the release of these criminals was the greatest crime the president could have committed. When they declared the state of emergency and these courts were formed, they started to discuss all cases. The most frequent of these were the cases which occurred in the period of recession from September to April, especially the cases of Islamic penalties, since most of those occurred in this period. After that, people felt that the situation had become serious. Everyone felt that, and consequently people started to treat the law as if it had been codified in order to be carried out. I believe that this is the greatest accomplishment that has been realized, since after April or the beginning of May, that is, since their establishment, the courts of full justice started facing the task of carrying out the requisite Islamic penalty. In addition to that, the complexes that had existed in people's spirits regarding the issue of the application of Islamic penalties were clearly dissolved. Judges and lawyers started dealing with this fact, that is, that the application of Islamic law had become a fact, and this was reflected in their litigation. In the past, lawyers would refer to English precedents, indeed, even insisted after the law was amended on referring to English or Sudanese judiciary precedents. However, following the application of this law, jurists started adopting new sources for the cases they presented and their study of cases. The era of referring to English writings and books of law ended, the books of 'Abd-al-Qadir 'Awdah and Muhammad Abu Zahrah, for instance, began to take their place in criminal law and other old and new books on jurisprudence, and the people's source of reference gradually became Islamic jurisprudence rather than English law or Sudanese judiciary precedents.

[5 Nov 84 p 10]

[Text] In this final instalment of our conversation with Sudanese officials, we take up another aspect of the judiciary, that of the office of the public prosecutor. The experiment of the courts of full justice has been practical, living testimony of the way in which the Islamic laws function in the Sudan. When this experiment asserted its scarcely paralleled success, the Sudanese government turned to put the experiment in general application throughout the Sudanese judiciary as a whole.

Of course, there has to be a role for the office of the public prosecutor in the judiciary. Regarding this aspect, we had our conversation with Prof Muhammad Adam 'Isa, who occupied the position of chairman of the office of the public prosecutor of full justice in the period when its courts were operating, after which he became a minister of state for criminal affairs in the office of the public prosecutor.

I began the conversation by saying "The name of the office of the public prosecutor casts a shadow of fear on the spirits of some people; what was the actual role of the office of the prosecutor with respect to the courts of full justice?"

[Answer] The effect of the role of the office of the prosecutor in achieving full justice in the Sudan manifests itself in the achievements the courts of full justice have made since their formation last May. In continuing this

discussion regarding the meaning of full justice, I can say that the principle of full justice is well known to virtually all systems of law. Justice will be just only if it is justice in full, because it is well known, even in the English judiciary, that they make the famous statement "justice delayed justice denied" -- a principle which all systems of law recognize.

[Question] In Britain, it often happens that a case takes 3 or 4 years before it is heard!

[Answer] That in my estimation is not justice. There is no doubt that Islamic law is not restricted to the endorsement of this principle of not delaying justice; slowness in realizing justice means the deterrence of justice in Islamic law. The slowness which occurred in the period preceding the establishment of the courts of full justice, as our eminent scholars were so kind as to state in their previous conversation, meant neglect of the principle of full justice, and this slowness resulted in the actual thwarting of justice, I should not say the thwarting of justice, but it led to the loss of many rights. People made noise and aspired to the attainment of justice in full, and the courts of full justice came into being. I can say that the courts of full justice revived this principle, while the measures of justice had been slow and many people's rights had been wasted.

In the period when the courts of full justice were operating, the difference became clear, and the distance vast, between the cases that were carried out before the establishment of these courts and after it.

The Perceptible Difference

[Question] How long did these courts last?

[Answer] The courts were established in May 1984; that is, they operated for 5 months.

[Question] Did people actually sense this difference which you talked about during these 5 months?

[Answer] Yes. Its effect appeared clearly in the number of persons who sought recourse with these courts, the number of cases on which judgment was actually reached, and the enthusiasm of the litigants, because the courts of full justice ruled on cases they had presented to the ordinary courts to the exclusion of others.

[Question] Is it the office of the public prosecutor which files the cases?

[Answer] Yes, and the fact is that the participation by the office of the prosecutor of full justice in this role bearing on full justice has been great, I believe, because what has embodied the role of this prosecutor's office is that all the cases which were filed before the courts of full justice had to pass through the office of the public prosecutor of full justice for investigation and review, so that they could be investigated and the data in them reviewed, and it could be determined whether these cases merited being ruled on before the court of full justice or not. If the

office of the prosecutor concluded that the cases merited being ruled on before the court of full justice, it would do so by a recommendation in which it spelled out the facts of the charges and spelled out the articles of law of which the office of the prosecutor considered the facts of the crimes constituted a violation.

Through this action by the office of the public prosecutor of full justice, the court's review of the case has now become I would not say facilitated, but the case is plainly evident to the court, and costs only a little of the court's time and effort.

[Question] I would like you to pardon me for the following question, but the reader would like to know if it is possible for the office of the public prosecutor of full justice to act arbitrarily and refuse to review a given case, or to have a case presented before the court. Could arbitrary behavior arise in the activity of the office of the prosecutor?

[Answer] I can state simply and with full confidence that there is no room for arbitrariness in the activity of the office of the prosecutor of full justice, because that is an office of prosecutor of justice and the issue of arbitrary behavior is not in essence at issue. However, a delicate balance exists in the office of the prosecutor, in its investigation of cases before they are brought before the courts of full justice, because, as is apparent from our brothers' discussion, these courts are committed to the criteria of full performance, and want to carry out their activity without delay or procrastination and without the loss of people's rights. The role of the office of the prosecutor is to investigate and ascertain to what extent there is proof that a blatant crime or violation of the provisions of the penal law has been committed. If it is apparent to the office of the prosecutor that there is a prima facie case which justifies bringing this case before the court, the office of the prosecutor at that point will take its decision to transfer the case to [the court of] full justice, according to the arrangement I mentioned.

However, if it is established to the office of the prosecutor that there is no basis for justifying that this accused person be brought to trial and that the data and proof do not reach the level where this accused person should be brought to trial, the role of the office of the prosecutor here will be to rule on this matter, and not to tire the court with such cases whose pursuit entails no benefit, whether this litigation arise from grudges among people, is to settle scores among them, or is just to wear down the litigants. If the purpose of the plaintiff or the person who has been summoned is just to make the accused person bear the worry of arguing before the courts and wasting his time, the office of the prosecutor will not allow this, and will save the court and the litigants the time that would be wasted on such cases.

That is the criterion by which the office of the prosecutor evaluates cases before they reach the courts.

[Question] Has the police had the right to have cases transferred to [the courts of] full justice, or is that the right of the litigants, or do you

consider that the office of the prosecutor alone should be the one to file the cases?

[Answer] The office of the prosecutor, according to the law on its establishment, has the right to investigate cases, examine them and establish the foundation. The case is then transferred to the court. However, the number of cases is large and the litigants have the option of turning to the police or to the office of the prosecutor at the outset. However, if the investigations into the case are completed and it is brought before the court of full justice only after it has gone through the office of the prosecutor of full justice, the person may then turn to the police, and the police will conduct an investigation into him and perform all the procedures of investigation and examination prior to the filing of the case. However, this case is brought before the court of full justice only through the office of the prosecutor of full justice.*

The attention of the office of the prosecutor of full justice at the beginning was focused on setting out a plan regarding these cases, in accordance with their priority, and we took into account the cases of public property, cases of state security and cases of Islamic punishment in the first place. My colleagues have spoken regarding the effect of the courts of full justice in restoring rights and grievances and restoring awe and status to the judiciary. I can add that these courts and the office of the prosecutor have had a great effect in this regard in restoring public property. We have found that there were many cases of embezzlement and cases concerning public property which remained neglected in the investigation because they were thorny cases to investigate and difficult to try because they involved numerous documents. Thus, we found that there was tremendous government property in the trust of individuals who were being stubborn about returning it to the government, because they felt that the judiciary was slow and that returning it through the ordinary courts would take a long time. There are people who refrained from returning this property, that is, the property of the government, for no reason except that they were in a strong, trusted position by virtue of their position or their power, that is, by virtue of their strong position in the organizations of the government. Therefore, the office of the prosecutor of full justice started to work to return the property of the government and restore its true authority. This situation concerned us from two angles, first, the restoration of awe and authority to the government so that this group which had declined to return the property would sense that, and second, that it was necessary to return this property, the property of the Sudanese people, and the government needed it for its various business.

Here some examples come to mind. The government had 8 million pounds in the trust of a private sector company which the latter had not returned, because no one had asked it about it. About 2 years elapsed in this affair, the office of the prosecutor took charge of investigating the issue of this money, and it was returned to the government in a few days.

[Question] Was it returned with or without interest?

[Answer] It was returned without interest, of course. The office of the prosecutor adhered to Islamic law in its dealings and in investigating the

cases of the government and the restoration of its money to it and all legal transactions. Thus it adheres to Islamic law in this only because justice is the basis of Islamic law and the office of the prosecutor or the judiciary must not deviate from the teachings of Islamic law.

We carried out investigations which dealt with commercial banks and, as a result of that, found that much of the property was still in the trust of the people holding it. They had been given credit facilities by the banks without adequate collateral. The office of the prosecutor of full justice took charge of investigating this matter, and it returned money totalling many millions to the government. The office of the prosecutor immediately insisted on the return of that; otherwise, it would have taken the necessary measures. In this fashion, we helped restore the proper reverence to the government, because [in the case of] everyone who was responsible regarding these cases and gave these bank facilities, all legal measures have started to be taken regarding investigation and trial, and indeed they have become subject to detention until the government's reverence is restored, in the first place, and then the Sudanese people's property is returned.

In this discussion, I can conclude by stating that during this brief period the office of the prosecutor of full justice has managed to get back no less than 30 million pounds.

In the office of the prosecutor of full justice, a committee has been established called the committee for the restitution of public property. This committee has tabulated the property belonging to the government of the Sudan which is in individuals' trust and in the private sector, and it has made a good tabulation of that and has spoken to the bodies concerned with it. This committee, in the course of 2 weeks, has managed to get back more than 22 million pounds.

From this, it is clear that the office of the prosecutor of justice has realized the two things to which it has devoted attention, restoration of the awe of the government and the return of public property to this government. It has indeed taken bold action which would not have been realized had these courts not been established and been given the powers they possess.

11887

CSO: 4504/84

FOREIGN MINISTRY CHANGES REPORTED

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 79, 13 Oct 84 p 5

[Text] An Arab source who carefully follows Iraqi affairs commented on the developments which the Iraqi foreign ministry experienced a few days ago, saying that they were "of an unusual nature." The source explained during a meeting in which AL-TADAMUN took part, that for several hours the Iraqi Foreign Ministry appeared to be without a minister or deputy minister, since developments occurred which led to the removal of Mr Hamid 'Alwan, the minister of state, and the retirement of Muhammad Sa'id al-Sahhaf, the deputy minister, while the foreign minister, Mr Tariq 'Aziz, and the first deputy minister, Mr 'Ismat Katani, were in New York to attend the meetings of the United Nations General Assembly. Moreover, the Arab politician added that developments in the Iraqi Foreign Ministry seemed to draw attention and to be of an unusual nature compared to the procedures which the Arab citizen is used to in regard to the removal or resignation of those in sensitive and important positions, procedures which involve the announcement of the acceptance of somebody's resignation, without mentioning the reasons. However, the Arab politician continued, what happened in the Iraqi Foreign Ministry confirmed what is said about President Saddam Husayn, that he does not go easy in combatting shortcomings, especially in time of war, whether in military men or civilians.

The source mentioned that of the aspects of the developments in the Iraqi Foreign Ministry that draw attention, one is that relating to the appointment of a new deputy minister, described by the source as one of the "old-timers." The new deputy is Mr Taha Yasin al-'Ali (b. 1939), who was one of the young men who took part in the attempt to assassinate 'Abd al-Karim Qasim in 1959 and was sentenced to death, then took refuge in Cairo with Saddam Husayn from 1959 to 1963, and after the revolution of 8 February 1963, he returned to Baghdad to work in the Ministry of Information as director of the relations department (which was later called the department of external information). In 1976 he became the Iraqi ambassador to San'a', and in 1979 he took the post of deputy minister of culture and arts, then deputy minister of information and culture. From there he moved to the seats of the National Assembly (the Parliament), of which he was elected a member in 1980 and became head of the Assembly's committee on culture, information, education and youth, and from there he became director of one of the national command offices before becoming deputy foreign minister.

Finally, information available to AL-TADAMUN indicates that there are no indications about the appointment of a minister of state for foreign affairs to succeed Mr Hamid 'Alwan, especially since there are two deputy ministers, one of whom, Mr 'Ismat Kattani, is responsible for internal affairs, and the other is the new deputy, Taha Yasin al-'Ali, who will probably be responsible for running the ministry's affairs with great care and precision.

12547

CSO: 4404/87

NAMES OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLY MEMBERS PUBLISHED

Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic No 345, 22 Oct 84 p 7

[Text] Baghdad Governorate:

First Election District:

1. Dr Sa'dun Hammadi
2. Iftikhar Ahmad Ayyub
3. Hamid Salih Muhammad
4. Dr Tariq Salih Ibrahim
5. Jimbra'il Ishaq Jirjis

Second Election District:

1. Dr Mundhir Ibrahim Ahmad
2. Ma'rab Ahmad Kamal 'Abd-al-Wahhab
3. Suhayl Muhammad Salih Sa'id
4. 'Abd-al-Qadir Muhammad Amin Yasin
5. Dr 'Abd-al-Rahman 'Abd-al-Karim Najm

Third Election District:

1. Khadr 'Abd-al-'Aziz Husayn
2. Rashid 'Ubayd Ghannam
3. Khalid 'Abd-al-Mun'im Rashid

Fourth Election District:

1. Latif Hasan 'Ulwan
2. Dr Dawud Hasan Dawud
3. Sabihah Musa Ja'far
4. Dr Talal 'Ashur Wadi
5. Dr Muhammad Mufid Radi 'Abd-al-Husayn

Fifth Election District:

1. 'Abd-al-Shahid Kati' Jabir
2. Hudhdham Muhammad 'Ali Latif

3. 'Abd-al-Ilah Mahmud Muhammad
4. Nuri 'Uthman Faraj
5. 'Abd-al-Rahman Muhammad 'Ali

Sixth Election District:

1. Batul Mahmud Hadi
2. Nizar Tawfiq Muhammad
3. 'Abd-al-Qadir 'Izz-al-Din Hammudi
4. Musallam Hadi Musa
5. Dr. Nizar 'Abd-al-Latif Sa'ud

Seventh Election District:

1. Manal Yunis 'Abd-al-Razzaq
2. Dr Harith Jamil Mahdi
3. Ghanim 'Aziz Khadduri
4. Dr 'Isa Salman Humayd
5. Shakir Dahash Salman

Eighth Election District:

1. Dr Najm 'Abdallah Ahmad
2. Tariq Safuk Huways
3. 'Abd-al-Qadir 'Abd-al-Razzaq 'Abd-al-Wahhab
4. Dr Muhyi-al-Din 'Abbas Muhammad
5. Shihab Ahmad 'Alwan

Ninth Election District:

1. Dr Mundhir Wardi 'Abd-al-Hamid
2. Ibrahim Muhammad 'Abd-al-Wahhab
3. Mahmud Shukr Isma'il
4. Hashim Hasan Rashid

10th Election District:

1. Sa'd Qasim Hammudi
2. Dr Amir Isma'il Haqqi 'Abd-al-Ghani
3. Amirah Nur-al Din Dawud
4. Kamal 'Abdallah Zuwayd
5. Dr Ihsan Shakir 'Abdallah

11th Election District:

1. Falah Matar Jabr
2. 'Abd-al-Kazim 'Atiyah Mushari
3. 'Abd-al-Kazim Husayn Shaway
4. Rashid Yasin Munakhkhi
5. Nuwwar Ibrahim Hilmi 'Abd-al-Karim

12th Election District:

1. Ahmad Muhsin 'Alwan
2. Nahidah Yusuf Muhammad
3. Darwish Laftah Zubun
4. Qasim Ya'qub Radi
5. Ghazi Muhammad 'Ali

13th Election District:

1. Hamid Muhammad 'Ali
2. Anwar Mawlud Dhiban
3. Sa'id Judah Mawzun
4. Sa'diyah 'Abbas Salih
5. 'Abd Jasim Hasan

14th Election District:

1. 'Abd-al-'Aziz Hamid Jasim
2. Fa'izah Fadil Muhammad Nuri
3. Sadiq Jamil Mar'i
4. Latif Majjul Salih
5. Hasan Hamad Darwish

Nineveh [Ninawa] Governorate:

First Election District:

1. Kamal Hamdun 'Alu
2. Batul Ghazal Sa'id
3. Qasim Ahmad Taqi
4. Ghazi Nayif Hawwas

Second Election District:

1. 'Abd-al-Wahhab 'Aziz Wahb
2. 'Abbas 'Ali Sharif
3. Dr Muhyi-al-din Tawfiq Ibrahim
4. Talaf Ahmad 'Abdallah
5. Sa'dallah Muhammad Fadil Hasan

Third Election District:

1. Ahmad Muhyi-al-Din Ahmad
2. Arshad Ahmad Muhammad
3. Anis 'Abd-al-Majid 'Abd-al-Hadi
4. Hazim Muhammad Mar'i
5. Nuh Butrus Yunu

Fourth Election District:

1. Farhah Khalaf 'Umar
2. Jasim Husayn Hammadi
3. Dr Sattam Hamad Khalaf
4. Faris 'Aziz Fandi
5. Idham Ahmad Mansur

Fifth Election District:

1. Sattam Hallush 'Abd
2. Humaydi Nuri al-Faysal
3. Qasim Khadr Ilyas
4. 'Ujayl Ahmad 'Ujayl
5. 'Abd-al-Qadir Amin Yusuf

Al-Basrah Governorate:

First Election District:

1. Hanidan Ahmad Muhyi-al-Din
2. Husayn Ya'qub Yusuf
3. Dr Muhammad Sharif 'Abd-al-Rida 'Abbas
4. Diya' Habib Faris
5. Fayiz Turki 'Abd-al-Bari

Second Election District:

1. Khawlah 'Abdallah 'Abd-al-Rahman
2. 'Ali 'Abd-al-Karim Salih
3. Salih Sabir 'Ali
4. Qasim Jasim Muskhi
5. Dr Mustafa 'Abd-al-Qadir 'Abbud

Third Election District:

1. Nahidah Nasir Amin
2. 'Abd-al-Muttalib Muhsin Mansur
3. Jasib Husayn Muz'il
4. Farid Khaz'al Muhammad
5. Ghali Shallal 'Abd 'Ali

Fourth Election District:

1. Khalaf 'Abd-al-Karim Khalaf
2. 'Amirah Muhammad Najj Ya'qub
3. Nuri Salih 'Abdallah
4. Nasir Mahmud Nasir
5. Salman Khalid Hammadi

Al-Sulaymaniyah Governorate:

First Election District:

1. Bakr Mahmud Rasul
2. Dr Amyad Midhat Mubarak
3. Baha'-al-Din Ahmad Faraj
4. Harbiyah 'Abd-al-Sattar Ahmad

Second Election District:

1. Hushman Mustafa Fattah
2. Sayrawan 'Abdallah Husayn
3. Aminah 'Abdallah Muhammad
4. Dr. Hasan Karim Fattah
5. Muhammad Hummah Karim Muhammad

Third Election District:

1. Nawzad Anwar Rashid
2. Hamzah 'Abbas Mamand
3. Shawkat 'Ali Muhammad Rashid
4. Bakr Wassu Muhammad

Dhi Qar Governorate:

First Election District:

1. Jasim Muhammad Khalaf
2. Jabbar 'Abd-al-Rida Nu'aymah
3. Abibah 'Abd-al-Ghani Rashid
4. 'Aziz Hajim Thamir

Second Election District:

1. Jasib Shantah Tarif
2. Bahlul Husayn Yasir
3. Hadi Malih 'Ali
4. Nassar Sulayman Salih

Third Election District:

1. Safih 'Ajrash Matar
2. 'Abd-al-Amir Kazim Muhaysin
3. Najiyah 'Abd 'Ali Hasan
4. Muhsin Khadr 'Abbas
5. Muhsin Thajil 'Aday

Babil [Babylon] Governorate:

First Election District:

1. Ibrahim Kazim Khuwayn
2. Shukriyah Mahmud Hamzah
3. Hasan 'Ali Salim
4. 'Aziz 'Abd-al-Karim Khadr
5. Husayn Muhammad Kazim

Second Election District:

1. Rabihah Kazim Hasan
2. Hamid Sa'id Hadi
3. 'Ali Hassun Jawad
4. Dr 'Abd-al-Wahhab Khalil Husayn

Third Election District:

1. Na'mah 'Annun Hassun
2. Talal 'Ali Husayn
3. 'Ali Musa Ja'far
4. 'Abd-al-Husayn Mahmud Turaykh

Diyala Governorate:

First Election District:

1. Ghazi 'Abd-al-Majid Qasim
2. Hatim Hamdan Mahmud
3. Ilham Hamid Rabi'
4. 'Ali Ibrahim Ahmad
5. Raghیب Hammud Sallum

Second Election District:

1. Su'ad Khalil 'Abd-al-Ghafur
2. Fadil 'Abd-al-Ghani Muhammad
3. 'Adnan Ghaydan Muhammad
4. Rif'ah Ibrahim 'Abd-al-Baqi

Third Election District:

1. Shihadhah Husayn Hasan
2. Yasin Kazim al-Fad'am
3. Fadil Husayn 'Abdal
4. Hasan 'Abdallah Rashid

Irbil Governorate:

First Election District:

1. Isma'il 'Abd-al-Karim Mustafa
2. Khasraw Hadi Ahmad
3. Faysal Mustafa Bir Dawud
4. Kakah Ziyad Bayiz Jamil

Second Election District:

1. Muhammad Shakir Mahmud Jum'ah
2. Ghubaysh Husayn 'Ali
3. Isma'il Dahham Jamil
4. Nizar 'Uthman Qadir

Third Election District:

1. 'Aziz Husayn Khadr
2. Rasul As'ad Rasul
3. 'Abdallah Qadir 'Aziz

Al-Anbar Governorate:

First Election District:

1. Ahmad Dawud Marzuk
2. Thamir Muhammad Kharbit
3. 'Abd-al-Latif Hamin Muhammad
4. Bazigh Futaykhan 'Abd-al-Hamid

Second Election District:

1. Dhiyab Yunis 'Irsan
2. Dr Ibrahim Ahmad Hammud
3. Fadil Zaydan Khalaf

Third Election District:

1. Hamad Khalifah Muhaysin
2. 'Aklah 'Abd Sakr
3. 'Inad Mu'jil Najras

Al-Ta'mim Governorate:

First Election District:

1. Fa'iq 'Aziz Rashid
2. Khalidah Burhan 'Abd-al-Qadir
3. Khalil Ibrahim Hadir
4. 'Abdallah 'Abbas Hasan
5. 'Abdallah Muhammad 'Ubayd

Second Election District:

1. Aswad 'Ali Muhammad
2. Sallum Hasan Muhammad
3. Sa'dun Mustafa Ahmad
4. Madi Nasir Humayd
5. Muhammad Hammud Muhammad

Al-Qadisiyah Governorate:

First Election District:

1. 'Iyal Matar Farhan
2. Khalid Muhammad al-Badr
3. Samirah 'Abd-al-Jabbar Sayyah
4. Ghalib Rashid Hamad
5. 'Ali Maktuf 'Abd-al-Husayn

Second Election District:

1. Hadi 'Ubayd Hasan
2. Sami Shahid Fad'am
3. Husayn 'Ali al-Sha'lan
4. Kazim Hammadi Turbal

Wasit Governorate:

First Election District:

1. Kassad Fadl Ziyad
2. Hasan Samawi 'Ayfan
3. Muhammad 'Ilan Husayn
4. Sariyah 'Ali Khalaf
5. Hadi Salih Husayn

Second Election District:

1. Nasir Husayn Faza'
2. 'Abdallah Khudayr 'Abbas
3. Najat Majid Darwish
4. Salih 'Ali 'Abbas

Al-Najaf Governorate:

First Election District:

1. Najm Muzhir Hasan
2. Husayn 'Abbas Muhammad Hasan
3. Ghazi Naji Majid
4. Fawziyah Sa'd Muhammad

Second Election District:

1. Mahdi 'Abd-al-Jawad Nur
2. Rahim Hadi 'Abdallah
3. Mithqal 'Atiyah Muz'il
4. Nizar 'Abbas Murtada

Maysan Governorate:

First Election District:

1. Musa Khalaf Namiq
2. 'Abd-al-Wahhab Muhammad al-Damad
3. Najah Zibalah Jabr
4. Majid Hatim Muhammad

Second Election District:

1. Muhammad Khalaf Hasan
2. Jawad Kazim Jubayr
3. Khaz'al Jabbar Lu'aybi
4. Wasil Jabr Yusuf

Salah-al-Din Governorate:

First Election District:

1. Hashim Hasan al-Majid
2. Dahiyah Mustafa Yasin
3. Ra'uf 'Abd-al-Karim Husayn
4. Hamzah 'Ali Hamad

Second Election District:

1. 'Abd-al-Rahman Mahmud Riha
2. Burhan Jasim Hasan
3. Khalil Kiwan Salman
4. Dr Khalil Ibrahim Salih

Karbala' Governorate:

First Election District:

1. Tamwin 'Ujayl Samarmad
2. Radi Hasan Salman
3. Jawad Rida Hamzah
4. 'Adil Jasib Shubayb
5. Makarim Majid Mahmud

Dahuk Governorate:

First Election District:

1. Jiyay Diwali Sa'id
2. Mustafa Kalhi Tahir
3. Muhammad Amin Muhammad Ahmad
4. Mustafa Musa 'Abdallah
5. 'Abd-al-Qadir Mustafa Muhammad

Al-Muthanna Governorate:

First Election District:

1. Kamil Karim 'Isa
2. 'Abd-al-Hasan Zawrah Zaydan Salman
3. 'Abd-al-Kazim Husayn 'Ajil
4. 'Adnan Husayn Ruwaysh

8494

CSO: 4404/94

LANGER CRITICIZES ISRAELI DOMESTIC, FOREIGN POLICIES

Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 47, 21 Nov 84 p 14

[Interview with Felicia Langer by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondent Sergey Merinov: "Felicia Langer: 'Israel is Destroying Not Only the Palestinians, but Itself as Well'"]

[Text] Felicia Langer is a well-known public figure in Israel and vice president of the Israeli League for the Protection of Human and Civil Rights. A lawyer by profession, F. Langer is one of the few Israeli lawyers who defend the rights of the Palestinians Arabs. She is the author of several books. They discuss Israel's problems and the courageous struggle waged by the Palestinians against the occupiers.

Felicia Langer recently visited the Soviet Union and met with LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondent Sergey Merinov. We are publishing the interview with the guest from Israel.

[Question] Following the elections to the Knesset, which did not give a marked lead to any of the main political groups, the Likud and Labor parties formed a government of equal power. In other words, the Likud remained in power. As far as one can judge, many people even in Israel itself did not understand how it could happen that after so many failures, the Likud did not suffer a devastating defeat in the elections....

[Answer] Many people, but not everyone. Those who soberly analyzed the situation could perfectly well predict the outcome. The Likud's extensive losses could very easily be predicted. The Begin Government and the Shamir Government which replaced it plunged Israel into the Lebanese adventure and brought it to the brink of crisis. Was it a failure? Yes, absolutely. But what did the Labor opposition propose as a replacement. Essentially nothing! Simply a more "delicate" and not so open and rigid version of the same expansionism. Labor supported the aggression in Lebanon--it did so with reservations, but it supported the aggression. It did not speak out against the colonizing of occupied Arab land. It even attacked the Likud members for the fact that they "gave away" the Sinai to the Arabs! The Labor leadership forbade its "doves" to conduct pre-election debates from a position of active criticism of the government.

And so, there was no actual opposition. Labor demonstrated that the crossing of Social Democracy and Zionism produces a very poor hybrid. Our people have even begun saying that there is no Labor at all, but only Likud-A and Likud-B, a "second Likud." In general, what happened is what frequently happens in nations in which the Social Democracy is passive, is in a mood of capitulation and contributes to the growth of extreme right-wing, including fascist, forces and trends.

The government formed jointly by Peres and Shamir does not symbolize "national unity" at all. It is more like national tragedy.

[Question] One magazine article on the results of the elections stated glaringly: "Israel voted against itself"....

[Answer] Perhaps so. The people voted just as should have been expected after so many years of aggressive policy and all-embracing, deafening anti-Arab, racist propaganda. This terrible and destructive indoctrination has been going on for 17 years now. It is an attempt to convince the Israelis that we are surrounded by a mass of hostile Arabs, that there are far more of them, that we are under siege and that our strength is the only thing which will save us. With respect to the Arab people of Palestine, they are depicted as a primitive people---they are people, but not quite like you, not quite people. It is not a crime to kill them, especially since they will kill you if you don't kill them. And almost the entire world is on their side. We must therefore live with sword in hand in order to prevent new Auschwitz's. That is, they do not disdain such contemptible exploitation of the most terrible pages in the history of Europe, the fate of millions of Jews.

This sort of conditioning affects primarily and to the greatest degree the most backward, unenlightened groups of the society. In the elections they rejected Labor and gave their votes to Likud, to right-wing religious parties and even to the fascist-minded Rabbi Kahane. The latter, incidentally, proved to have many supporters in the Israeli Army.

[Question] You are speaking of broad segments of the society. How are they being affected by the crisis in Israel's economy, by the enormous foreign debt and out-of-control inflation....

[Answer] The debt amounts to tens of billions of dollars. There is a 3-digit inflation rate, a swollen military-industrial complex, the expensive occupation of Southern Lebanon, and so forth. I know what you had in mind: Why did the people not vote resolutely against all of this?

[Question] Yes.

[Answer] The fact is that broad groups of the population are not yet directly feeling economic crisis in their daily lives. The people have money. We are printing so much money that there is no longer enough dye. The government is plugging the people's mouths with this money, with subsidies for the increasing prices. There is no large-scale unemployment, and this is very important.

All of this can only last so long, of course. There is no such thing as miracles in economics. The crisis is upon us, and the establishment will ultimately have to treat it. I am afraid that this will be shock treatment.

[Question] As far as one can judge, the aggression in Lebanon also had a shock effect upon the Israeli society. Is that true?

[Answer] Yes, this is a special war. It is the first war on which there has been and is no national agreement. Who in Israel has spoken out against wars in the past? The communists and other fighters for peace, a relatively limited group of people. The aggression in Lebanon split up the society, even the army! Two thousand Israeli soldiers refused to serve in Lebanon, and hundreds of them went to prison for this. The protests against the war surged onto the streets for the first time. This war has opened the eyes of many people.

This is just one side of the matter, of course. Another aspect is that it is a war of chauvinism and extremism. The cruel have become even crueler, the aggressive even more aggressive. Even the deaths of soldiers--and there were extensive casualties in Lebanon--made no crucial difference in the minds of the people. We have become conditioned not to be horrified by death. At first we did not feel it when we killed Arabs, now we do not feel it when they kill us.

Racist, fascist tendencies have long been active in Israel, but this is something new. It is new in the sense that the forces of the world have been aroused. More people have begun listening to what the communists are saying and more people have come to understand where the unrestrained aggression can lead us.

[Question] What do you mean?

[Answer] A fascist-type authoritarian regime--you remember, I spoke of shock treatment? Many of our people are now making a comparison with Germany at the beginning of the 30's. Believe me, the danger is great. We must either turn into a normal nation or take the next step along the path we are following, and the next step will be fascism. Insane military outlays, the enormous foreign debt, uncontrolled inflation--how are we to cope with all of this? We must either resolve the Palestinian issue--and it can only be resolved by peaceful means--or seek another way out of the crisis, accept large-scale unemployment and a drastic lowering of the standard of living. This will not be easy, and we shall begin seeking a "powerful leader," a leader who will take control of the nation, establish order and discipline and disband all of these parties and groupings.... And we have such "leaders"--Sharon and others. One can already hear people talking about the need for a "powerful person" in Israel. Some speak of this out of naivete, others with a complete understanding of their objectives.

An enormous effort will be required to prevent events from developing in this way. Israel is terribly sick. We are destroying not only the Palestinians, but ourselves as well. Moral degradation is also fertile soil for fascism, after all.

[Question] Members of the recently discovered anti-Arab terrorist network, who have cold-bloodedly arranged the murder of totally innocent people, are certainly setting an example of such degradation.

[Answer] As an Israeli lawyer, I cannot comment upon their trial--there are corporate rules. As vice president of the League for the Protection of Human Rights, however, I shall say that this is a caricature, a disgrace. The sentences are simply absurd. One of the terrorists was sentenced to 18 months, and he brought in 40 mines to arrange an explosion in a mosque filled with people! Their hands are already bloodied. They have killed Arab students and Palestinian mayors. And the sentence is 18 months! On the West Bank, under the new law, Arab boys who throw rocks at the occupiers are given 10 to 20 years!

Who are these terrorists? Why do the police treat them as heroes? Why are they given special privileges even in prison? All of this is very simple and terribly simultaneous. They belong to the Gush Emunim movement, ardent supporters of the colonizing of occupied land. This means that they are of the Likud, its product, a product of the Israeli establishment! This accounts for the leniency on the part of both the justice system and public opinion.

[Question] As a legal expert and lawyer, how long have you been defending the Palestinian Arabs now?...

[Answer] ...for 17 years now. Since 1967, from the first day of the Israeli occupation. I appear in military courts in occupied territory and in our supreme court. At that time I was defending the fathers, now it is the children. For all these 17 years I have done this and thought about this day after day. This is actually my life. And you know, I am proud of those people whom I defend, whom I have been able to help in some way. They include some remarkable people, some real heroes.

[Question] Have any cases been won recently?

[Answer] Very few, only individual cases. You can ease their lot, however, and tell the truth publicly. You can prevent torture in the prisons and sometimes bring the scoundrels to accountability with your intervention. You can give a mother some news of an arrested son about whom no one knows anything and whom the occupiers could simply have killed without your intervention. When you succeed in doing anything at all, this means that another victory has been won. And my books serve that same purpose--to tell my fellow countrymen and the community abroad the truth about the situation in occupied territory, the truth about the excesses of the military and the courageous struggle waged by the Palestinians.

And there has been some improvement. At any rate, I am no longer referred to as "public enemy No. 1." Many people are beginning to understand that we need some sort of "bridges" to the Palestinians, although the wall of hatred in front of them is still very strong. Especially among our soldiers on the West Bank, even among the women and girls. They have a terribly distorted attitude. I sometimes think that the occupation is a tragedy not only for the Palestinians, but is to an even greater degree a tragedy for Israel.

[Question] You have returned to the Palestinian issue again. It would appear that all of Israel's numerous problems are related precisely to this issue in one way or another.

[Answer] Unless the Palestinian issue is settled, we can achieve neither peace on the West Bank nor the resolution of Israel's internal problems. This is the central, the key issue. It must remain constantly on the agenda until it is resolved. What is the main basis and the strength of the Soviet position on the Near East? They lie in the fact that the Soviet Union has consistently and steadily stood up for and demonstrated the most important thing all these years, the fact that Israel must remove its troops from occupied territory, that the Palestinians have the right to their own state and that the issue cannot be settled without the UN. It is all very simple and clear. This position was reaffirmed in a July statement by the Soviet Government.

[Question] Certain circles in the West attempted to belittle the importance of that statement, calling it a purely propagandistic move. Israel will not accept the Soviet proposals in any case, was their attitude, and Moscow has decided to "show off" once again for the Arabs.

[Answer] Just what did they expect? That the Soviet Union would abandon its positions of principle? That it would betray the Palestinians?

The appearance of that document and affirmation of the positions of principle have now been logically justified by the development of the political situation. Just look at the situation: Camp David failed, the Reagan Plan failed, the Palestinians have not been destroyed, Syria is vigorously opposing aggression, and the "peace agreement" imposed upon Lebanon has been abrogated. The Near East continues to live in a climate of war.

The Soviet statement was an important and timely political step. It underscored, as it were, everything which the Americans and Israel have done since 1977, when Sadat was brought to occupied Jerusalem. The Arab nations and the PLO support the Soviet proposals. Israel is isolated to an even greater degree. What is the USA going to do now? It must respond in some way. It may not respond today or tomorrow, but sometime in the future it will have to respond. With what? It will no longer get away with tricks involving separate deals.

[Question] Well, it has some veteran magicians....

[Answer] No, the time for tricks is past. Syria is no longer with them, and that says it all. Both the States and Israel will ultimately be forced to answer to the point as to whether or not they want this. Israel's government circles are still saying "no." They have always done so. For many years now they have said nothing but "no, no, no." They will not succeed in blocking the path to a just settlement in the Near East forever, however.

11499

CSO: 1807/110

FOREIGN TRADE BALANCE IMPROVING

Haifa ISRAEL BUSINESS in English No 401, Dec 84 p 3

[Text]

Israel's balance of foreign trade continued to improve at the end of the summer, for a substantial reduction of the deficit. During the first three quarters of this year exports were up by 14%, imports down by 1.5%, and the trade gap narrowed by no less than 21%.

Although these achievements attracted but little public attention in recent months, because they were overshadowed by a continuing contraction of the foreign currency reserves, by rampant inflation and by ongoing efforts to conclude a "package deal", they represent an important step forward.

Of major significance, in this context, is the 6.3% gain in farm produce exports, from \$ 369m. in 1983, to \$ 392m., which was achieved in spite of the rapid retreat in fresh citrus sales. Between January and September 1984, exports of oranges and grapefruit brought in \$ 107m., 22.3% less than in the same period a year earlier, but other fresh produce — fruit, vegetables, cut flowers and poultry products — more than made up for that.

Various branches of manufacturing also racked up high gains. The textile and garment industries increased their exports by 10%, almost 19% more chemical products were sold abroad and processed food sales went up by 23%. Most important, perhaps — because of their increasing importance in the Israel economy — was the 20.5% export expansion in the metals, machinery and electronics industries.

Relatively slow growth was reported by the country's diamond cutters. Their sales did increase by 24% in September alone, but the nine month total was only 4.1% ahead of the same period last year. The foreign sale of mining and mineral products — primarily potash and phosphate rock — remained almost unchanged, increasing only by a nominal 1%. Possibly this relative stagnation was also caused by the ongoing development of the chemical industry here, which tends to replace raw material exports with the sale of more sophisticated, and more profitable, processed chemicals.

The breakdown of Israel's imports during this period indicates that there also were significant improvements in this sector. Thus the foreign purchase of consumer goods declined by almost one third, saving the economy some \$ 235m. during the period under review. On the other hand, raw material and fuel purchases were up: for instance, Israelis bought 16% more rough diamonds, 17.2% more industrial raw materials and 16.2% more crude oil and coal. Some of those purchases undoubtedly went to bolster reserve stocks, bought while world market conditions were relatively favorable.

CŞO: 4400/54

EXPORTS TO ARAB NATIONS

Haifa ISRAEL BUSINESS in English No 401, Dec 84 pp 5, 6

[Text]

Some \$ 500m. worth of goods made in Israel are sold annually to the Arab world, according to an extensively researched article in *Forbes*, one of the world's most prominent business magazines. Such sales are in direct contravention of a boycott, to which most Arab countries claim to adhere.

The Arab world's refusal to buy goods made in Israel was designed to choke this country's economy to death. Although not nearly as detrimental as its originators would like it to be, it does cause not insignificant damage: cut off from their natural hinterland, Israel's farmers and manufacturers must work much harder to penetrate more distant markets, often at quite considerable cost.

In the long run, however, what was meant to be a curse may turn out to be a blessing in disguise. With large markets next door, this country's industry might have devoted its energies to the production of the low technology consumer goods which the Arab world still imports, eventually to be left high and dry when local production and imports from low wage areas expand. Since that way was closed to them, business executives here had no choice but to develop the high tech production capabilities, which allow them to sell in the more demanding, but also more profitable markets of Europe, America and the Far East.

But now it appears that the Arab boycott not only failed in its effort to prevent the Israel economy's development; it even cannot prevent the entry of significant quantities of "Zionist" merchandise into the Arab states. Although there is no way of checking the accuracy of *Forbes'* estimate, there is little doubt that some Israel exporters derive significant revenue from their direct or indirect sales to neighboring countries.

In recent years, of course, wide cracks have been opened in the boycott barrier. A peace treaty was signed with Egypt, considerable quantities of goods are said to be resold by Arab traders in the Administered Territories to Jordan, and quite an extensive trade has developed with importers in Southern Lebanon. In every instance, one may assume that at least some of the goods sold to those areas do not stay there, but move on to other destinations in the Arab world.

There also have been reports that certain importers in Europe specify that the Israel products they buy be unmarked, or carry some innocuous designation. Some of those shipments, it is said, are then relabeled and repacked for sale to Kuwait, Saudia and other Arab countries.

In some instances, *Forbes* and others have reported, consumers in Arab countries exert considerable pressure in order to get specialized Israel products. A good example are the trickle irrigation systems, developed here especially to meet the needs of arid zone agriculture. Seeing their successful application west of the Jordan, it is not surprising that farmers also want to use them to the east of that river.

When sanity once again gains control — as it inevitably must, in the near or more distant future — historians undoubtedly will find that the Arab boycott of Israel products was a significant factor in the Arab world's continuing technological backwardness. What the injection of billions of petrodollars failed to do could have been accomplished by regional cooperation and the neighborly exposure of young Arabs to the technology now available in the Jewish state. That, however, was prevented by the insane hatred that still rules in this part of the world.

That such hatred cannot be channeled exclusively against outsiders is demonstrated daily. Although rhetoric here focuses on enmity of Israel, of Jews and of the West, bloodthirsty action mostly proceeds in suicidal folly against other Arabs and Moslems. Events in Lebanon and the Iraq-Iran war are the outstanding, but most certainly not the only examples of such aberration.

In that madness, reports of Israel exports to the Arab world offer a welcome glimpse of sanity. Such trade becomes possible when people on both sides of the border act on their enlightened self interest. That some do so in Arab countries, in spite of official enmity and widespread incitement to hatred, also encourages hope of a better future.

EL AL OPERATING ON PROFIT AGAIN

Haifa ISRAEL BUSINESS in English No 400, Nov 84 p 3

[Text]

A very modest operating profit — \$1.6m. on a turnover of about \$450m. — was reported by EL Al Israel Airlines for the twelve month period that ended on March 31, 1984. Even though the overall profit and loss account still is negative — net interest payments alone amounted to about \$14.3m., adding up to a significant deficit — this is something of a milestone for the company, after six consecutive years of operating losses.

A profitable operation during most of its existence, El Al went into the red in 1978/79, when its operating loss amounted to \$16m. That was followed by a \$46.8m. deficit in 1979/80, the worst in its history, and results better only by comparison during the next three years.

To some extent, the reported progress was the result of slipping fuel costs — 13% less than in 1982/83 — and greater demand for air transportation. The seat occupancy rate averaged 73% last year, when El Al carried 1.3 million passengers, two thirds of them foreign tourists to Israel, one third Israelis going abroad.

However, the most important cause of this improvement undoubtedly was the prolonged process of belt tightening: the company reduced the number of its employees, trimmed salary levels and tightened up operating procedures. Its payroll now numbers only 3,700, less than two thirds of the number only a few years ago; wages and fringe benefits, now averaging about \$2,000 per month, are significantly lower than they used to be; and crew layovers, to mention only one costly expense item, have been eliminated on many runs.

EL-88

To a great extent, progress became possible because labor relations in the company have been peaceful, since the strike and lockout at the end of 1982. That is also the result of the greatly reduced power of the employees' representation: where any one of eight separate committees used to bring operations to a halt at the drop of a hat, industrial peace has now been maintained without a single mishap over a year and a half. Facing their company's imminent closure and the complete loss of their jobs apparently brought El Al employees to the conclusion that militancy would be ill advised.

The present operating profit is even more creditable, since it was earned in the face of an enforced sabbath close down. How much cessation of operations for about thirty hours every week really costs El Al remains a debatable point. However, there is no doubt that that decision — made for political reasons, to maintain religious party support for the coalition a couple of years ago — deprived the company of some of its most profitable runs. Thousands of people from Europe used to come here for nine day vacations, arriving early Saturday and going back on Sunday evening, a week later. Now unable to provide that service, various estimates place the damage at anywhere between \$6m. and \$30m. a year. Even at the lower limit, that is a substantial penalty.

Economists and other observers have raised many questions about the company's annual report, which some think unduly optimistic. Nevertheless, most agree that 1983/84 probably was an important milestone in El Al's far from easy struggle for renewed profitability.

CSO: 4400/54

LIQUID COAL PRODUCTION BEGUN

Haifa INNOVATION in English No 108, Nov 84 pp 3-4

[Text]

Haifa — A pilot plant for the production of "liquid coal" has been built on the premises of the Paz Oil Company here, at a cost of some \$ 200,000. Based on knowhow acquired from the United States, this installation can turn out about 10,000 tons a year of an economical liquid fuel.

First produced in Kentucky, about five years ago, "liquid coal" is an emulsion of powdered coal, heavy fuel oil and water, and treated by ultra sound waves. The emulsion is quite stable; even after prolonged storage, there is no precipitation of coal particles.

Israel authorities have taken several major steps toward the replacement of petroleum fuels with coal. Most important among these was the construction of a large coal fired 1,400 MW power station, and preparations are now under way toward the construction of a second such facility, with a capacity of 1,100 MW. The changeover of existing industrial plants to coal, however, constitutes a not inconsiderable problem, mainly because of the cost of replacing oil burners and the difficulties of handling a solid fuel.

The availability of "liquid coal" may help overcome those obstacles. The mixed fuel can be transported, stored and pumped exactly the way heavy fuel oil was, and it requires only relatively minor adaptations on most combustion systems. A changeover can be effected within a relatively short time, at minimal cost and without interference to other production processes.

Since coal is substantially cheaper than petroleum, for a given caloric content, economists estimate that a switch to liquid coal would be economically advantageous for all industrial firms that now use 3,000 or more tons of heavy fuel oil a year. That includes at least forty manufacturing enterprises in this country, among them leading chemical, mineral product and paper plants.

The pilot plant was set up by the United Coal Company, a firm owned by Israel's three major petroleum fuel distributors. A \$ 4m. commercial scale installation, capable of turning out 100,000 tons a year, is now in the planning stage.

CSIL 4400/54

NEW INDUSTRY IN JERUSALEM

Haifa ISRAEL BUSINESS in English No 400, Nov 84 p 4

[Text]

Efforts to develop Jerusalem's manufacturing industries have been made almost without interruption, ever since Independence in 1948. Both community leaders and the national government understood the need to diversify employment opportunities in Israel's capital: public services and government offices are not enough to support a healthy local economy.

In recent years, considerable progress was made on this account. Some forty new manufacturing firms opened their doors in the city, creating on the order of 1,800 new industrial jobs. Most of the new ventures can be classified as high technology enterprises, some of them leaning heavily on the University and other sources of well trained personnel in the city.

However, in spite of such growth, industrial employment still provides a much smaller portion of all jobs, than it does in other Israel cities. In Haifa, 21.9% of all gainfully employed people work in manufacturing enterprises; an even higher proportion — 23.7% — is reported for Tel Aviv. The corresponding figure for Jerusalem is only 12.3%.

That difference is more than balanced by the large concentration of public service employees in the capital. More than 45.1% of all Jerusalemites work in public administration and similar fields, including the extensive educational and health facilities in the city; the corresponding figures are 25% in Tel Aviv, and 30.9% in Haifa.

Although one cannot change the fundamental fact, that civil servants will be numerous in the seat of government, Jerusalem's city fathers still think it important to develop a viable and growing industry in their community. Already the home of several important manufacturing ventures, the city has the skilled manpower to support additional science based enterprises.

CSO: 4400/54

BRIEFS

PHOSPHATE PRODUCTION EXPANDING--Oron--Annual production of phosphate rock in Israel will be increased by almost one third, as the result of an investment program slated to cost \$23 m. The mines are operated by Negev Phosphates Ltd., a member firm of the government controlled Israel Chemicals group. During business year 1983/84 the company sold almost \$140m. worth of phosphate rock, nine tenths of that to customers overseas. In many European countries Israel supplies now cover between 10 and 20% of total demand, the most important other suppliers being Morocco and the United States. The present expansion program calls for substantial investments in new equipment, detailed studies of the only recently discovered Zohar field, and extensive additional prospecting activity. Much of the needed capital will come from the company's own resources; it reported profits of \$4.8m. last year. [Text] [Haifa ISRAEL BUSINESS in English No 400, Nov 84, p5].

CSO: 4400/54

BIRRI DISCUSSES CONTACTS IN U.S., SITUATION IN SOUTH LEBANON

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 82, 3 Nov 84 pp 11-12s

[Interview with Nabih Birri, minister of state for southern affairs: "War Erupted from South and in Its Liberation Lies Peace; Lebanese Are Required To Separate Liberation of South from Internal Reforms; Israel Will Have No Security If It Does Not Depart"]

[Text] Nabih Birri received us with his southern accent and in accordance with the southerners' customs.

With the language of the fighter resisting the Israeli occupation, the minister of state talked to us about the circumstances of the hardship, attrition and blockade under which the occupied Lebanese territories live.

With the logic of the politician, the chairman of Amal Movement talked about the difficulties facing political reform in Lebanon and about the solutions and projections he sees for this reform. But while talking of the abolition of political sectarianism, he speaks about being compelled to accept "the sectarian distribution of the top-level positions because politics is the art of the possible."

Many have jokingly described Nabih Birri as "the minister of nothing" because he is the minister of the constantly disrupted water and electricity resources, the minister of justice where the unjust language of weapons prevails and the minister of state for southern affairs at a time when state control is absent from the south, which lies under the yoke of the Israeli occupation.

But these inconsistencies have not prevented Nabih Birri from being an influential figure in Lebanese decision making, even though his rise derives from a sectarian presence in a country being shattered by sectarianism.

These and other issues were the focus of the interview conducted by AL-TADAMUN with Birri during his recent visit to the United Nations in the company of Prime Minister Rashid Karami.

[Question] What are the impressions you have formed, whether through projection of the Lebanese issue in the United Nations or through the meetings held with U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and with his assistance, Richard Murphy. What are the results that may be produced by these meetings?

[Answer] First, I would like to say that I believe that the political struggle is no less important than the struggle on the ground and the fight against the occupation with all means. This is why we have come to the United Nations and made a number of contacts with the ministers of foreign affairs to whom we are bound by common positions and from whose contacts and connections we may benefit. In assessing these contacts, I believe that we have achieved progress that may crystallize in important political steps. These words do not mean that the Israeli withdrawal and the liberation have come within reach. We are at the beginning of the path. But we have found that the path has become open to us. I will not say that I am very optimistic. But I am inclined now toward optimism, with extreme caution. We must not say beans until they are in the scales [we must not count our chickens before they hatch], as the Lebanese popular saying goes.

[Question] What is your interpretation of President Reagan's refusal to receive Prime Minister Karami? Do you attribute this refusal to the Lebanese government's adherence to its conditions not to agree to direct negotiations with Isarel in order to insure its withdrawal from South Lebanon?

[Answer] We have not learned of an official U.S. refusal. What has been issued is an unofficial statement. Our projection of the solution does not depend on an appointment with the U.S. president nor on Reagan's refusal or acceptance. What we are projecting is that the Lebanese army must gain sovereignty over every inch of its country's territories and that we must increase the number of the UN emergency forces and enhance their effectiveness. We will not agree to any negotiations outside the framework of the truce agreement. This is our position and it is up to the others to change if they want to meet with us. In addition to our projecting the political solution, there is struggle and there is resistance in the south, in Western al-Biq'a and in Rashayya. The two go hand in hand and neither will affect the other until the last Israeli soldier departs from the soil of the homeland. The political action will not affect the resistance until the occupation ends. It is then that the political action will be the fruit of the struggle. In other words, political action should serve the resistance, not vice versa.

[Question] What did you mean when you told George Shultz at the meeting you and Prime Minister Karami had with him that the Lebanese national resistance operations may extend to pose a threat to the security of the Galilee?

[Answer] What I said was not to this effect. What I said was that Israel has not been able so far to insure its security in the Lebanese territories it occupies despite the presence of tens of thousands of Israeli soldiers, so how will it be able to insure its security through the so-called Army of South Lebanon, which is commanded by Antoine Lahd? If Israel wants to stay in the south, it will lose not only the south's security but also the security of the Galilee.

[Question] You have said that the political solution to the situation in Lebanon emanates from liberating the south. Where has this liberation reached now?

[Answer] The political solution begins with liberation. Lebanon's problem started in the south. It is in the south that the fire broke out and it is there where it will be extinguished. The south is the fuel tank that provides fuel for the fire. Moreover, the internal political solution has a connection with liberation. But the liberation has its independent character, precisely because we believe that the Palestinian issue must be separated from the Lebanese issue, for example, so as to serve both issues together. The same applies internally. There are numerous liberation issues tied to humanitarian issues. We in Lebanon are required to separate the liberation issue from the differences over the internal reforms because all agree on the issues concerning liberation. For example, there are numerous differences over the army law and the army's structure. But all agree that the army must go to the south when Israel withdraws from there.

[Question] In the steps taken by the government for reform, we have seen the innovation of positions for the sole purpose of having a person from a certain sect fill them. Was this necessary? Moreover, don't you think that this entrenches sectarianism?

[Answer] What the question says is 100 percent true. The innovation of a position just to have this position given to a Shi'ite, a Sunni or a Christian is tantamount to circumventing the reform. This is true. The fact is that as national forces, we have not been able to achieve all the political reforms we want and aspire for. As you know, we have projected the political reform pertaining to job appointments in three words: "abolishing political sectarianism." But we have not been able to abolish it totally with our struggle. The Lausanne draft agreement, ratified in Damascus and issued in the cabinet statement adopted by the national unity cabinet, calls for abolishing political sectarianism in all jobs, except the top-level jobs. We have agreed to divide the jobs equally until we can bring about change. We thus find that we have taken a stride toward solving the problem. We cannot get all we want at once. Politics is "the art of the possible." With this art, we have gained what we have been able to achieve. We have discussed the issue of the army which we believe has the priority because of the role the army will have in the south. In our discussion on the defense law and on the top-level jobs in the army, the idea of introducing the state security intelligence position materialized because there used to be a state security directorate which was headed by Wadi' Haddad. This directorate was abolished and the State Security Intelligence Directorate has been introduced instead, provided that this directorate be tied to the Higher Defense Council, which is the Council of Ministers at present. Thus, we have been able to divide the various security leadership positions among the various sects.

[Question] What is your evaluation of the Arab support for the national resistance and for South Lebanon?

[Answer] "Let the words help if the conditions cannot" (verse from an old Arabic poem which begins with the words "you have no horses nor money to give in gifts.") There is verbal encouragement, but regrettably, the south has not yet received real Arab aid. In many cases, this resistance has been punished.

[Question] Can you explain to us the conditions in which the south, Western al-Biqa' and Rashayya live under the Israeli occupation?

[Answer] The fact is that there are two sides to the situation existing in these areas. The first side is embodied in the hardships experienced by the inhabitants of these areas under the Israeli occupation, such as the blocking off of the roads, the real attrition of the economy, the diversion of water and the plundering of agricultural crops. This means that it is a real blockade in every sense of the word. Added to this is another reality embodied in the organized official terrorism. Through its official secret intelligence agencies, Israel assassinates citizens in the occupied territories. We have more than one name and more than one incident that have taken place within this framework. The Israelis have often obstructed the delivery of flour to certain areas, even to the south in its entirety. I recall that a few days before I came to the United Nations, I was informed that ships loaded with flour and wheat were still docked in Sidon and Tyre ports and that the occupation forces were not permitting delivery of the wheat and flour to the south. On top of all this, the work of the Lebanese official departments is impeded, either through obstructing the official school examinations, obstructing the efforts to repair the electricity and water lines or preventing the paving of roads. Israel creates all these obstacles and impediments to make the hardship and lives of the citizen in the south, in Western al-Biqa' and in Rashayya insufferable, not to mention that we have reached an impossible state of despair. Let me add to all this the operations in which small villages with a population of no more than a few hundred are stormed with tens of tanks. The latest example of such operations is the recent operation against Sahmar. This is the first side.

But the other side is bright faced and might and it is a side to which every Arab aspires as an old dream. This side is the national resistance in the south, Western al-Biqa' and Rashayya and the resistance of the people of these areas against the Israeli occupation. This resistance started spontaneously with the start of the occupation. Its spontaneity is the spontaneity of the southerners themselves. This resistance by the southerners is not new to those who read history well and to those who recall what happened in the days of the French mandate and of the Turkish occupation. Those who know these things are well aware that these people never succumb. It is true that there are numerous heroes whose names have been distorted since the days of the French mandate, such as Adham Khanjar, Haris Hamzah, al-Mahumd and others, and it is true that there are endeavors at present here in the United States and in the West generally to distort the image of the southern heroes by coupling their resistance with terrorism and so-called international terrorism. But it is truly surprising that the charge of terrorism is stuck to those who defend their land and resist occupation in accordance with the UN charter and resolutions while the side that attacks people and usurps their will and their waters occupies a seat inside the United Nations and is viewed as a representative of civilization!

In any case, the south has said its word. While suffering the hardships we have described in the first part, the people are struggling to lift this injustice and they will continue to do so until the south and all of Lebanon are liberated.

[Question] Before we conclude the interview, there are two questions: some view the appointment of Joseph al-Hashim to succeed Pierre al-Jumayyil in the cabinet as a thorn in the side of Walid Jumblatt, considering that both men are from al-Shuf.

[Answer] It is all right. The newborn body is resilient.

[Question] You have called for the resignation of President Amin al-Jumayyil for a long time. How do you deal with him now?

[Answer] (sighing) He is a youth who lives in the 1940's. He dreams of a future but lives in the past.

8494

CSO: 4404/100

PHALANGISTS LOSE CONFIDENCE IN ISRAELI ROLE

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 79, 13 Oct 84 p 16

[Article: "Confidence Crisis Between Israel and the Lebanese Forces"]

[Text] Phalangist-Israeli relations are approaching the point of no return, and the Lebanese Forces consider the Israeli role in Iqlim al-Kharrub to be suspicious.

There has been much talk lately about a sudden Israeli withdrawal from the al-Kharrub region (in the al-Shuf region), and what that would mean with respect to the situation erupting and fighting breaking out similar to the fighting in the mountains. On this subject, informed Lebanese circles that visited Paris a few days ago spoke about a report that was presented to certain political and security authorities in Beirut and that talked about the goals of the withdrawal and about the success of the efforts leading to the postponement of the region's war and putting an end to it. The report wonders whether regional, international and local efforts would succeed in averting a catastrophe from the South, a catastrophe more fearful than that of the mountains and which would snuff out the last glimmer of hope of unifying Lebanon.

The Lebanese circles which visited Paris and which asked that they not be identified, say that the report, which was prepared by Western departments through their embassies in Lebanon and the region, and through investigations done by foreign reporters on their behalf, is as follows:

The al-Kharrub region now forms a vital artery connecting the coast around the capital Beirut to South Lebanon, and it is divided between two forces: the Progressive Socialist Party (which was able to control an important sector of it after the fall of al-Shahhar and the retreat by the Lebanese Forces from al-Mashraf and then al-Damur, in addition to its effective presence in the Sunni sector of the region itself) and the Lebanese Forces (which still control the coastal highway from al-Jiyah to al-Awwali). However, this artery has been closed to traffic to the south of the country since the fall of west al-Shahhar, and southerners who wish to go to or leave their towns and villages are left with only one of two ways:

1- By land by way of the crossing point at Batir.

2- By sea to al-Jiyah and from there to the crossing point at al-Awwali.

That is extremely difficult, but facilitated in part for Christians who avoid traveling by land in Druze areas to get to Jazzin, al-Zahrani, or Marj 'Uyun.

The report adds: the present situation in Iqlim al-Kharrub prevents the realization of the essentials of a Druze canton, about which there was much talk after the war in the mountains. But it seems that that is not definite, because Israel initially decided to withdraw from the South in stages, but it prefers a sudden withdrawal in order to achieve a number of goals all at once. Foremost of these goals are:

a - To revive the notion in world public opinion that it was not the direct cause of the fighting going on among the Lebanese, since the war broke out anew in Iqlim al-Kharrub as soon as it began to withdraw its forces.

b - The sudden withdrawal from al-Iqlim al-Kharrub will be towards al-Awwali River, where the forces of the Army of South Lebanon there, which collaborate with Israel, will be reinforced in number and with supplies. So when the Southerners pour out along the al-Iqlim coastal highway, they will run up against the harsh measures which this army will impose on them. Consequently, battles will occur with the forces of the Amal movement, which will rush along the coastal line, expending the line of confrontation and extending it close to al-Awwali while confronting the army of Lahd.

c - The goal of the Iqlim al-Karrub war, according to Israel's plan, is to connect the mountains to the coast and give the proposed Druze entity an outlet to the sea, or maritime depth. It is not impossible that this entity could extend as far as the port of Sidon, if Israel can avoid the international and local outcry that would erupt around it.

d - Among the indications of work towards establishing a "Druze statelet" was Israel's facilitating the commission of a massacre by groups of a particular sect in the town of Suhmur in the western Biqa', which was described as the beginning of a plan to force the Shi'ites to leave that region for al-Nabatiyyah, Tyre, and Bint Jubayl, provided that the Christians be forced to leave the areas that stand in the way of setting up an exclusively Druze region. Thus the aforementioned statelet would create a buffer zone between the south and the strategic Syrian lines in the western and central Biqa', and the danger of a return by the Palestinian resistance from Beirut, the mountains, or any other region. Lebanese authorities, party, official, and religious, have information which confirms the truth of this Israeli direction.

But what was it that postponed the Iqlim operation, or at least froze it? Here the report gives a number of reasons, including:

a - The surprise trip by the American assistant secretary of state, Mr Richard Murphy, to the countries of the region, bringing with him a plan for settling the timetable of the Israeli withdrawal and an agreement on security arrangements between Syria, Israel, and Lebanon.

b - The threat by the Lebanese Forces to close their office in Israel, and announce that they were breaking relations with it once and for all in the South and elsewhere, and issue a statement putting the blame on Israel for any harm that might befall the Christians in the border regions.

c - The visit by the assistant director general of the Israeli foreign ministry, Yitzhak Lior, to Beirut a couple of weeks ago or so, in an attempt to assess the Lebanese Forces and what their reaction might be if the Iqlim al-Kharrub operation were carried out, and his return from the Lebanese with impressions to the effect that Israeli-Phalangist relations were the worst they had ever been, and were so troubled they might have reached the point of no return. It is said that Yitzhak Lior heard harsh words from the leaders of the Lebanese Forces, who described the Israeli role as suspicious and unreliable.

Information circulating in Beirut says that Israel demanded that the Lebanese Forces withdraw from Iqlim al-Kharrub within a week, indicating that it would guarantee safe passage of these forces, in addition to guaranteeing the safety of people and property.

The report itself says that regional and international developments have frozen the Iqlim al-Kharrub operation, but that Israel has not given up on it.

It doubted the ability of the emergency committee for the South, which includes al-Iqlim, which had been formed recently by the cabinet out of representatives of Amal, the Socialists, the Phalangists, and al-Ahrar, to handle the rapid developments, and that the most this committee could do would be to prevent heavy losses in lives and property if a sudden withdrawal were to result in clashes and battles, because the formation of this committee without the execution of a security plan for the mountains makes its work very limited.

In conclusion, the report believes that things in al-Iqlim al-Kharrub and pertaining to the South will be frozen until after the American presidential elections, when the efforts will take on new forms and various dimensions.

12547

CSO: 4404/87

RIFTS IN SHI'ITE MOVEMENT ANALYZED

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 82, 3 Nov 84 p 16

[Article: "After Protocol Meeting at Residence of Missing Imam, Is Shi'ite Troika Moving Toward Concord or Toward Rift; Shams-al-Din Demands Return of Those Who Represent 'Legitimate Imam' Because He Believes Leftist Infiltration Controls Political and Security Helm of Amal Movement"]

[Text] Information received from Beirut and gathered by AL-TADAMUN correspondents in more than one capital indicates that there are interactions within the lobbies of the Shi'ite sect's leaderships which may lead to concord among disputing sides within these leaderships or to further rifts among them. Following is a summary of the most important contents of this information:

The meeting which took place on Friday, 9 October 1984, at the residence of Imam Musa al-Sadr and which included Husayn al-Husayni, the Chamber of Deputies speaker; Nabih Birri, the minister of state for southern affairs; Shaykh 'Abd-al-Amir Qablan, the paramount Ja'fari [Shi'ite] mufti; and Rabab al-Sadr Sharaf-al-Din, the sister of Imam al-Sadr, was a necessary protocol meeting in this phase to absorb the tensions rocking the base of Amal Movement.

This has been confirmed by sources close to Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams-al-Din, the deputy chairman of the Higher Shi'ite Islamic Council. Explaining the background of the meeting, these sources said that the meeting was held at a personal request by the wife of Imam Musa al-Sadr for whom the Shi'ite leaderships, especially the leaders of the Higher Shi'ite Islamic Council and of Amal Movement, have great respect and who is rarely denied a request because she rarely asks for anything or interferes in the sect's political or social affairs, in contrast to Mrs Rabab.

The sources have revealed that contrary to the reports saying that the meeting between al-Husayni and Birri discussed deeply the issues raised and the need to settle the pending differences between them--differences emanating from the competition for the leadership of Amal Movement and from the disagreement over its political line and over some of the movement's internal organizational issues--the discussion between the two did not go beyond courtesies and the exchange of reproaches at times and barely touched on the sect's political concerns and other affairs within a general theoretical framework.

Neutral Shi'ite circles have cited statements by the deputy chairman of the Higher Shi'ite Islamic Council on the meeting that gave the impression that the meeting was superficial. The deputy chairman said: "Sir, all we did was sit around and eat. All we want is that the legitimate power in Amal Movement be restored to those who are truly entitled to it." What is meant by Shaykh Muhammad Shams-al-Din's words is a reinstatement of the 16 members appointed in the past by the missing Imam Musa al-Sadr to the Amal Movement's Political Bureau so that they may run the movement and take charge of its affairs through having them assigned to leadership positions.

The 16 members representing the "imam's legitimate power" have scattered "all over the place," with only 3 of them remaining at the head of the movement: Nabih Birri, 'Akif Haydar and Husayn al-Yatim. Here are the names of the "legitimate members" who have moved away from the movement since Nabih Birri assumed its leadership and who are divided into a front that is opposed to Amal Movement's current leadership and another front that prefers to remain silent and not involve itself in what is happening: Husayn al-Husayni (Chamber of Deputies speaker), Husayn Kan'an (chairman of the Southern Council), 'Abbas Makki (a colonel), 'Ali al-Hasan (a physician), Malik Badr-al-Din (physician and hospital owner), Ahmad Isma'il, Jamal Mansur (a physician), Rafiq Shara (a painter), Muhammad Sa'd (from the cadres), Ja'far Sharaf-al-Din (ex-minister), Muhammad Ya'qub (clergyman), 'Abbas Badr-al-Din (a journalist)--both Ya'qub and Badr-al-Din disappeared with Imam Musa al-Sadr during the visit they made to Libya at the end of August 1978--and Mustafa Shamran (the first Iranian minister of defense in the first Iranian cabinet formed in the wake of Ayatollah Khomeyni's return from his exile in Paris under the chairmanship of Mahdi Bazergan; Shamran was killed under vague circumstances while inspecting the Iran-Iraq front and it was rumored at the time that he was killed in a plane crash.

Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams-al-Din ties his agreement to restore his relations with Minister Birri to their normal course and coordination between the Higher Shi'ite Islamic Council and Amal Movement to the reinstatement of the "imam's legitimate power" group at the helm in Amal Movement. Shams-al-Din believes that the leftist infiltration of Amal's current leadership controls the movement's political and security helm.

By examining what is happening in the Shi'ite arena, one can conclude the following:

1. The disagreement existing between Husayn al-Husayni, the Chamber of Deputies speaker, and Minister Birri "has been put in order" but not eliminated. The seeds of this disagreement continue to exist. What was achieved at the meeting, held to please Umm Haydar, the wife of Imam al-Sadr, who is dear to both the movement and the Shi'ite Council, did not go beyond a superficial framework.
2. Al-Husayni is inclined to perform his tasks as speaker of the Chamber of Deputies and to leave the political issues to Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams-al-Din and the issues concerning Amal Movement to Minister Birri because he is content with the chairmanship of the legislative authority and does not want to get involved in "headaches," as his sources say.

3. Minister Birri seeks to settle matters within Amal Movement in his political favor, especially since he has been able to contain the military command of Beirut District through his appointment of 'Aql Hamiyah as the official in charge of this district, in addition to his military responsibility in the movement, to replace Sa'd Jabir, the former official who is considered a supporter of Hasan Hashim, the chairman of Amal's Executive Committee.

4. Amal Movement fears that the dispute will move from the top down to the base, subsequently causing military clashes that may affect the movement's cohesion.

5. Rabab al-Sadr Sharaf-al-Din cannot engage in reconciliation efforts because some believe that she has entered the game of the axes and has projected herself as a "silent partner" in the leaderships of Amal and of the Shi'ite Council.

6. The family of Imam Musa al-Sadr is disinclined to involve itself in the ongoing conflicts. The imam's wife, Umm Haydar, lives in her home in Beirut far from the limelight and takes care of raising her two little daughters. The imam's two sons are outside Lebanon, one in Iran and the other still studying in the United States. The efforts to bring them back and to get them involved in any political or partisan action in Lebanon have been futile.

It is to be noted that those who follow what is going on in the Shi'ite arena in Lebanon and behind the scenes in Amal Movement believe that this arena will witness numerous developments and that the features of these developments began to emerge with the battle for the Chamber of Deputies speakership.

8494

CSO: 4404/100

PROS, CONS OF SELLING GOLD RESERVES DEBATED

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 84, 17 Dec 84 p 36

[Article by Ibrahim 'Awadah: "The Drop In the Price of the Pound Arouses Debate Over Selling Gold Reserves To Strengthen the Pound"]

[Text] Economic analysts in Lebanon disagree over how to deal with the fall in the Lebanese pound's exchange rate, and are suggesting conflicting ideas as to what the state must do to put an end to this serious monetary phenomenon, the likes of which was unknown in Lebanon even during its most troubled times, and the continuation of which threatens to destroy the remaining pillars of the Lebanese economy.

It is obvious, from looking at the many opinions and ideas proposed by this or that party for dealing with the deteriorating monetary situation, which became particularly serious in October when the price of the US dollar passed the 9 pound threshold, that some of them arise from the extremely pessimistic point of view that the economic collapse has actually occurred and that the only solution is to take radical, decisive, daring and innovative measures, even if the required rescue measures include declaring economic bankruptcy in spite of the serious, negative dangers involved. Those who subscribe to this view feel that the pound must be saved at any cost, and that the mistake must not be perpetuated for whatever reason, and are therefore suggesting the idea of selling the gold reserves (9 million ounces at US\$444.22 an ounce) which Lebanon uses to cover the exchange rate for the Lebanese pound. Alternatively, part of these reserves could be sold, and the dollars obtained from this sale could be used to protect the Lebanese pound. Other voices and views are categorically and violently opposed to such a suggestion, holding that Lebanon has not yet reached such a state of economic collapse that it has to sell its gold, even with the sharp decline in the price of the pound, the drop in productivity, and the increased general budget deficit.

Because of the importance of this monetary and economic situation, and in light of the vast difference of opinion as to how to deal with it, AL-TADAMUN met with Economy Minister Victor Qasir and Chairman of the Supervisory Committee of the Beirut Stockbrokers Association Muhammad Kamil Tabarah, a proponent of the gold reserve sale idea, and discussed with them the pros and cons of selling part of Lebanon's gold reserves to rectify its monetary situation.

Economy Minister Victor Qasir said, "There is no doubt that the monetary situation has become very serious, in light of the continual drop in the exchange rate of the pound vis-a-vis foreign currencies in general and the dollar in particular. During the last 9 months of 1984, these currencies registered a great increase, about 30 percent, over the pound. There is also no doubt that if this situation, which is basically due to the poor economic situation, continues, it will pose the threat of a true national economic catastrophe if steps are not taken quickly to confine its causes and effects and to adopt measures guaranteed to help strengthen the Lebanese currency.

"From what I have mentioned above, anyone who has studied Lebanese monetary and economic affairs can clearly see that the problem is primarily a political and economic one, and only secondarily a problem of market speculation against the pound. This means that merely achieving political stability will bring about economic revival and consequently the backing the Lebanese pound needs. Political stability will mean the return of Arab and foreign capital to Lebanon and the start of reconstruction, and thus increased productivity and economic stimulation. All of this will strengthen the nation's currency, especially since it is covered by more than 9 million ounces of gold, which was and still is the basic factor for the pound's local and international strength.

"For this reason, I say that the suggestion that the state sell the gold reserves used to cover the pound, or sell part of them and use the resulting dollars to restrict speculation against the pound, is out of place, unobjective and illogical. The Lebanese monetary problem is not one of speculation, but is a politico-economic problem. Furthermore, for Lebanon to merely express a desire to sell all or part of its gold reserves might partly hint at the possibility of Lebanon's bankruptcy, something which would have severe negative repercussions on the Lebanese economy and currency, especially on the international level, for Lebanon would thereby lose the trust of international financial and monetary organizations. Lebanon's name would be added to the list of 'bankrupt' countries, and Lebanese currency would become worthless. The Lebanese pound would become just like the Israeli shekel or the Turkish pound."

Supervisory Committee Chairman for the Beirut Stockbrokers Association Muhammad Kamil Tabarah, proponent of the idea to sell gold reserves to curb the price of the dollar and ensure the support the nation's currency needs, says, "The palliative cures which the state is relying on in confronting the serious decline in the price of Lebanese currency have been proven futile, the proof being the pound's fall vis-a-vis foreign currencies and the American dollar in particular throughout 1983 and during the final months of 1984. In 1983, the price of the pound as opposed to the dollar dropped 44 percent, and during 1984 it dropped by 30 to 32 percent. This proves that the currency measures adopted by the government to strengthen the pound have been ineffective, because they dealt with the results of the crisis when its causes should have been treated instead, through daring, practical realistic solutions, not through 'building castles in the air.' By this I mean that we should start with the following facts.

1. The Lebanese people have no confidence in the pound and are afraid to invest their resources in commercial, economic, financial or real estate fields.

2. The political situation is uncertain, and no one can predict when the Lebanese crisis will be solved. This has weakened confidence in the Lebanese pound and continues to do so.

3. The security situation is such that many Lebanese are leaving Lebanon to work overseas, in which case they take with them whatever national resources and savings they can carry.

"On these bases, we can see just how seriously the given factors in the country affect Lebanese currency, and therefore just how hard it is to treat them. At the very least, Lebanese currency remains subject to serious, unbearable pressures, which make it essential that the state act quickly and effectively to save the situation before it is too late--by selling part of the gold reserves used to cover the Lebanese pound.

"The gold reserves were created to protect the pound, so why not use them? If we don't, this gold will become a direct cause of all the tragedies we are suffering--currency inflation, the high cost of living, and continually rising wages. Besides that, this gold is like a weapon in the hands of an ignorant person who doesn't know when or how to use it. This was the case with Germany and Japan, both of which emerged from the war empty-handed, without gold or dollar reserves or any foreign currency, but which relied on a wise financial policy which brought them into the ranks of the rich, developed countries."

8559

CSO: 4404/123

MILITIAS PREPARE FOR STRUGGLE IN IQLIM AL-KHARRUB

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 84, 17 Dec 84 pp 74-77

[Article: "Iqlim al-Kharrub: Will It Become Another Jabal Once the Israelis Withdraw?"]

[Text] The "pot" of possibilities in Iqlim al-Kharrub and South Lebanon has started boiling faster ever since the Israeli leaders announced their decision to end the Israeli occupation of Lebanon in the next few months. On the other hand, the Lebanese government is faced with two facts. The first is the feeling of joy, happiness and delight on all Lebanese official, political and popular levels which the Israeli statement aroused, especially since it came at a time when the Israeli occupation authorities had stepped up their oppression, punishment and intimidation of the inhabitants of the areas they had occupied in the South, the western Biqa', and Rashayya. The superpowers and the international authorities involved have been unable to curb this Israeli intransigence either because of their inability to do so or because of their policies of international non-alignment.

The second fact is the mixed joy and fear, the wagers, and the wracking of brains as to what might happen to Lebanon should the Israeli khamsin winds blow. Experience is the best teacher, and the experience which is still fresh in the mind, and in the wounds and injuries of the disabled, the maimed and the victims (especially innocent ones) is that of the Israeli withdrawal from the Jabal. The proof is all the bloody incidents which followed their withdrawal from this mountainous area, which ever since the events of 1975 had been a most impressive model of coexistence and accord among Lebanese of whatever sectarian or religious affiliation, until the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 1982 and the accompanying deeds which split the people of a single village, and sometimes the members of a single family.

The experience of the withdrawal of Israeli occupation forces from the Jabal consisted of the displacement of hundreds of thousands of citizens, the killing of thousands, and the infliction of grievous material losses, which included blowing up the homes in entire villages, accompanied by a growing wave of consuming sectarian hatred. The situation remains thus in the Jabal, and the proof is unchanged to this day. This is why observers are making a

connection between what happened after the withdrawal from the Jabal and what might happen if there is a withdrawal from the South, the western Biqa', and Rashaya.

Senior Lebanese officials do not hide their fear that the game which Israel is playing might make the anticipated withdrawal a carbon copy of the earlier withdrawal from the Jabal. They are beginning to harp on their demand that the government take international and regional action to delay the Israeli withdrawal, saying that once it is carried out, it will leave behind it the same tragic sights and sounds witnessed in the Jabal. But the latest Lebanese government opinion, expressed by Prime Minister Rashid Karami himself, is that it is illogical for Lebanon to ask for international mediation in one form or another to convince Israel to delay its withdrawal until "the Lebanese house is set in order," so that the Jabal tragedy will not be repeated--rather, the Lebanese government must get ready to face any post-withdrawal contingency and select the best and least oppressive measure, even if it is the lesser of two evils.

In this case, sources close to the Lebanese prime minister are expecting the same kind of censure which the government met with prior to the Israeli withdrawal from the Jabal, when it mobilized all its international diplomatic and political facilities towards convincing Israel to delay its withdrawal. University of Lebanon Professor of International Law Dr George Dib, who has participated in the preparation of UN projects and who has influence among Lebanese government and political figures because of his academic standing, was one of the most heated critics, contacting senior officials who shared his viewpoint, especially Karami and Dean Raymond Iddih, for the purpose of expressing his censure.

This same picture, with some changes, is being repeated now. Among Lebanese officialdom, the scale has been tipped in favor of expediting the fortification of the Lebanese house and "defusing" any Israeli attempts to ignite sectarian incidents in susceptible regions, especially Iqlim al-Kharrub. But the question appears to be whether this region is fortified and strong enough to deprive Israel of any opportunity to sow more sectarian strife among the Lebanese people.

A Tour Of the Region

During AL-TADAMUN's tour of Iqlim al-Kharrub, the picture we got of the land seem, to a certain extent, incompatible with the desires for fortification, for, in the words of a combatant at Shahim (a village with two members in the Chamber of Deputies, 'Abduh 'Uwaydat and Zahir al-Khatib), entire villages had been changed into contact lines. This commando added that by "contact" he meant that entire villages in that area had been destroyed, and their inhabitants had fled, since the outbreak of fighting between elements belonging to the "Lebanese Forces" and others belonging to several progressive parties, particularly the Progressive Socialist Party.

Along the Sibliin axis, which overlooks the now severed Beirut-Sayda coastal road, a combatant said, "The military battles have not yet ended, at least as

far as we know. We would like to reach a definitive military solution, or a security plan like the one drawn up for the Jabal, in order to solve this area's problem. The security measures for the Jabal and Iqlim were not completed because of Israeli pressure, which took the form of not opening the coastal road at Iqlim. However, if this road remains closed, we will be forced to forcibly re-open it, no matter what the results are for Israel."

Speaking of the possibility of an impending confrontation in Iqlim al-Kharrub, another commando said, "Nothing is unlikely, especially since Israel has usurped our land and our existence. It is our duty to expel it from Lebanon at any cost. We are not one of those groups which has concluded a treaty with Israel. There is no fighting right now, because the security plan is keeping the general situation in hand. If this plan does not bear fruit, then the military option will be more appropriate. It is obvious that this plan is linked to the international resolution."

In short, all those bearing arms in Iqlim are standing ready. As a combatant at Bsaba said, they may not be able to learn what behind-the-scenes activities in the plot against Lebanon they should get ready for, but, he added, "We commandos feel that the outlook for the required solutions is obscured by dark clouds, and we are therefore getting ready for another round of fighting."

These very words, with the same phrasing and the same meaning, can be heard at whatever military position you enter to find out what is going on in Iqlim. Two combatants from the towns of B 'Asir and al-Za'ruriyah affirmed in unison, "It appears that Iqlim will never get accustomed to the atmosphere of accord being striven for there and throughout Lebanon."

Meetings With Political Leaders

But why are black clouds massing in this region? While the commandos were unable to put their fingers on what is going on behind the scenes right now, or what can be expected to happen, the politicians know best what is going on with the people of the house. Therefore, AL-TADAMUN met with some of the political and spiritual leaders of Iqlim al-Kharrub, including Mufti of Jabal Lubnan Dr Shaykh Muhammad 'Ali al-Juzu, who made the following comment on the situation in Iqlim: "All this talk about cantons is aimed at arousing the fears of Iqlim's inhabitants. Who is doing this? The enemies of the national plan, who are infuriated that Iqlim al-Kharrub is taking this noble stand in defense of its land, dignity and honor. In alliance with the Jabal and its brothers there, it has been able to withstand the attacks of its enemies. Cold war inevitably begins in times of peace. The intent is to defame the allies and friends who are standing alongside Iqlim during its tribulations."

Al-Khatib: A Buffer Zone

In response to AL-TADAMUN's question about why the security plan has not been implemented, especially since its success would guarantee the perseverance needed to face the vicious Israeli wind, Deputy Zuhayr al-Khatib said, "The

Iqlim question has obviously transcended its narrow, local limits and has become a question affecting all honorable Lebanese, because the situation in Iqlim after the Israeli invasion resembled the situation in the South before the invasion, particularly with regard to the plot to cut off the South and steal its water and resources. The Zionist plot clearly intends to make Iqlim a buffer zone between the South and the rest of Lebanon, as well as a barrier to protect the occupation from the possibility that the rest of the noble Lebanese might exercise their right to join and unite with our people in the South who are resisting the occupation, in order to drive it out of our land unconditionally. The purpose behind making Iqlim an internal barrier is to intensify the siege of the South, strike a blow at what it needs in order to stand firm, and destroy the foundations of its economy by preventing the marketing of southern goods or produce elsewhere in Lebanon, or else by increasing the cost of transporting goods and produce to the South. This extremely serious affair is aimed at exhausting the South on the one hand and the Lebanese economy on the other. Such measures are not in the least bit different from the grave, arbitrary measures which Zionism is resorting to in its attempt to empty the South of its inhabitants. All of this clearly shows how Iqlim al-Kharrub symbolizes the patriotic cause in Lebanon. For this reason, the application of the security plan must be considered in light of these facts. Opening the coastal road and breaking the siege of Iqlim has become a crucial patriotic duty, and is the single bold, serious step which can substantiate this plan."

Deputy al-Khatib went on to stress that the internal bleeding in the Lebanese popular body must be stopped, and emphasized the duty of "throwing ourselves into liberating the South and healing the split between it and the other occupied areas, in order to provide full support for armed popular national resistance activities to liberate the land, thwart Zionist plots, and drive them out. It is not enough to just declare solidarity with the national resistance; we must go on to take bold, practical steps to actually achieve this solidarity and this practical support for our resisting people."

Progressive Party: The Army Should Go Throughout Lebanon

The view of the Progressive Socialist Party, headed by Public Works and Tourism Minister Walid Junblatt, was explained by one of the party leaders, Dr Ibrahim Muhsin, who said, "The situation in the South is very sensitive. As you have observed, it took only a few days to implement the security plan in Beirut. The situation in the South is different, especially since it has paid dearly for liberation with hundreds of martyrs, hundreds of wounded and disabled, and material damages amounting to millions of Lebanese pounds.

"What conditions are we proposing for achieving the political accord which the South needs, as a first step towards implementing the security plan, so that the South can be a bulwark protecting the Jabal, Iqlim, and other Lebanese regions from the dangers which might take place after the Israeli withdrawal? The conditions we are demanding are national, not sectarian, conditions. How does the Lebanese government think it can carry out the security plan in the Jabal, or even in part of it? How can the security plan be implemented in the Shuf and 'Alayh and not in al-Matn Kasrawan and

Jubayl? Why does the Lebanese army, as much as we respect it, go into the Shuf and 'Alayh and take away our comrades' weapons, when not a single Lebanese soldier goes into Kasrawan or Jubayl? More than that, why isn't the army carrying out its duties yet in East Beirut?"

Dr Muhsin added, "All roads must be opened, and the army must go into every area. Only thus will we be right in saying that the national army has united all the areas into one, as a unification concept for the country. Is it wrong for Party Chief Junblatt to demand that the security plan for the two Jabals, or the two sections of the Jabal, be impartial and balanced, and that the coast and mountain roads be opened? When Walid Junblatt links the security plan with the political plan and political reform, he is taking a stand harmonious with the resolutions of the Lausanne conference. We should also point out that the 'other side' openly rejects the application of any security plan on any level. The living example is Dock No 5 at Beirut Port, which is still under the control of that party's militias."

Amal: Take the Situation in Iqlim al-Kharrub Into Consideration

In the opinion of the Amal movement, the command council of which is led by Minister of Water Resources and Electricity and Minister of State for Southern Affairs Nabih Barri, any security plan for the Jabal must take into consideration the situation in Iqlim al-Kharrub in particular, for this area, as Amal Political Bureau Member Dr Husayn Yatim told AL-TADAMUN, is part of the Jabal on one hand, and at the same time is a "bridge" to the South. Consequently, more attention must be given to dealing with the situation in Iqlim al-Kharrub, which is the bridge to the international road between Beirut, the heart of the nation, and the South, and the object of all eyes and hearts because of the continuing Israeli occupation.

Dr Yatim added, "We in the Amal movement, like the people of the South, and like citizens who view the facts with the naked eye, feel that once again the entire plan for the Jabal appears to be totally deficient and devoid of any nation-wide scope, because it does not yet seem to have extended as far as the al-Awwali River in Sayda by opening the coastal road, which remains cut because of existing conditions in Iqlim al-Kharrub. Therefore, any security plan of truly national scope must address itself to the South. The South begins in Iqlim al-Kharrub, where we must stand united, with our security plan, facing Israel. Here is the greatest test of our patriotism--our belief that Israel, by continuing to occupy Lebanese territory, constitutes a threat to all Lebanese of whatever sect. As long as the Jabal plan begins with al-Awwali, includes Iqlim al-Kharrub and the entire Shuf, and extends to Kasrawan and even Jisr al-Madfun, we will have found the solutions for all the problems, and will have removed all the time bombs along the coastal road between Beirut and al-Awwali."

What Do the Inhabitants Say?

It is clear from what the politicians say that the Iqlim area is still orbiting around evil, i.e. bloody possibilities, even though it is being asked to be a bulwark against Israel's attempts to "pepper the region with gunshot" and transform it into "another Jabal" when it withdraws from the South.

The fact remains that one of the strange, amazing differences is that this area is not under direct Israeli occupation, even though Israeli patrols do not hesitate, from time to time, to enter some of its villages and then withdraw in the direction of Sidon, in order to intimidate the people and shake the big Israeli stick in their faces.

Even so, the inhabitants of Iqlim seem to be "persevering," in spite of all the difficult conditions, the poor outlook, and the gruelling way of life.

Nazih 'Ammar, school principal in the town of 'Anut, told AL-TADAMUN, "The people are determined to survive and stay here, in spite of what has happened and what might happen. The biggest proof of that is the fact that we at the school are working almost as usual, and our students insist on coming to school, even on the worst days of shooting."

'Abd-al-Amir al-Ghawr, also of 'Anut, offers a different picture of the people's attitude which shows just how critical the situation is, saying, "The crisis encompasses all the villages of Iqlim. Foodstuffs are lacking, and vegetables are available only via the Biqa' or Sayda, and take almost a month to get here. When they reach us, most of them are spoiled and unfit for consumption. But we feel that there is a tax being levied on us which we have to pay, and its name is perseverance and bearing up under difficulties and troubles. It is a tax which we are paying with pleasure."

'Ali 'Isa, from the town of al-Wardaniyah, points out that the people of Iqlim are fully aware of the plots being hatched against their area in particular and their homeland Lebanon in general. Therefore, they are always prepared, as they say, to face threats. If they were not, Israel would scorn Iqlim and withdraw from it, leaving it as a buffer zone between the areas it is occupying in the South and the rest of Lebanon.

This was reaffirmed by a citizen of Darayya, Mahmud Rammal, who added, "We are mainly concerned with getting through this tribulation which we have suffered through for so long, and resuming our normal lives."

Shaykh Qasim Shams-al-Din, from al-Za'ruriyah, joins the conversation to answer a question about how Iqlim al-Kharrub could resume normal life. He says, "Iqlim was a fine example of Christian-Muslim coexistence, even in the worst days of sectarian strife in Lebanon. After the 1975 incidents, Iqlim remained a model of coexistence, brotherly love and harmony among its people, but everything changed after Israel came in. Maybe everything will change and return to normal once they withdraw from Lebanon soon, God willing."

These are some examples of what is being said in and about Iqlim al-Kharrub, all of which falls under one heading: waiting for the anticipated Israeli withdrawal. Will Israel succeed in bringing its devils into Iqlim in order to further violate the people's spirits and possessions after that withdrawal, or will the people, politicians and spiritual leaders of Iqlim be greater than the hellish game being played by Zionism and its tools?

8559

CSO: 4404/123

LEBANON

AL-JUMAYYIL MOVES TO WEAKEN OPPOSITION

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 85, 24 Dec 84 p 12

[Article by Husayn Karim: "After Obtaining Syrian Approval, Al-Jumayyil is Besieging the Opposition At Home and Encircling It Abroad"]

[Text] The clashes which occur from time to time in the capital and the mountains have proven that the war cannot easily be resumed just by closing a bridge or exchanging gunfire along the contact lines, or by government figures issuing questionable statements.

The war cannot be resumed unless three basic elements are present: (1) disagreement between the Lebanese and Syrian governments; (2) dissolution of the "National Unity Government," these two factors being inseparable; and (3) a blitzkrieg between Syria and Israel.

This time, no one is optimistic that Karami's soothing words, based on the principles the Lebanese prime minister believes in, will be of any use. In fact, other considerations are causing the opposition to be alarmed at the course of action the government is pursuing in its inter-Arab activities, with the intention of encircling the opposition on the Arab scene after having partially succeeded in doing so at home.

Nabih Barri's and Walid Junblatt's followers have experienced a case of "political confusion" as a result of President Amin al-Jumayyil's surprise moves, such as his visits to Libya and Algeria.

These circles feel that al-Jumayyil has decided to rely on "shock treatments" at present, as a preface to taking away some of the Arab support with which the opposition had armed itself in order to strengthen its domestic position vis-a-vis the government.

It is not strange for the Lebanese president to resort to such a method, now that he has realized that some Arab regimes are dealing provocatively with Lebanon by considering the interests of only one Lebanese faction, not the interests of Lebanon itself. Therefore, few observers were surprised when the Lebanese president told his Algerian hosts, "I have come to your country to learn from your revolution."

With this statement, al-Jumayyil was declaring that he is more revolutionary than Barri and Junblatt, and that his fervent talk, especially his call for "liberating Arab territory," far outdistances whatever the Amal and Socialist leaders have been claiming.

Some analysts have commented on the government's "pouncing" on the opposition's Arab "bases" by saying that it amounts to a coup through which the president hopes to encircle his opposition enemies on the Arab scene, now that he has gained Syrian support for all his steps so far to set the Lebanese house in order.

As part of this same tactic, unconfirmed press reports say that the Lebanese president is determined to "storm" the last strongholds of his enemies by means of a visit to Iran that he is seriously considering, the major effect of which would be on the Hizbollah and other radical organizations.

Great progress has apparently been made on the preparations for this visit, following two parallel approaches. First, Husayn al-Husayni, president of the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies, will presumably visit Tehran to feel out the Iranian leadership. Secondly, Lebanon wants Syria to make the arrangements for the visit, because of the excellent relations between Damascus and Tehran. The message which Khaddam carried to the Iranian leaders last Saturday presumably contained just such a Syrian request.

Circles close to the government believe that this visit, if it takes place, will have important repercussions on the entire Lebanese situation.

In one sense, it will please Nabih Barri, whom the Hizbollah and a faction within Amal considers the main obstacle to "Shi'ite aspirations." The Lebanese government will also be pleased, for its success in Tehran would be the first step towards weakening the radical Shi'ite opposition and its endorsement of Barri, who would then be freed of the anti-government stands he has taken in deference to the religious wing within Amal.

Although observers feel that Iran, which has its own considerations which revolve around its war with Iraq, will not go along with the Lebanese president's official move, since that would leave the field wide open for Shi'ite Saddam Husayn, the first signs have begun appearing in West Beirut with the move of Shaykh Sa'id Sha'ban, head of the "Islamic Unification Movement," from Tripoli to Beirut.

"Islamic Magasid Association" President Tammam Salam was the first to warn of the dangers to which the Islamic ranks might be exposed, when he appealed last week to the various organizations, especially Amal, to approve radical, decisive, "down-to-earth" measures to put a final end to the widespread excesses and offenses which have exceeded all bounds.

Such talk weakens the opposition's position in favor of the Lebanese government's activities on the Arab and international scene.

It is no secret that French President Francois Mitterand's visit to Damascus on 26 November was basically motivated by Lebanese factors. It is true that France aspires to a Middle East role in the near future, and considers Syria a cornerstone for this role. However, to a great extent, Syria's stands on regional and international affairs are governed by concern over Lebanon. Therefore, Mitterand sent his special advisor for Lebanese affairs, Francois Du Grosevoir, to Beirut to ascertain the Lebanese government's views on several points concerning the situation in Lebanon which the French president would be raising with Hafiz al-Asad.

For this reason, the recent agreement to station the Lebanese army along the coast road from Beirut to al-Awwali in the south and to Jisr al-Madfun in the north is considered another domestic success to be added to the record of Amin al-Jumayyil, who was able to bring Damascus over to the Lebanese government's point of view about the security plan for the Jabal. His continuing coordination with the Damascus government has helped make the opposition appear to be the "obstacle" to government plans, the delay of which might lead to the demolition of Syria's role in Lebanon, and has led to rapid, decisive Syrian pressure on the Lebanese president's opponents, Barri and Junblatt, for the purpose of making it easier for the government to extend its authority throughout Lebanon.

In this context, Amin al-Jumayyil's attempt at domestic and foreign "encirclement" of the opposition appears to have succeeded to such a degree that "political surprise moves" can be expected, which will gradually lead to transforming the "armed opposition" to his government into a "political opposition" according to the rules of the democratic game which had been played in Lebanon prior to the 10-year war.

8559

CSO: 4404/123

LEBANON

BRIEFS

PRIVATE SECTOR DEBT--The private sector debt during the first quarter of 1984 was 36.304 billion Lebanese pounds in current prices, compared to 33.927 billion pounds at the end of 1983. A Bank of Lebanon report on this subject said these debts have now come to comprise 52.38 percent of all influencing factors, whereas this percentage was less than 48.58 at the end of last year. The report explained that loans to the private sector in Lebanese currency comprised the major portion of loans to this sector, reaching 9.185 billion pounds at the end of last March, recording an 8.2 percent increase in the amount over what it was at the end of 1983. As for loans to the private sector in foreign currencies, they were 7.119 billion pounds in current prices at the end of March 1984, recording a 2.35 percent increase over what the level was at the end of 1983. [Text] [London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 79, 13 Oct 84 p 33] 12547

MEA 20 MILLION DOLLAR LOAN--Middle East Airlines - the Lebanese airline - has begun talks with some local banks on getting a financial loan that could be as much as \$20 million in order to cover part of its liquidity needs. It is known that the talks which the company's president, Mr Salim Salam, has begun with officials of the local banks aim at creating a bank consortium to give the company loans, as happened at a previous time. Mr Salam announced that the loan would initially be around \$20 million, though of course it would be paid in Lebanese pounds. It would be the biggest loan acquired by the airlines, and in fact the biggest loan recorded in Lebanon up until now. It is understood that MEA will mortgage one of the jumbo jets that it owns for the loan which it will get, on condition that it will have the right to use it after it is mortgaged to the lending banks by renting it at a cost close to the interest rate on the loan. [Text] [London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 79, 13 Oct 84 pp 33-34] 12547

RECONSTRUCTION BANK PROPOSAL--Amidst all the studies, reports, and portfolios that the Lebanese government turns to these days to solve the current economic crisis, the labour minister Dr Salim al-Huss has come out with a creative plan to help the private sector, enable it to stand on its own feet once again, and bring back its effective and influential role in strengthening the national economy. The plan referred to, which Minister al-Huss announced several weeks ago during a meeting with several industrialists, calls for the establishment of a "super" bank run by the Lebanese government and supported by long-term loans, by which it would take on the task of

strengthening the role of saving the Lebanese economy by granting the economic sectors long term **loans on easy** terms, especially after their real estate assets are reassessed at the current inflationary price. The plan does not reject the idea of the proposed bank financing two establishments in the event of a merger between them. As for the revenue account of the proposed bank, that could be between 4 and 5 billion Lebanese pounds (about \$700-750 million) of which about 25 percent would be in the form of capital covered by the Lebanese government. As for the rest of the proposed capital, the plan says that could be ensured through loans contracted by the government with a number of friendly nations, and Arab aid that it counts on receiving. The plan calls for limiting the duration of this super bank's operation to 15-20 years, after which it will be liquidated to pay its debts which will have comprised the major portion of its revenues. The plan talks about the proposed bank following a program to lift the barrier from industries with financial planning and the transitory money given to them. Also, the list of things this banking institution might be interested in is long, but the extent of its role depends on whatever credits are obtained from the network of banks in the private sector, which in 1983 was "34" billion Lebanese pounds. [Text] [London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 79, 13 Oct 84 p 34] 12547

CSO: 4404/87

PRIVATE SECTOR DIFFICULTIES EXAMINED

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 80, 20-26 Oct 84 pp 31-32

[Article: "The Saudi Private Sector Faces a Difficult Test"]

[Text] Has the reduction in income from oil revenues begun to cast a burden on the Saudi economy, on the private sector, to be exact? The reason for asking is what was reported recently about the bankruptcy of a Saudi-American company, and the financial difficulties reaching \$400 million faced by a large Saudi company.

The issue is important because it affects the private sector which the government is encouraging and nurturing.

It is preparing it to play the role of the prime mover of the country's economy so that the government can take its preferred place, which is for the private sector to carry out all economic activities except for arms importation and oil export. Questions increased when it was reported that one of the main reasons for the collapse of the two companies was the fact that the government was slow in paying bills owed to the companies.

The first company belongs to the Shabakshi family and is owned by the two brothers 'Ali and Fahd. Its fields of endeavor include real estate, publishing and printing, manufacturing and contracts. The family has not become bankrupt, and of the various companies in operation, only the contracting firm has problems; its debts amount to \$400 million to several Arab and Western banks, primarily the American First Chicago Bank, and the National Saudi Commercial Bank. The firm's main problem is that it took up three projects whose expenditures exceeded original estimates, which led to delays in completing the projects on schedule, which contributed to the delay in receiving payments from the government.

The three projects are: a building for the headquarters of the Ministry of Public Works in Riyadh, a housing complex for the royal corps in al-Jubayl and Yanbu', and the Dammam-Riyadh expressway. One of the factors causing the completion of these projects to be delayed was that some of them, such as the highway and the ministry headquarters, needed to have rocks shifted with explosives. That could only be done through the Ministry of Defense, which caused delays of up to six months in the timetable for completion.

The company is not in danger of bankruptcy, because it belongs to one of the oldest, most respectable families in Saudi Arabia, which has assets and property in the Kingdom, Egypt, and Britain valued at more than a billion dollars, so there is no fear from that aspect. The American bank Morgan Stanley has been asked to arrange a rescheduling of debts owed to the creditors.

As for the other company, it is Saudi Carlson, a Saudi-American company the majority of whose shares are owned by Prince Sa'ud Ibn Fahd Ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, chairman of the board of the Tihamah publishing firm. The company was building 416 villas for the King Sa'ud University at its new site outside of Riyadh. Slowness in paying what was owed to the company according to its sources, or because bills were not paid because completed work was not up to required standards, according to official sources, caused a severe monetary liquidity problem to occur which made it impossible for the company to make payments to its employees and workers or to pay other administrative expenses, all totalling between 7 to 10 million dollars. It happened that the senior administration of the company has fled the country, since Saudi law considers the administration to be obligated to pay all that it owes whether to the banks or the workers, and if it cannot those officials will be imprisoned until what they owe is paid. As a result of the flight of the administration and the halt to the company's operations, about 3000 Asian and Western workers were left without pay or anyone to take care of them.

These two events brought up the question on the extent of the effect of the reduction in oil income on the performance of the private sector. The question is important because during the past decade the private sector has developed expansively along with the economic upsurge of the past decade, which was characterized by the availability of vast opportunities for work and of large, quick profits of not less than 60 percent in various fields. The official support which the private sector received aided in that, for at that time for every contract it was paying 20 percent of the costs of the project at the time the agreement was signed, that to ensure rapid completion to encourage expansion of private sector activity. That was a measure that was ended when oil revenues began to fall last year.

Things began to change 2 years ago. The volume of oil production in the Kingdom began to fall, from over 10 million barrels a day in 1981 to just over 4 million barrels a day at the present time. Consequently, the state's budget fell from the record level it reached in 1981 and 1982, that being 313 billion riyals, to 260 billion this year, with a deficit of 45 billion riyals. The results of that were that some of the previous facilitations were withdrawn, such as giving 20 percent when a contract was signed, then the number of projects proposed each year dropped. In addition, they were extended over greater periods of time.

It must be emphasized that the government did not abandon the private sector to becoming a victim of the fluctuations in such circumstances; rather it took certain steps to lessen the effects of the shock and to ensure that that sector would get a larger share of the projects that the government puts forth. Heading those measures are three basic steps, which are: using a system of open bidding with regard to the projects, requiring foreign

companies to use Saudi contractors from within for the projects which they are implementing, and likewise to limit maintenance and operations to Saudi companies only.

With regard to the first decision, which was issued last year, a change was made in the bidding system. Previously, the minister had the right to invite four or five companies to compete for a specific project, and the basic purpose for that was to speed things up. As a result of the decision the situation changed, since King Fahd issued an order that all government invitations for bids be open to public bidding, giving enough time for all competing companies to submit their proposals. This decision has served two purposes. On the one hand, it has given all operating firms the opportunity to find out about projects and to approach them. On the other hand, it has helped in lowering building costs by up to 20 percent, as estimated by some officials such as Dr 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Zamil, representative of the Ministry of Trade, who believes that companies now have the opportunity to bid on 20-25 projects a year, something which for its part has allowed the citizens to be informed about the various development projects being carried out in the Kingdom through the public invitations to bid and the competition between the companies.

As for the second decision, it requires foreign companies that win in the bidding for contracts to give 30 percent of that offer to a Saudi contractor inside the country. If we took this year's budget as an example, we would see that it had budgeted 40 billion riyals for projects in the field of contracts, which means that about 15 billion riyals of that will go to Saudi companies 100 percent. The importance of this decision is revealed when the contracts market is reviewed. Most of it used to go to foreign companies, especially Korean ones; in a study by Saudi chambers of commerce for the years of activity 1977-81, it was shown that 161 billion riyals had been spent in the field of contracts, and that 20 percent of that had gone to Korean companies alone.

The third decision limited all works and maintenance operations to Saudi companies, and that means jobs in the range of 40-50 billion riyal's in this year's budget alone, and that figure is slated to increase, because as the basic construction projects are completed, the concentration will be on maintenance and operation projects, which are expected to get a third of the allocations of the fourth five-year development plan, on which work will begin next year.

In spite of all these government measures, the government expects private sector companies to work hard and depend on themselves completely without government support. In other words, this means that these companies will have to work hard in the fields of marketing, improving production operations, administration, and holding down costs. Companies that cannot keep up with the situation and follow the old practice of waiting for jobs and projects to come knocking will not be able to continue operating, and as Dr al-Zamil said, it will not hurt the government if such companies die.

In the case of the Shabakshi and Saudi Carlson companies, their financial problems were the result of several factors, including bad timing perhaps, some responsibility borne by the government because of its delay in making payments, the standards of administration of these two companies, and their preparation for the projects, which led in one way or another to their facing financial problems. However, it is difficult to assess exactly each side's share of the responsibility. It remains that many a loss can be beneficial, and that the climate has paved the way for the Saudi private sector to move on to firmer and better anchored foundations, with support from the government, within reasonable limits.

12547
CSO: 4404/78

DIVERSIFICATION OF INDUSTRIAL BASE SOUGHT

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 80, 20-26 Oct 84 p 33

[Article: "And a New Measure to Strengthen the Private Sector"]

[Text] Finally after a delay of several months, announcement was made of the establishment of the National Manufacturing Company in Saudi Arabia. The delay was not a result of bureaucratic red tape, as one might think, but rather because of a basic change in the structure of the new company. The Ministry of Trade issued the license necessary for the company's establishment in late September, after several government establishments which had been going to subscribe in it were withdrawn; they were: the Saudi Arabian Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC), the Public Investment Fund, the Social Security Establishment, and the Office of Retirement Pensions.

But to begin with, what is the "National Manufacturing Company"?

The idea of establishing arose essentially to strengthen the upsurge in industry which the Kingdom was experiencing, and to encourage the private sector to enter this field more effectively, especially since the government had undertaken the establishment of what are called basic petrochemical industries which can be employed in the manufacture of intermediate and final products.

Dr Mahsun Bahjat Jalal is the man who directs the operation of setting up the company, and he is one of the most prominent figures in the Kingdom's economy. He was among the first 70 students sent abroad to pursue their university studies, and he also has experience and expertise in the field of public works. He was a representative of the Kingdom to the International Monetary Fund, and he is on the board of directors of SABIC and chairman of the board of one of its subsidiary companies. He is also president of the Saudi Arabian-Tunisian Investment Company and the United Saudi Bank, one of the last banks that was made Saudi at the beginning of last year.

Dr Mahsun says that the company aims to support the manufacturing option, which he sees as more appropriate than something else to achieving the Kingdom's goal of diversifying the production base of the national economy. Dr Mashun presents several reasons to explain this point of view of his. There is the Kingdom's geographical location between three continents which makes it a strategic location for distribution; also, energy is cheap and plentiful, and there are basic industries upon which other industries can be built, and it is expected that 129 secondary industries and 283 supporting

industries can be established, which would provide 160,000 new job opportunities. In addition to all that, there is unlimited support of industry by the government in the form of providing services at token prices, providing loans of up to half the cost of the project, and waiving taxes for up to 10 years. One can add other factors such as providing liquidity through local banks, for which deposits last year were more than 70 billion riyals. Then the Kingdom as a whole is considered a free zone, since there are no restrictions on taking currencies in or out, and the duties imposed by the government on certain commodities do not exceed 4 percent.

It was decided that the capital of the new company would be 600 million riyals, and about 118 Saudi businessmen have been contacted, each of whom has paid a million riyals, in addition to the participation of every bank in Riyadh, the National Commercial Bank, and the Arab Saudi Investment Firm. So far half the proposed capital has been covered, and it is expected that it will be completely covered within 2 years.

The Manufacturing Company will be a holding company, in the sense that it will set up other companies to carry out operations. It is expected that a company concerned with investment affairs will be subsidiary to it, as well as another company for projects that will need the participation of a foreign partner because they will deal with fields having to do with high technology, and companies in the field of services such as information systems, administration, etc. But the question is, why has the government decided to keep away from the project and leave it completely in the hands of the private sector?

Even though it is the government's aim to encourage the private sector, it seems that this goal will have priority in the next five-year development plan which will start in 1985. Signs of this direction appeared when at the beginning of this year the government presented 20 percent of SABIC's shares to Saudi and Gulf citizens. So if the government has begun to divest itself gradually of its holdings in existing establishments, it has all the more reason to stay away from the start from new establishments being formed. SABIC's experience stirred reflection on another aspect which might have been a factor in the government's decision to leave the company completely for the private sector. For SABIC's shares that were presented met with phenomenal demand, as shown by the fact that the presented shares were covered fivefold. The reasoning proceeds thus: if there is enough liquidity as indicated by the fivefold coverage of the presented shares, why should the government intrude and compete with the people? Why not leave everything to them?

However, the Manufacturing Company will not be an ordinary company being added to those in which the field abounds. After the company began to take on its final form, the idea of the program of economic balance was presented. This is the program which requires the aggregates of the four American companies competing for the command and communication project within the Ministry of Defense, known as "Penninsula Shield", to invest 30 percent of the

value of the contracts which they win for projects in the Kingdom with Saudi companies. The National Manufacturing Company and SABIC are among the companies slated to play a role in this program which harmonizes with the goal which the National Manufacturing Company is striving to achieve, which is the diversification of the Kingdom's economic base through industry. On the other hand, the program aims at encouraging investment in the fields of high technology, and therefore it is expected that the company will play an important role in this area. Initial contacts have in fact been made between Dr Mahsun Jalal and representatives of these companies to explore the areas where the company might cooperate with the American companies. Dr Mahsum does not make a secret of how he sees this, for he often comments that when the company first arose, the project for economic balance had not yet seen the light of day, but now the National Manufacturing Company is the most likely candidate to enter and take part in it effectively, especially since the matter has to do with two basic goals which the program for economic balance and the National Manufacturing Company concur on, which are: diversification of the state's economic base and giving greater opportunities to the private sector.

12547 CSO: 4404/78

92

SYRIA

GOVERNMENT BRIEFS KLIBI ON ARAB UNIFICATION

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 402, 3 Nov 84 p 17

[Article by Marwan al-Mahayini: "Damascus for Arab Summit Beyond Camp David Lines"]

[Text] Damascus--AL-MUSTAQBAL has learned that Damascus familiarized Chadli Klibi, the Arab League secretary General, during his latest visit to Syria with the Arab situation and with its viewpoints on dealing with the deterioration in this situation, asserting that the unification of Arab ranks and the development of real Arab solidarity are tied fundamentally to a tendency toward a common Arab action that confronts effectively Israeli ambitions and U.S. schemes. Damascus also asserted that Syria, while ceaselessly seeking to establish a strategic balance with Israel, still believes that the battle against Israel is a comprehensive pan-Arab battle. Consequently, Syria believes that any Arab meeting or conference must seek primarily to strengthen the Arab position vis-a-vis the Israeli aggressive schemes which are allied with Washington and to cling firmly to the resolutions of the previous Arab summits, especially those resolutions rejecting Camp David and preventing its Arabization through allowing other Arab sides to slip into it. Among other things, Klibi heard from Damascus its rejection of any Arab meeting intended to give the Camp David path and those dealing with it absolution. He also heard from Damascus that it will only take part in Arab meetings likely to shoulder the tasks of continuing the fateful struggle against the fateful enemy. These circles underline the need for advanced and good preparations for any future Arab meeting so as to avoid makings its convocation the cause for further deterioration in the Arab position and for making things in the area even worse. Insofar as Lebanon is concerned, the Syrian efforts have focused on obstructing the endeavors to disrupt the security situation anew. Syria considers renewal of the infighting a serious setback for the major national accomplishments achieved by Lebanon through the reconciliation and salvation process. The Syrian sources have warned that Israel will resort, under the pretext of the so-called security wall of its northern borders, to touching off a number of serious explosions, using for the purpose the so-called army of Antoine Lahd. In its contacts with the various parties concerned, Damascus stressed the need for uniting and intensifying their efforts to confront the Israeli scheme and to liberate the soil of Lebanon, pointing out that all the other issues are subsidiary issues in the face of the dangers emanating from any new explosion in the security situation which is intended to prolong the Israeli occupation. An official Syrian source told AL-MUSTAQBAL that all the Lebanese brothers must realize that the coming phase will not be easy, that Israel will not abandon its ambitions easily and that they must mobilize their capabilities and unite their efforts to confront the dangers of this phase.

SYRIA

BRIEFS

AL-ASAD MOSCOW VISIT--Arab sources have said that one of the reasons for Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad's current visit to Moscow emanates from the Syrian officials' fear that they will lose their prominent position in the Soviet presence in the area in the wake of the Kremlin officials' contacts with the officials of a number of other Arab countries, not to mention the meeting which took place between PLO Chairman Yasir 'Arafat and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko. These sources add that the Syrian officials have expressed their concern over the latest Soviet activities in the area in private messages exchanged on the occasion of the conclusion of the Syrian-Soviet friendship and cooperation treaty. Moreover, diplomatic sources in the Soviet capital assert that the Gulf war and the resumption of Jordanian-Egyptian relations are among the points over which there has been disagreement in the "viewpoints" between the two sides. Al-Asad has expressed his annoyance with the increasing Soviet support for Iraq and has asked Moscow to denounce the Jordanian step, but the Soviets have clung to their position toward the Gulf war and have declined to denounce the Jordanian step. [Text] [London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 345, 22 Oct 84 p 3] 8494

CSO: 4404/94

GOVERNMENT FORCES KILL OVER 200 IN RETALIATION

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 12 Dec 84 p 24

[Text] Tehran—Central News Unit—It has been learned from reliable sources in Islamabad that 17 families, more than 200 people, were killed last week in the course of retaliatory operations by the Soviets and Afghans in northern Afghanistan.

The slaughter took place in the little city of Shal, in a state where most of the residents are Tajiks. The average Tajik family has at least 12 members.

It is reported that the Afghan revolutionaries succeeded several times in preventing military vehicles from using the strategic highway Salang, which connects Kabul to the Soviet Union, and in inflicting strikes on the occupying forces.

According to diplomats in Kabul, the Afghan fighters succeeded in destroying 25 government tanker trucks carrying petroleum to Kabul on 3 September. At that time Afghan government forces began two days of helicopter operations to clear the roadside.

The Central News Unit quotes AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE as saying that combined forces of the Soviet Union and Karmal's regime have dug new trenches to the east and west of Kabul, in order to prevent the penetration of Muslim rebels into this city on the fifth anniversary of the occupation of Afghanistan.

According to this report, three Soviet BM-21 rocket launchers have also been brought to the Kabul airport in order to meet attacks coming from the northern valley.

On the other hand, an Afghan Muslim rebel official announced in Peshawar that last week Muslim fighters overran an Afghan army base to the west of Herat and captured a large quantity of weapons and military equipment.

The report adds that Muslim rebels also destroyed a cement factory overlooking the main Herat road and killed a number of Afghan soldiers.

Diplomats in Kabul also report that a Soviet military transport plane was shot down on 25 November eight kilometers outside Kabul and all eight crew members were killed.

9310

CSO: 4640/198

MUJAHIDIN REPORTEDLY FIGHTING EFFECTIVELY ON ALL FRONTS

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 16 Dec 84 p 5

[Text] As a result of fierce fighting in Panjsher Valley of Afghanistan during the last four weeks, 300 Soviet-Karmal troops were killed while eight tanks and 22 army vehicles were destroyed. It is learnt that three fourths of the killed are Soviets. The Mujahideen's legendary Commander Ahmed Shah Masud has stated that the Soviet offensive had been frustrated and the advance of the invasion troops into the valley had been stopped by Mujahideen on October 26. According to the Commander the Mujahideen had been fighting with the invasion forces at five points in the southern part of the valley and they had foiled all attempts to reinforce the trapped Soviet troops. The air force was also active and the reports received till November 8, seven helicopters and three Soviet MiGs were destroyed during the recent campaign.

Convoy in Neemroze Attacked

The Afghan Freedom Fighters encircled a Soviet-Karmal military convoy coming from Zaranj, Headquarters of Neemroze near a place Lakhi between Dilaram and Khash towns. In the clash taking place at this point, the Mujahideen killed 14 Soviet-Karmal troops and destroyed two armored vehicles. In the fire exchange from the other side four Mujahids were martyred and nine were seriously injured. When the air cover was provided to the convoy the Mujahideen ended the encirclement and headed towards their area. Another report said that the Mujahideen blocked the way of the convoy by mining the area near Shehr-e-Safa on Kabul-Qandahar Highway. The convoy was going from Kabul to Qalat Ghilzai headquarter of Zabul Province. The two tanks of the convoy in the front line were destroyed by mine blasts by which the convoy's way was blocked. On November 3, the Mujahideen also succeeded in destroying a truck loaded with ammunition. When they received information about the reinforcement to the invasion forces from two sides--Qandahar and Qalat Ghilzai, the Mujahideen moved to their safe destinations. The fighting which continued for two days where 18 Soviet-Karmal soldiers were killed and several others were injured.

Karmal Commander and his Troops Defected to Mujahideen

The Karmal Commander of Sarobi Dam, 70 kilometers east of Kabul on Jalalabad Highway defected along with his troops and disrupted the power supply in the Afghan capital with the help of Mujahideen.

AAP sources reported from Jalalabad that the Mujahideen of Mahaz Milli Islami Afghanistan established contacts with Hassan Khan, the commander of security guard of the dam. On November 16 when the Mujahideen came to the dam, the commander told his men about his decision to join the Mujahideen. The Mujahideen with the help of Afghan troops cut off the power to Kabul and destroyed transmission towers and some installations of the power house. The power supply from Chak Dam in Wardak Province had already been suspended.

A Helicopter Gunship Destroyed on the Ground at Bari Kot

A Soviet helicopter gunship was destroyed by rocket fire on the ground in Bari Kot, border cantonment of Kunar Province in a surprise attack conducted by Afghan Freedom Fighters.

According to the sources of Agency Afghan Press, two helicopters brought ammunition and food supplies for the besieged force of Bari Kot cantonment on October 30. When the supplies were unloaded and the helicopters were still stationed on the ground, the Mujahideen equipped with rocket launchers hit a helicopter which caught fire by the rocket firing while the second helicopter took off and flew away.

According to another report, on November 1 two Soviet officers, one of them a lady, and two Karmal soldiers were killed during the attack by Mujahideen on Bari Kot. On November 2, three Afghan militarymen fled Dalgam post of Asmar cantonment and joined the Mujahideen. On November 3, the Soviets bombed Dara Devgil in sub-division Sokai where eight women and children were injured. Several houses were devastated by the bombing while dozens of cattle were killed. On November 4, a tank and a truck were destroyed and several soldiers were injured when the mine blasts took place at Babro Tangi, the front of Commander Mian Saeed.

The former Chief Justice of Afghanistan's Supreme Court Mr Justice Maulvi Fazlur Rehman Shinwari has said that Karmal administration is practically paralyzed in Afghanistan and the entire powers are in the hands of Soviets. It is to be noted that Maulvi Fazlur Rehman remained Chief Justice from 1971 to 1973 and was removed from the office during Sardar Daoud's regime. Talking to the correspondent of AAP Peshawar, Justice Fazlur Rehman said that most of the rural areas of the country had been devastated by the continuous bombing and shelling by Soviet forces. Mujahideen are very active in cities and rural areas. He explained that the Afghan issue could be settled alone through Jihad and Afghan masses were determined to drive out Soviet usurpers from their homeland. He maintained that the organizations of Mujahideen had no point of difference as they had common goals of bringing to an end Soviets occupation and revival of Islam.

Operations in Balkh

The urban guerrilla Mujahideen are reported to have launched operations in the Balkh Province.

According to the details a guerilla Mujahid contingent killed Din Mohammad, the Karmal Militia Post Commander in an attack inside Mazar Sharif, the provincial capital of Balkh Province. On October 26, the guerrilla group of Mohammad Qasim Javed captured a Karmal militia officer and seized two Kalashnikov rifles. The officer was going from his post to his home accompanied by a body guard when he was attacked. The body guard ran away leaving behind his rifle. The officer offered to surrender which was accepted, the arms were seized and he was handed over to the court of the liberated territory.

Soviet Bombers Killed 23 Afghan Women and Children

The Soviet planes bombed a caravan of Afghan civilians in sub-division Khost Farang of Baghlan Province in northern Afghanistan as a result of which 23 women and children were martyred and 15 others were injured.

The Agency Afghan Press sources said that over 100 Afghan civilians mostly women and children were on the way in sub-division Khost Farang to take refuge in the safe places after constant atrocities by invading Soviet authorities. The Soviet planes bombed the caravan in Deh Ghor area on November 12 due to which 23 women and children were killed on the spot. The Afghan civilians who managed to save their lives were able to move towards safe places picking up the dead bodies of the victims.

Guerrilla Operations in Laghman Province

The Mujahideen were reported to have destroyed a security post, two military vehicles and killed 13 Soviet-Karmal troops during the operation in Laghman Province. The Kabul-Jalalabad Highway remained closed for two days while three Mujahideen lost their lives.

According to the Agency Afghan Press sources from Jalalabad, a group of Mujahideen raided on the security post in Tor Char area on November 2, where the building of the security post was razed to the ground by rocket fires and two Karmal troops were killed. The Mujahideen seized the arms of killed soldiers and moved towards their hideouts before the counter attack.

It was learnt that a Mujahid Abdus Samad was martyred during the clash with Soviet-Karmal forces in the same area on November 6. The report says that two military vehicles were blasted with mines planted by the Mujahideen on Kabul-Jalalabad Highway killing 11 Soviet-Karmal troops in the vehicles. The traffic between Kabul and Jalalabad was suspended for two days after the operation. The Soviet planes in retaliation bombed the Mujahideen fortifications in which two Mujahideen were martyred and Commander Gul Nabi was injured.

Press Release

Afghanistan's economy has been badly affected during the six years of resistance movement in the country ever since 'Saur Revolution.' This was stated by the Karmal administration in a survey report which has recently been published. The losses estimated are equal to fifty percent of the total amount invested during the period of 20 years before 'Saur Revolution.'

CSO: 4600/175

PAKISTAN URGES INTERNATIONAL SOLUTION TO AFGHAN PROBLEM

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 17 Dec 84 p 24

[Text] Zia al-Haq: Pakistan wants a solution to the Afghan problem reached through international efforts.

Tehran—ISLAMIC REPUBLIC NEWS AGENCY—Pakistan says that this year more than 250 persons have been killed or injured by Afghan forces while crossing the border.

The Pakistan Foreign Ministry reports that there have been 61 violations of Pakistani air space by Afghan aircraft and 90 instances of border fighting on Pakistani soil, in which 144 persons have been wounded and 110 others killed. The statement adds that most of the casualties were Afghan refugees, and that the border between the two countries is constantly being bombed and fired upon by Afghan artillery. The two areas most heavily hit are Arando and Trimangal, where most of the casualties have occurred. According to the Pakistan Foreign Ministry, since 1978 Afghanistan has violated Pakistani air space 634 times, and has fired on its borders 131 times. Kabul consistently denies these accusations.

Zia al-Haq's Comments

General Zia al-Haq, President of Pakistan, said today: Pakistan can effectively answer Afghanistan's provocative acts at the common border of the two countries, but in order to avoid disrupting the peace in the area and in order not to create more problems for the people of Afghanistan, who are already suffering because of the presence of Soviet military forces and the aggression of the Kabul regime, Pakistan is refraining from taking retaliatory measures.

According to the Central News Unit, quoting from Peshawar, General Zia al-Haq said at the camp of the Pa Tan tribe, which resides at the Pakistan-Afghanistan border: The Kabul regime is seeking to disrupt the resistance of the Afghan freedom fighters by paying bribes to the natives and through the use of various channels. With regard to Afghanistan's air attacks on Pakistani border sites, General Zia al-Haq said: Some forces believe that they can change the government of Pakistan's position towards Afghanistan with such acts, but they must realize that they are entirely mistaken. General Zia al-Haq said: Pakistan wants a solution to the Afghan problem reached through international efforts.

The President of Pakistan said: Our relations with the Soviet Union have improved; apart from the issue of Afghanistan, we have no problems with Moscow.

General Zia al-Haq said: The extraordinary number of Afghan refugees fleeing to Pakistan has imposed a heavy burden on Pakistan's shoulders, and as a result the people of Pakistan are enduring economic problems arising from the presence of countless numbers of refugees. Zia al-Haq said: Because of its defeat in Afghanistan the Soviet Union is making propaganda that says Pakistan is making facilities available to Americans to enable them to help the Afghan fighters, but this is not true.

AFGHANISTAN

BRIEFS

GUERRILLAS REPORTEDLY SURRENDER--New Delhi (Dispatches)--One thousand Islamic guerillas fighting the Communist government in Kabul and its Soviet backers have surrendered in the province of Parwan Afghan radio claimed late Monday. The radio said "they (the rebels) brought with them mortars, recoilless guns, rocket launchers and other assorted weapons." The surrenders were marked by a celebration attended by the "Chief of the North Zone" and other officials, the radio said. The radio frequently reports the surrender of guerillas, but rarely in such large numbers. No independent confirmation of the report was available as the Afghan government refuses to permit independent reporters into the country. Meanwhile, Afghanistan accused neighboring Pakistan of repeatedly "lying" on alleged border violations. The Pakistani Charge D'Affaires was summoned to the Foreign Ministry in Kabul to be told that Islamabad's statement that two Afghan planes penetrated 15 kilometers (9 miles) into Pakistani territory and dropped bombs last week was a "baseless and blatant lie," the broadcast reported. A Pakistan government spokesman charged the past weekend that the pro-Moscow Afghan regime had violated Pakistan's airspace 634 times and its land border 131 times in the last seven years. [Text] [Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 19 Dec 84 p 1]

CSO: 4600/187

GERMAN-SWEDISH COMPANY TO PURCHASE FOOD PRODUCTS

Tehran BURS in Persian 21 Nov 84 p 5

[Text] A German-Swedish company has announced its readiness to purchase cherry jelly and tomato paste from the foodstuffs factories of Khorasan. The acting director of the above factories gave an interview to the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC NEWS AGENCY. While announcing this, he said: In implementing the plan to expand the above factories, which also include a three-ton refrigeration unit, talks were held with a German-Swedish firm, and this firm announced its readiness to procure refrigeration equipment in exchange for jelly and tomato paste. He said: The cost of building the refrigeration unit will be around 160 million rials, of which around 40 percent will be allocated for the purchase of machinery. In implementing the factory expansion plan, the fruit juice line, with a capacity of 2,000 tons of juice, has reached the final stage, and the company winning the bidding for machinery on this line will soon be named. It is hoped that by the end of the first three months of next year [21 June 1985] the above line will go into operation.

The acting director of the factory said that the nominal capacity of the factory's can assembly line under optimum conditions is 150 cans per minute. He said: Since last year, when there were 10 million tin forms in the factory's warehouses, around seven million cans have been produced. A number of the tin forms were lost to wastage, and a number also remain. About 1.5 to two million cans are yet to be produced. In the meantime, the necessary steps have been taken to procure the tin forms needed. Concerning the current year's production, he said: This year we had planned to produce five million one-kilogram cans of tomato paste, but unfortunately, due to the early cold in Mashhad and the shortage of tomatoes, this level of production was not reached, but three million one-kilogram cans were produced, which is 150 thousand cans more than the amount produced last year. Plans were also made to produce eight million cans of jelly, and we hope to reach this figure, because so far 6.5 million cans have been produced, and the rest can be produced by the end of the current year.

9310

CSO: 4640/186

IRAN

TALKS FOR TRADE EXPANSION WITH ALBANIA UNDERWAY

Tehran BURS in Persian 27 Nov 84 p 8

[Text] The first trade delegation at the level of the Ministry of Commerce from Albania has visited Tehran and been received by the Minister of Commerce of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Mr Shane Korbeci, Minister of Foreign Trade of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania, who came to Iran at the head of a four-person delegation, spoke to a correspondent from the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC NEWS AGENCY concerning the objectives of the trip by himself and his delegation. He said: The purpose of this trip by myself and the delegation with me to the Islamic Republic of Iran is to study the possibilities for expanding trade between the two countries Iran and Albania, as well as the greatest possible expansion of relations and cooperation in various areas. He added: Throughout our stay in Tehran members of the delegation will talk with their Iranian counterparts and exchange views concerning goods that the two countries can exchange.

Mr Hasan Abedi-Ja'fari, our country's Minister of Commerce, told the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC NEWS AGENCY concerning the Albanian delegation's trip to the Islamic Republic of Iran: Throughout their stay in Tehran, the members of the Albanian delegation will study areas for cooperation and goods that can be exported from Iran to Albania and vice-versa. It is expected that a list of goods that can be exchanged between the two countries will be prepared, so that they can be mentioned in the protocol which the Albanian delegation is planning for the conclusion of their visit in their Iran. In conclusion, Mr Ja'fari said: This is the first major commercial and economic group that has visited our country from Albania.

The report from the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC NEWS AGENCY states that the delegations which have come to our country from Albania in the past were mostly lower than then level of Minister; this was the first important Albanian delegation from a ministry of that country. The first important Albanian delegation after the triumph of the revolution in Iran was sent to the Islamic Republic of Iran two years ago.

9310

CSO: 4640/186

CLOSE TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAN, SOUTH KOREA CITED

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 22 Dec 84 p 2

[Text]

TEHRAN — Trade officials from the Republic of Korea said they were satisfied with their talks in Iran, and expressed the hope that the discussions would make a firm basis for future trade, IRNA reported Thursday.

The Korean delegation led by Deputy Commerce Minister Chol Su Kim held its final meeting with the Foreign Trade Deputy of Iran's Commerce Ministry, Mojtaba Khosrow-Taj, and reviewed its previous meeting with Iranian officials.

The Korean official said he is satisfied with his four days of activity in Iran and believed it was a base for strengthening and expanding of relations.

He said his country respected Iran's policy of "independence from Eastern and Western powers," and herself pursued "a program of cooperation with Third World countries," according to IRNA.

Iran's deputy commerce minister said "existing potentials could be exploited in the interest of both countries" and trade could expand.

Meanwhile, Minister of Industries Gholamreza Shafei'e said Iran would be interested in buying electronics, textile and steel products from South Korea if their quality and price met Iranian expectations, IRNA reported late Wednesday night.

Shafei'e said this in a meeting with the South Korean Deputy Commerce Minister Chol Su Kim Wednesday.

He said in return Iran would export raw materials and oil to South Korea.

The visiting Korean official said his country had experience in the mentioned areas and wishes to cooperate with Iran and buy Iranian oil in return.

South Korea would be fully prepared to work with Iran in the transfer of technology he added.

Kim later met with Deputy Foreign Minister in charge of International and Economic Affairs, Hussein Kazempour Ardebili, and discussed issues of mutual interest with him.

Another IRNA report said Thursday, Iranian officials said they were satisfied with the 20 locomotives purchased from the Republic of Korea last year and Korean officials said their country could provide Iran with rail equipment.

The satisfaction was expressed in a meeting between Iran's head of railways, named only as Khamoushi, and Korean Deputy Commerce Minister Chol Su Kim Thursday.

The Korean official expressed the hope that the purchases of the locomotives were a base for future relations and said his country could provide Iran with passenger and cargo wagons as well as rail equipment.

Khamoushi, who is also deputy minister of roads and transport, said Iran was satisfied with the locomotives but had no interest in purchasing cargo wagons since they were being produced domestically.

On the purchase of passenger wagons, Khamoushi said if current plans were implemented, there would be no need for their purchase, otherwise the purchase would be announced on the international market.

Khamoushi said in his visit to Korean Steel Mill Complexes, after which a number of agreements were signed, he had been satisfied with the quality of products.

The visiting South Korean minister also held talks with his Iranian counterpart, Abdul-Hussein Vahaji, on Wednesday for expansion of commercial cooperation between the two countries.

Vahaji said the volume of Iran's purchases from the South Korea had increased considerably in recent years.

He said both countries should try to strengthen and expand present relations through the exchange of commercial missions and that South Korea should exert efforts to supply Iran with "higher quality goods at more reasonable prices."

CS0: 4600/188

ARTICLE EXAMINES 5-YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 6 Dec 84 p 7

[Article: "Massive Five-Year Plan for Economic, Social, and Cultural Expansion"]

[Text] The five-year plan includes a set of the country's basic and fundamental priorities and establishes executive directions and procedures for achieving the country's future short-term goals.

It is clear that established goals should be made in the direction of a specific policy ruled by Islamic ideology in various areas, because under present conditions a correct perception of the country's basic needs eludes planners because of mistakes arising from shortsightedness, the lack of comprehensive command of the situation, and the resultant abundance of waste. Below is the text of a summary of some of the special issues of the fifth plan, prepared by the reconstruction crusade committee on statistics and planning, dealing with the Islamic Republic of Iran's first massive five-year economic, social, and cultural expansion plan.

In any plan, there is an overall ideological framework from which the plan's executive directions and procedures take their inspiration. In other words, it is the dominant ideology in a nation's culture that determines the goals of that nation's planning, and which also contains the paths and procedures for reaching those goals. If we imagine an ideology in which the goals are specific but the methods of attaining them are non-existent, we are not really envisioning an ideology. The reverse is also true. If we propose scientific and executive procedures, and we have specific goals in mind, we are talking in terms of an ideology.

For example, the claim is made that agriculture is the fulcrum for economic expansion, but the share of this sector in the country's gross national product is supposed to decrease from 15.3 percent in 1361 [21 March 1982 - 20 March 1983] to 14.2 percent in 1366 [21 March 1987 - 20 March 1988]. How can agriculture, under existing conditions in our country, be a fulcrum for expansion when its share of the gross national product decreases after five years? How is it that the growth in gross domestic product in the agricultural sector in 1982 is estimated at six percent, then it suddenly reaches seven percent in 1983 and remains at the same level until 1985?

The statistics and figures presented are deliberately intended to reach these goals, but what the resources and executive procedures for reaching these goals are and where they will come from is not clear. For example, agriculture is named as the fulcrum for growth in one place, but on page 57 we read that government guidance for investment and credit is to be in the area of creating, expanding, and evolving basic industries (in the areas of metals, raw materials, chemicals and petrochemicals), large industries, and strategic industries. Here nothing is said about agricultural

industries and basic investments in improvements for the country's fulcrum of expansion (agriculture) such as canals, dams, roads, and in general the growth of agricultural services in such a way that they form the major part of national investment.

In the area of transportation, construction, cultural and social services, and health and health care the statistics given appear to be imaginary and without regard for the country's existing resources. In view of the limitations, the attainment of the goals established in these sectors is not feasible. These goals are not compatible with the country's policy of political, economic, and social independence, and with the aim of selling a minimum of the country's national wealth. For example, in view of the shortage of teachers, educational space, the dispersion of villages, rural cultural problems, and other limitations, how can we expect to eliminate illiteracy among six- to ten-year olds in five years? Did the planners know of any executive resource that would provide 100 percent primary education within five years?

The country's tribes, which make up an important part of its social fabric, and who are the principal producers in the country's livestock industry, are not mentioned in this plan, and the government's general policy regarding them is not stated in this plan.

In general, until the legal problems in the agricultural sector (agricultural land and water), in the livestock industry (pastures), in the construction industry (urban lands), in industry (ownership, councils, management, etc.), in commerce (nationalization of foreign trade), and in other areas are solved, how can we anticipate growth in the various sectors with precision, and specify amounts of activity and investment? It is this very relationship between laws of ownership that determines the kind, amount, and direction of activity.

In general we must say that the statistics and figures in the planning report, by the admission of the authors themselves, are unreliable, and the relationship between resources and goals is in no way clear; it is not clear what resources we will use to reach the goals established. The spirit of this plan is the same spirit that reigned over the sixth plan of the detested former regime, which took us in the direction of exporting raw materials and importing intermediate industrial capital goods and which intensified our dependence on foreign countries. In the sense of the noble Koranic verse, "God will never leave the way to domination over the faithful open to the infidels," this would be in violation of the sacred law of Islam.

Under an Islamic government, planning must have the following two characteristics:

- 1 - It must not put the Islamic government in a state of crisis in which it is forced to abandon its primary precepts and resort to contingencies.
- 2 - It must be designed to relieve existing difficulties and move towards the implementation of the primary precepts of Islam.

It appears that it is necessary initially for the Majlis to specify as quickly as possible the legal relationships of the various economic sectors (especially ownership, trade, management, etc.), and then we must take steps in the direction of growth and greater independence by specifying agriculture as the fulcrum and the primary resource for expanding the country, along with the growth of factory industries for raising agricultural technology and producing necessary consumer goods.

In the area of agriculture, investments and resources must be allocated to this sector to whatever extent it can absorb them. The revival of unused lands, water conservation, insuring agricultural crops, and creating and expanding rural service centers and making them active by employing people who believe in the Islamic revolution are among the basic steps needed in this sector.

Reassembly industries must not be viewed as the country's industrial sector; these must be seen as dependency industries. The country's industry must be the very small production factories, which will gradually be able to produce the intermediate goods used in the reassembly plants as their production increases, so that this dependent sector of industry can merge with the independent sector of industry.

One of the blessings of Iraq's imposed war on the Islamic Republic of Iran is the recognition of the talents latent in our people. If an economic mobilization were to be mounted to bring forth the country's agricultural resources in the same way that the mobilization of manpower was used for the war, all committed talents would be utilized for launching and expanding this economic sector, and with the expansion of various procedures for cultivation and raising agricultural technology, this important task would be accomplished. This is how agriculture will really become the fulcrum for growth, industry will grow, and the foundation will be laid for an independent economy.

9310

CSQ: 4640/190

IRAN

FARS POWER PLANT REPORTEDLY UNDER CONSTRUCTION

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 12 Dec 84 p 22

[Text] Shiraz—On the auspicious occasion of the joyous birthday of His Holiness the Respected Prophet (Peace Be Upon Him) and Imam Ja'far Sadeq (Peace Be Upon Him), ground breaking ceremonies were held 40 kilometers from Shiraz for the Fars Province one million kilowatt power plant, with Dr Ghafuri-Fard, Minister of Energy, striking the first blow with a pick.

The construction of this power plant, which officially began in the presence of the deputy governor-general, the Fars region acting director of power, the general manager of Tavanir, and a group of Fars Province officials, will include four 250,000 kilowatt turbine generators, which will be powered by steam and hot air produced by four other steam devices.

According to this report, executive operations for the great Fars power plant will be in the capable hands of committed Iranian specialists, and 86.402 billion rials have been allocated in credit for its construction. The construction will take 66 months, and the plant will employ 1,000 people in its various sections when it goes into operation in 1369 [21 March 1990 – 20 March 1991].

The same report says that this power plant's main fuel will be natural gas, with an annual consumption after operations begin of 1,300 million cubic meters. Its secondary fuel will be fuel oil, which is to be stored in three 50,000 cubic meter tanks.

The great Fars power plant will also be dried by cooling systems, and the electrical energy it produces will be transferred to the 400.230 kilowatt post of Siman-e Fars and the 230.66 kilowatt posts at Pol-e Fasa and Pol-e Khan by means of 230 kilowatt lines, and it will have a worthy effect on improving the procurement of needed electrical energy in the area.

According to this report, the aforementioned plan also includes the construction of 1,000 housing units for plant workers.

9310

CSO: 4640/204

MONTAZERI: POSITIONS MUST BE FILLED BY QUALIFIED MILITARY

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 15 Dec 84 p 3

[Text] Qom—The commander of the revolutionary guards of the Islamic revolution, along with the deputy commander and representative of the Imam in the revolutionary guards, an operations official, and the Minister of the Revolutionary Guards met and spoke with Ayatollah al—'Ozma Montazeri.

At this meeting, after the gentlemen reported on the situation at the fronts and the full readiness of the combatants of Islam to defend Islam and the revolution, Ayatollah al—'Ozma Montazeri thanked and praised them and prayed for the victory of the brave combatants. He said: With the sacrifices that have been given by the people and the combatants at the fronts and behind the lines, it is incumbent upon all of us to pay greater attention to the problems, shortages, and lack of coordination which have been seen in some instances. As much as possible, efforts must be made to strengthen our valuable and experienced forces, and those with greater understanding of the fronts and war tactics who have ideas and views must be employed. He also stressed: This is not solely an affair pertaining to the revolutionary guards and the fronts, but actually it is necessary that we give greater discretion and room to grow in all organizations and positions to worthy, strong, and sincere people who have been with the revolution for years and whose commitment and passion for the revolution have been proven in practice. Otherwise, opportunists or weak people may claim to support the revolution and take on essential tasks, and consequently do damage to the revolution.

On the other hand, he stressed to those with views, plans, or problems in mind relative to an individual or a task that respect must be fully observed for officials, and they must not do anything that will give the enemy and the counterrevolution something to talk about under these sensitive circumstances. Confrontations and criticism must be entirely constructive, logical, documented, and completely free of personal interests or the desire for vengeance.

In conclusion, Ayatollah al—'Ozma Montazeri made the necessary remarks concerning greater attention on the part of revolutionary guard and mobilization officials to instilling in members of the guard and the mobilization a sense of their heavy and critical responsibility at the fronts, in dealing with various problems, in raising the level of their combat and military training, as well as in giving full attention to existing shortages at some of the fronts.

The Friday imams of Ilam, Razan of Hamadan, Khvorasgan, Duzduzani and Qorbani, the representatives of Tehran and Astaneh-ye Ashrafiyeh, as well as the Majlis representative from Khalkhal met and spoke separately with His Holiness Ayatollah al—'Ozma Montazeri.

According to the same report, on the occasion of the death of Ayatollah Fazel Qa'eni, a memorial service was held by the committed clergy of Iraq who were expelled and exiled years ago from Iraq for the children of the deceased at the meeting hall for Najaf residents living at the Qom Seminary. A delegation from Ayatollah al—'Ozma Montazeri's office attended the service.

BALUCHISTAN GOVERNOR: ARMS TRICKLING INTO OUR COUNTRY

Karachi DAWN in English 20 Dec 84 p 2

[Text]

QUETTA, Dec 19: Baluchistan Governor Lt-Gen. K.K. Afridi has said, over the past five years there is a full-fledged civil war going on in Afghanistan. Obviously the spillover effect of this gruesome undeclared war will have some manifestation on this side of the border."

In an exclusive interview here, he said, "all the same our government is alive to this fact that arms are trickling through unfrequented routes in our country." The government, the Governor added, has taken all possible measures to check this menace effectively.

Replying to a question, the Governor said, Afghan refugees on their arrival in Pakistan are asked to declare their weapons which are deposited in government Malkhana. These weapons, he added, would be given to the Afghan refugees when they return to their homes with dignity and in safety.

The policy of the government regarding carrying of arms is very clear. He said, no one is allowed to carry arms without valid licence.

Referring to the strength of Afghan refugees in the province the Governor said, "we have over seven and a half lakh Afghan refugees living in over 60 tentage vil-

lages. It means that every seventh man is an Afghan national."

These Afghan refugees, he added, are concentrated in only five out of 17 districts of Baluchistan which make the local vis-a-vis Afghan ratio still higher.

Over the past years, Governor Afridi added, the local population as well as the Afghan refugees have shown a lot of cooperation and understanding.

Referring to relationship between Afghan refugees and the locals the Governor said one must accept that small incidents here and there between the locals and the Afghans have taken place but at the same time he emphatically stated that the abedience shown by the Afghan refugees to the law of the land is commendable.

Meanwhile, the Baluchistan Governor said that the Election Commission, in coordination with the civil administration has started work at full speed for the forthcoming National Assembly and Provincial Assemblies elections in accordance with the Aug 12, 1983 plan given by the President Gen. Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq to the nation for the return of a representative government in the country.

CSO: 4600/178

ECONOMIC POLICIES, PLANNING CRITICIZED

Karachi DAWN in English 22 Dec 84 p 5

[Article by Shahid Kardar]

[Text]

THE misgivings expressed by some on the poor distribution of Pakistan's economic growth has invoked a sharp response from the regime's intellectuals in the Planning Commission and the related departments.

The case presented by these articulate spokesmen of the regime is a lucid and sophisticated analysis of the problems being faced by the Pakistani economy and the policy measures necessary for laying the foundations of a potentially dynamic economy. It has been so well argued that it can draw society's attention away from the policies which have relentlessly penalised the have-nots.

They argue that Pakistan's development potential is no longer shackled by the scarcity of food and foreign exchange - the constraints operating upto the mid-seventies. The more significant problems facing the economy are the low productivity and inefficient management of the public and private sectors and the lack of infrastructural facilities - electricity, transport, safe drinking water etc; — and social services — education, health etc., especially in the rural areas. They claim that the low productivity in the manufacturing sector is the logical outcome of a scenario in which an ill-organised management is up against an indisciplined labour force using strong arm tactics.

Farm sector

In the agriculture sector sufficient quantum of readily available inputs would serve the goal of 'Rural Development'. Electrification of villages, provision of farm-to-market roads, and availability of social services will, according to them, "liberate the areas through such development even in the present circumstances". A significant amount of economic and political power would be transferred to the poor and although this, they acknowledge, "is not an ideal solution it is far better than any solution provided in the past".

For some "there are other issues which in our context are perhaps more important than that of land redistribution, how to give security of tenure to tenant farmers, how to increase the cropping intensity of large holdings and how to increase the productivity of the small farmer." The importance of socio-economic factors in tackling the problems of agricultural growth is recognised but then passed over in favour of these 'other institutions' which can bring about an effective participation of the small farmers.

These spokesmen would acknowledge that rural institutions have been unable to serve the poorer farmers. Given the inadequacy of resources it is not surprising that they are siphoned off by those dominant on the rural scene. The failure of rural institutions to uplift the target groups is not because of any inherent bias in the

since Pakistan was an Islamic country there was no need for enforcing Islam like that. Some of them even said that the Islamic laws were not needed in the present day world.

The President said some of his friends were of the view that in referendum the decision to enforce Islamic order should not be put at stake because it was not known what fate it would meet. They contended that it was difficult to anticipate the tide of popular will.

But, the President said, he and his colleagues did not agree with this line of thinking. So it was decided to have the question of Islamic system and continuity put to the people. This had to be done because the system given by the Holy poverty of public services and poverty of soul".

For some of its supporters at the World Bank, the Government's statistics, which were earlier sighted as evidence of the dynamism of the economy, despite the poor cotton and wheat crops, now appear to be overstating poverty and understating savings, investment etc. for the model to acquire legitimacy the Government's own figures need to be disbelieved and correspondingly ignored.

Policy measures

But the proposed strategical framework disregards the constraints on development imposed by the historically determined class and social structures. It only makes passing reference to the need for a structural change in the entrenched power system controlled by the rich and powerful sections of society, composed of the large farmers, capitalists, traders and contractors—groups whose interests will determine the future course of the economy. All the objectives, the related policy measures and the means adopted to ameliorate the lot of the poorer sections of society will only succeed if approved and supported by these interests. There is this deliberate abstraction of planning for growth from the structural relationships prevalent in society, thereby revealing their ulterior anti-poor motives and aspirations.

It fails to explain why the poor are poor. They are poor because they do not have the resources at their command which can guarantee them adequate food, clothing and shelter. An analysis of this control over resources will necessarily require an examination of the whole power structure, the social location of political power and the concentration in a few hands of the community's productive assets. Mere increases in the availability of inputs will not alleviate poverty unless preceded or accompanied by the destruction of the power structure controlled by an oligarchy which is determined not to concede its socio-economic hegemony, e.g. rural development for the less privileged will require a socio-political structure which will facilitate the implementation of such policies. But, unless these structural relationships are altered, all the benefits accruing from the inflow of more resources will be appropriated by the already rich and powerful.

On the practical front, for an economy precariously dependent on remittances to the extent of 2.8 billion dollars a year, the future, given the recent fall in these remittances, hardly looks promising. If they were to stagnate at around 2.8 billion dollars, instead of rising at 10 per cent per annum, as assumed in the Sixth Five Year Plan, the current account deficit of 2 billion dollars projected at the end of the Plan will in fact rise to 3 billion dollars. This will also considerably worsen our ability to service our foreign debt which at 10 billion dollars is understated on account of the exclusion of the 3.2 billion dollars worth of "peanuts". Moreover, the consumption pattern and the size of the domestic market are determined by the distribution of income. These factors and the investment pattern likely to be generated by the import liberalisation measures being pursued by the government will make the economy more dependent on imported technology and equipment, thereby tying its fate to its capacity to export.

The policies to encourage exports will require liberalised imports to acquire the levels of sophistication and technological

upgrading necessary to compete in international markets. This in turn will require more exports to pay for these imports setting in motion a vicious circle of exports to settle import bills followed by imports to increase exports and so on. It is important to note this because if the agriculture sector does not achieve the growth rates and production levels projected in the Sixth Plan, the constraints imposed by a small domestic market will put greater pressures on the economy to export, possibly through exchange rate adjustments or larger export rebates, even if only to finance the import requirements of the industrial sector.

There is repeated emphasis on an urgent need for deregulation through relaxation of administrative controls. The operative controls ought to be those relating to prices and incentives. In other words, the less known their activities to the public, the better for business confidence. The private sector obviously prefers policies which will make it less subject to public scrutiny and will make it easier for private investors to obtain concessional finance through all possible channels — which will include getting some of their units declared 'sick' and in urgent need of help.

Soft-sell approach

The soft-self approach suggests that given the past failure of the public sector in augmenting resources its sphere of activities should be pruned and the available resources more fruitfully employed in meeting demands for the development of infrastructure and programmes for social services. Therefore, it is argued, it is imperative that the private sector be called upon to speed up the industrialisation process. The entrepreneurs would consequently have to be courted through reasonable incentives and facilities. The underlying motive is the pressure on the government to supplement its resources to meet the swelling defence and administration expenditures. This enhanced role of the private sector is expected to accelerate domestic resource mobilisation measures.

With over 40 million inhabitants of the Islamic State below the age of 15, the changing face of the industrial structure is cause for deep concern. The Government's political and economic measure have assisted in bringing about an increase in the value of production of the large-scale industrial sector by 275 per cent, the assets employed in

production by 260 per cent but an absolute reduction in the level of employment.

The belief that the bureaucratic and administrative network can decentralise the process of planning, economic policy and control cannot be reconciled with a political set-up which operates in complete contrast to the requirements which such a devolution will demand. To this Dr. Haq would say "The fault with the Ayub era was not the Martial Law nor other aspects. It was basically that the whole philosophy which ... left out the important ingredients of distribution." But the failure to create institutions like a free Press, free legislature, free judiciary etc. has fathered a social crisis and heightened the sense of frustration faced by the smaller provinces.

The Government through harsh legislation has stifled all demands for a more rational way of resolving the crisis posed by the central questions — the issues of greater and more fundamental decentralisation of the power structure and a more equitable distribution of the pool of national resources. The ban on any meaningful discussion on national issues by rejecting compromise and by seeking total submission threatens a holocaust too painful even to imagine.

PAKISTAN

REFERENDUM MANDATE FOR ZIA HAILED

Karachi DAWN in English 22 Dec 84 p 6

[Text] Karachi, Dec 21--The nation's mandate in favour of President Gen Zia-ul-Haq was mailed by various religious, cultural and social organisations here on Friday as a vote of confidence in his policies for the Islamisation of society and the country's stability.

Thanks-giving Day was observed in the city and special prayers were offered by Friday congregations for enforcement of a true Islamic order in the country.

The Mayor of Karachi, Mr Abdus Sattar Afghani has expressed satisfaction over the outcome of the nationwide referendum and said that an overwhelming majority of voters cast their votes to reaffirm commitment to continuation and consolidation of the Islamisation process. He hoped the confidence reposed by the nation will be fully honoured.

Prominent among others who have congratulated the President for victory in the Referendum are Maulana Irshadul Haq Thanvi, Mr Abdur Razzak Rajwani, Member, Majlis-i-Shoora, Maulana Firozuddin Rahmani, Maulana Ahmad Sagheer Shahzada, Mr Fayyaz Ahmad and Pir Syed Baqar Shah Gailani.

Meanwhile, people listened with great expectations to the nationwide broadcast of President Zia-ul-Haq and appreciated his reference to the prospective general elections.

Popularity proved

APP adds: Maulana Zakarya Kamdar, Minister of State and President's Adviser on Haj in a statement, said that the overwhelming success of the President in the Referendum had proved his popularity and established the fact that about hundred percent people in Pakistan want an Islamic system.

He said that the voters had strengthened the hands of President Gen Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq and his government for carrying on the Islamisation policies for another five years.

The Maulana also hailed the President's post-Referendum speech on Friday in which he called for national unity and mutual understanding among the people of Pakistan.

PAKISTAN

BRIEFS

PRISONERS PARDONED IN PUNJAB--Lahore, Dec 21--About 13,000 convicted prisoners in the Punjab province are likely to benefit from the remission granted by the President on Friday. Approximately 500 prisoners may be released on Saturday, it was learnt. Sources said that the 28 jails in the Punjab had a total population of about 28,000 prisoners. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 22 Dec 84 p 1]

ZIA REMITS PRISONERS' SENTENCES--Islamabad, Dec 21--President General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq on Friday announced the grant of special remissions to prisoners undergoing various terms. In his address to the nation on radio and television networks, the President said that the prisoners serving terms of 14 years or more would be granted one year's remission. The prisoners serving seven years term of imprisonment or more would get six months' and those serving less than seven years but more than one year three months' remission. He said that the prisoners with one year or less than one year's imprisonment would be granted one month's remission.--APP [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 22 Dec 84 p 1]

ARRESTED FOR DISTRIBUTING PAMPHLETS--Gujrat, Dec 21--City Police have arrested Ch Mohd Tufail, joint secretary, defunct Tehrik-i-Istiqlal Punjab, along with a local leader, Mr Safeer Hussain Shah, on the charge of distributing pamphlets against the referendum and the present government during the Punjab Governor's visit to polling stations here. Talking to this correspondent at the lock-up, Ch Tufail Mohd accused the city police of harassing his relatives and taking into custody his ten-year-old nephew until he gave himself up for arrest. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 22 Dec 84 p 2]

GHAFOOR ON REFERENDUM VOTING--Karachi, Dec 21--Prof Ghafoor Ahmed, Naib Amir of defunct Jama'at-i-Islami, has said that the elected institutions establish their credibility only when people are confident that their representatives have been elected through honest means. According to a local Urdu daily, the Jama'at leader said that in his opinion at the most 20 percent of the voters exercised their right of franchise in the December 19 referendum. He said he neither cast his vote nor visited any polling station, staying home on the referendum day. He said that it was the doctoring of the election results in 1977 that angered people and made them come out on roads. He said a political vacuum persisted despite the referendum and this could have unpleasant consequences. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 22 Dec 84 p 6]

ELECTION ARRANGEMENTS REVIEWED--Islamabad, Dec 21--The Election Commission on Friday reviewed in detail arrangements for holding the forthcoming general elections to the National and Provincial Assemblies. The meeting, presided over by the Chief Election Commissioner, Mr Justice S.A. Nusrat, was attended by the Members of the Commission. The meeting suggested various measures to improve the arrangement for holding the general elections. The members of the Commission who attended the meeting included Mr Justice S. Usman Ali Shah, Chief Justice of Peshawar High Court, Mr Justice M. Rafique Tarar, Judge of Lahore High Court, Mr Justice Alley Madad Shah, Judge of Sind High Court and Mr Justice Qadiruddin Choudhry, Acting Chief Justice of Baluchistan High Court. Chief Election Commissioner Mr Justice S.A. Nusrat thanked the staff and officers of the Election Commission Secretariat for their hard work and unstinted cooperation in holding referendum on Dec 19. He exhorted them to work with greater zeal and devotion for the holding of the coming general elections.--APP [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 22 Dec 84 p 8]

CSO: 4600/178

END